Designing the renewed European defence policy through permanent structured cooperation. Why?

ABSTRACT

As the COVID-19 crisis has evidenced, Europe is currently facing non-traditional, hybrid threats and challenges to its public order and security that question traditional, stand-alone responses. Conscious of this, during the last decade the European Union (EU) has developed several tools to deal with those security threats and challenges jointly by making full use of the Lisbon Treaty provisions. Indeed, in addition to the strengthening of the policies and instruments of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), the EU has particularly boosted European defence cooperation within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since 2016 through initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo). The aim of these defence initiatives is twofold: on the one hand, to complement AFSJ instruments to protect the EU homeland and its citizens; on the other, to enhance its response to international crises and contribute to international peace and security. A matter of future concern will be, nevertheless, to sustain the political momentum after the COVID-19 socioeconomic crisis and to show the positive externalities of enhancing defence cooperation in fighting non-traditional threats and challenges, notwithstanding the many difficulties that it will encounter in its uncertain path.

KEYWORDS:

• PeSCo
• defence cooperation
• CSDP
• European Union
• international security

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest to be reported.

Notes

1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (PeSCo Decision), OJ L 331, 14.12.2017, p. 57–77.

2. “PESCO is an ambitious, binding and inclusive European legal framework for investments in the security and defence of the EU’s territory and its citizens. PESCO also provides a crucial political framework for all Member States to improve their respective military assets and defence capabilities through well-coordinated initiatives and concrete projects based on more binding commitments. (…)”. Annex I to PeSCo Decision, 70 (emphasis added).

3. “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. (…)” (emphasis added). Nevertheless, inclusiveness has prevailed over this initial level of ambition in the official launch of PeSCo, “largely the result of a German push for inclusivity” (Blockmans and Crosson 2019, 4).

4. “PESCO is a framework driven by participating Member States and remains primarily within their remit” (PeSCo Decision, 75).

5. The possibility of traditional inter-State wars may not, however, be totally discarded in the European and national policy documents, as the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 or the recent rising tensions in the Strait of Hormuz or the Eastern Mediterranean have demonstrated.

6. In Spain, for instance, the Ministry of Defence («https://www.defensa.gob.es/») deployed more than 8,000 military personnel under Operation “Balmis” to disinfect hospitals, train and bus stations, airports and other public spaces and buildings, and to set up field hospitals in several cities particularly affected by the pandemic. In other Western countries, such as France and Germany, armed forces played analogous functions. See Lațici, Tania. 2020. “The role of armed forces in the fight against coronavirus”. EPRS Briefings, PE649.401. Available at «www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank»

7. Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, 8910/20, Brussels, 17 June 2020, particularly paragraph 4. See Fiott, D. (2020) ‛Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence’. EUISS Brief No.16; and Biscop, S. (2019) ‛From Global Strategy to Strategic Compass: Where Is the EU Heading?’. Security Policy Brief, 121.

8. European Commission (2015). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The European Agenda on Security, COM (2015) 185 final, Strasbourg, 28.4.2015. This document calls inter alia for the further reinforcement of the links between the AFSJ and the CSDP “to bring together all internal and external dimensions of security”, in particular against the three priorities identified in this general document, as well as in their specific strategies: fighting terrorism and foreign fighters, serious and organized crime, and cybercrime. Additionally, the Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015–2020 (Council of the EU 2015, 9798/15) also asked for synergies between CSDP and the AFSJ, but no further attention was paid to defence as a means to protect EU internal security.

9. As Antonio Sanahuja argues: “More than just a policy document stating means and goals, the EUGS may be perceived as an exercise of discursive power […] in which the EU tries to redefine its identity and legitimacy, and generate support through some kind of narrative identity and self-legitimation in which it grants itself a key role as regards Member States and the citizenship in times of existential crisis, centrifugal tendencies and constrictions due to its own institutional structure.” (Sanahuja 2018, 18) (author’s translation).

10. Concerning the message and instruments to tackle them, compared to the 2003 European Security Strategy (European Council 2003), the EUGS security narrative is more pragmatic, less idealistic. Indeed, the EUGS calls for a renewed “principled pragmatism” that endorses the enhancement of the CSDP and the construction of strong common defence capabilities by means of PeSCo, following a realpolitik with European features (Biscop 2016) aiming at greater “strategic autonomy” (High Representative (HR/VP) 2016).

