The limits of exporting the homeland security construct: lessons from the Gulf

ABSTRACT

Many conceptualizations of homeland security posit a rigid division between national security, which focuses on global threats and challenges at the systemic level, and homeland or domestic security, which focuses on internal threats and challenges inside a state. Thus, in the United States, Iran is a national security threat, while human trafficking or natural disasters are homeland security threats and challenges. The American conceptualization has come to dominate much of the academic literature and curriculum on homeland security. Analysis of courses in domestic and homeland security in the Middle East shows that an American model of homeland security is a frequent export of American-style education. However, this artificial division is not relevant for small states, even aspiring regional powers, because their security priorities overlap the domestic and international. A case study of the United Arab Emirates demonstrates that its key security priorities are shaped by both domestic and global inputs, and require solutions at both levels. However, many courses on domestic and homeland security in the Emirates do not reflect this reality. In studying and teaching security in non-superpowers, the homeland security concept should be updated to properly fit the strategic context of a small state in theory and practice.

KEYWORDS:

• National security
• homeland security
• UAE
• military education
• strategic context

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Richard Kilroy, Aart Holtslag, Igor Kovac, and the journal’s peer reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of this project.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. See for example https://www.idc.ac.il/en/schools/rris/graduate/pages/counter-homeland.aspx; http://www.newhaven.edu/news/releases/2015-2016/king-fahd-security-college-and-unh-sign-collaboration-agreement.php/; http://www.ra.ac.ae/vocational-training-homeland-securitycounter-terrorism/; http://aue.ae/portfolio/master-of-arts-in-security-and-strategic-studies/#eluida11f48d0; http://www.nesa-center.org/nesa-Saudi-armed-forces-war-course-curriculum-development-workshop/.

2. Consider the collaboration between the University of New Haven and the King Fahad Security College, which according to UNH Provost Daniel May is explicitly about “ … developing with the ministry an American-style program” (AP 2016).

3. This despite the fact that an informal query of Homeland Security practitioners suggested that “As domestic and foreign threats run together, it is not clear whether it makes sense to view these [homeland and national security] as separate issues” http://www.hlswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/draft-CHDS-Futures-Advisory-Committee-Subject-Areas-Report.pdf.

4. Bullock et al. (2015) reprinted this critique as a contrary perspective.

5. Consider also that her predecessor, John Kelly (2017), used this construct in his combative address at George Washington University.

6. See also QHSR 2014, 6–8.

7. Indeed, House Republicans attacked the 2014 QHSR’s brief mention of climate change. Scott Perry, then the Chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency, held a hearing called “Examining DHS’s Misplaced Focus on Climate Change.” Perry excoriated the department, contending that he was “ … outraged that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to make climate change a top priority.” See https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=791999.

8. This text has gone through 6 editions since 2002, and shifted its focus to link terrorism with homeland security.

9. See for example https://www.shsu.edu/academics/criminal-justice-old/departments/security-studies/; https://www.apu.apus.edu/academic/schools/security-and-global-studies/masters/homeland-security.html; https://www.udc.edu/programs/homeland-security/; https://www.angelo.edu/dept/security_studies_criminal_justice/border_security_intro.php.

10. The database is available at https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/collegelist/dhsmaster/.

11. Indeed Waever (2008) argues that this distinction is also inapplicable to the United States.

12. As the UAE does not publish an unclassified version of its national security priorities, the author will rely on published secondary sources by Emirati nationals and expat authors with extensive experience on security issues in the region.

13. According to Ulrichsen, Abu Dhabi had long distrusted the Brotherhood, but the UAE only banned the group in 2012 for reasons of domestic politics and suggests that this is one area of divergence between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with the UAE taking a harder line across the region. However, Al Kitbi (2020, 5–6) disagrees with this assessment, suggesting that both countries strongly oppose the Brotherhood.

14. The Sawab Center, a UAE-US counter radicalization partnership, fell under the auspicious of the State Department rather than Homeland Security as an “away” activity, despite the fact that counter-messaging continues to be a US CT priority. See https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244709.htm.

15. Consider, for example, the pro-Qatar support from Omani citizens at the Asian Cup held in the UAE noted in Al Musalmy (2019).

16. See https://www.ncema.gov.ae/en/about-ncema/laws-and-legislation.aspx.

17. That it is useful for the United States is also matter for debate. For example, Morag (2011b) argues that even the US needs cooperation on many matters that only seem like they are purely domestic.

18. See for example the program at Rabdan Academy https://ra.ac.ae/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Academic-Catalogue-2018-19-strategic-map.pdf and standalone courses at the University of Sharjah and the American University of the Emirates for other examples.

19. For more on the college’s mission and raison d’etre see ndc.ac.ae/en/ and Toronto (2018, 63–86).

20. See https://nwc.ndu.edu/Academics/Curriculum-Overview/.

21. This is based on correspondence with faculty at Kahlifa University, October 2018, and review of Khalifa University syllabus on civil security.

22. Discussions with UAE NDC Faculty.

23. Indeed, even in Alseraidi’s positive treatment of the construct, he warns against copying some elements the complex institutional model of the US, warning that the UAE ought to “[a]