11. That is, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (Council of the EU 2016b), the European Defence Action Plan (European Commission 2016) and the Common Set of Proposals for the Implementation of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (Council of the EU 2016c).

12. In his 2014 Political Guidelines, the former Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker stressed the need “to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defence matters” (Juncker 2014, 11), and he was one of the main supporters of including a specific heading in the Community budget to fund common research and capability development in the defence sector. The Von der Leyen Commission has continued these efforts both at the policy and organizational levels. The role of the European Parliament remains, however, still limited despite the progressive enhancement of its powers under the Lisbon Treaty in other areas, such as the AFSJ. It has, inter alia, the right to scrutinise the implementation of the CSDP and to address the High Representative (Article 36 TEU), as well as to supervise the CSDP budget (Article 41 TEU).

13. See, for instance, the Action Plan against Disinformation [JOIN(2018) 36 final (5.12.2018)] and the successive reports on the implementation of the Security Union [e.g. COM(2019) 552 final (30.10.2019)].

14. The restructuring of Airbus («https://www.airbus.com/newsroom.html») and Alestis («https://www.alestis.aero/») are just two examples, also having a strong impact on the auxiliary industry.

15. Even if they are participating Member States in PeSCo, Austria, Ireland and Sweden are considered neutral/non-military countries either due to legal requirements laid down in their constitutions (Austria) or as a self-imposed policy (Ireland and Sweden). Malta, on the contrary, has enshrined its neutral policy into its constitution, and is not taking part in PeSCo.

16. One of the PeSCo commitments is to increase defence investment expenditure to 20% of total defence spending in the medium term, as well as the share of expenditure allocated to defence research and technology with a view to nearing 2% of total defence spending. However, according to NATO and EDA official statistics only several participating Member States would reach this figure in the medium term (Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Poland, and Romania) and many of them are far from this collective benchmark. In Luxembourg, Spain and Belgium, for instance, total estimated defence spending in relation to their GDP represents only 0.55%, 0.92% and 0.93%, respectively.

17. Since the 1999 Tampere European Council, in which the AFSJ was officially endorsed, the EU institutions have been calling for greater coherence of those internal and external policies dealing with security.

18. Articles 42 (7) TEU (mutual defence) and 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, TFEU (solidarity clause). Additionally, according to the EUGS, “[alongside] external crisis management and capacity-building, the EU should also be able to assist in protecting its Members upon their request, and its institutions. This means living up to our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity and includes addressing challenges with both an internal and external dimension, such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber and energy security, organised crime and external border management.” (High Representative (HR/VP) 2016, 19–20). However, the only invocation of the mutual defence clause was the call to the EU and its Member States by the French President at the time, François Holland, in the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks.

19. Council of the European Union, Cooperation between CSDP missions/operations and JHA agencies, 14,265/17, Brussels, 20 November 2017.

20. According to Article 42 (1) TEU, “the Union may use [CSDP civilian and military assets in] missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security…” (emphasis added). However, this should not prevent the potential deployment in the territory of the EU of CSDP missions and operations, in line with the provisions laid down in the mutual defence and solidarity clauses.

21. In Spain, for instance, the Military Emergencies Unit was created in 2005 as a joint force within the armed forces providing disaster relief throughout the country mainly, and abroad if required. In France, the military Opération Sentinelle was launched in 2015 to protect sensitive points of the country from terrorism. Equivalent operations were launched too in Belgium and the United Kingdom.

22. «https://www.edrmagazine.eu/the-pescos-european-patrol-corvette-epc-programme-gains-momentum».

23. Project details available at «https://pesco.europa.eu/».

24. According to the priorities for civilian crisis management [EEAS (2017) 1281] and the Concept Paper for the Strengthening of the Civilian CSDP [EEAS (2018) 435], the fourth priority defined in the Feira European Council in 2000, civilian protection, “is no longer applicable within CSDP”. It should be considered to be covered by other EU instruments, such as the Civil Protection Mechanism. Close cooperation between the CSDP and the Mechanism should be, however, ensured, since it is well known that “European armed forces may increasingly be called upon to participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in response to environmental crises, or to become engaged in conflict in such areas.” (Kepe et al. 2018, 15).

25. More information on the 2018 CDP and related documents available at: «https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/capability-development-plan».

26. These are: “Joint crisis management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions surrounding the EU; Joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations; Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations inter alia using the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission-tailored Force package; Substitution/executive civilian missions; Air security operations including close air support and air surveillance; Maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe; Civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising, training) inter alia on police, rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, resilience, response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions; Military capacity building through advisory, training, and mentoring missions, including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.” (Council of the EU 2016a, 15–16, 2016b, 16).

27. Some of the identified priority subareas, such as power projection, naval surface superiority, air-to-air refuelling, ballistic missile defence, strategic and tactical air transport, are being dealt with under the lead of the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR) instead of PeSCo. Examples of these common efforts are the following programmes: A400M, the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft or the bilateral French-Italian Frégate Européenne Multi-Missions.

28. Available at: «https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/european-defence-industry-results-calls_en».

29. For information on the Horizon 2020 projects, visit the CORDIS database: «https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/cordisH2020projects». More information on EU funding for defence see: «https://eda.europa.eu/eufunding».

30. The PeSCo project coordinators are one or more of the participating Member States. By contrast, OCCAR coordinates the programmes jointly developed on behalf of the participating States.

31. Similar to the use of the NATO-owned and operated Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) aircrafts. This has been the option chosen for the purchase of the MRTT aircraft.

32. See inter alia Articles 15, 18, 24 and 27 TEU, and Articles 220–222 and 329 TFEU.

33. Besides the close relationship with DG DEFIS in developing EU defence programmes, the relationship developed with the Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department (ECHO) it is worth noting here. Operated within ECHO, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) coordinates the available resources from the 34 countries participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, acting as a coordination hub and liaising directly with the civil protection authorities of the country in need. Its mandate also includes close contacts with the EEAS and the Council, and its work is complemented by the civilian aspects of CSDP, in line with the aspirations of the Civilian CSDP Compact, and the EUGS integrated approach.

34. In addition to the EEAS Headquarters, the Union has deployed counter-terrorism experts in the EU Delegations abroad.

35. According to Council Decision 2014/496/CFSP of 22 July 2014, the HR/VP and the Council are the responsible bodies, and therefore should take the appropriate actions, if they observe a threat to security of the Union or its Member States through the European Global Navigation Satellite System.

36. Europol Programming Document 2019–2021, adopted by Europol Management Board on 30.11.2018, p. 45. This document, as well as the working arrangement with Operation Sophia, are available at: «https://www.europol.europa.eu/».

37. All these documents are available at: «https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/».

38. Developed, however, within the OCCAR framework. More information available at: «http://www.occar.int/programmes/mmf».

39. “Managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge.” (High Representative (HR/VP) 2016, 33).

40. Although the deterioration of the relationship with Russia is recognised, this country is acknowledged in the ESS as “an important partner on global issues” and “a major factor in our security and prosperity”.

41. Added by the EU-NATO Joint Declaration.

42. Included in the 2008 review of the ESS.

43. For the purpose of this research, we may consider a hybrid threat as “the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare” (European Commission and High Representative 2016, 2). This definition includes, for instance, massive disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks.

44. Illicit firearms, migrants and drug smuggling, as well as human trafficking, are recognized in the EES as a part of transnational organized crime.

45. Pandemics are considered, however, part of the external threats.

46. A “threat multiplier” according to the 2008 review of the ESS.

47. The EU’s action is, however, rather limited in its scope: “We have an interest in fair and open markets, in shaping global economic and environmental rules, and in sustainable access to the global commons through open sea, land, air and space routes. […] In space, we will promote the autonomy and security of our space-based services and work on principles for responsible space behaviour, which could lead to the adoption of an international voluntary code of conduct.” (High Representative (HR/VP) 2016, 15 and, 43).

48. Included in the 2008 review of the ESS.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Defence’s Defence Culture Programme (grant number: 130–14139);<#funding-source;>Spanish Ministry of Defence</#funding-source;> [<#award-id;>Ref. 130–14139</#award-id;>];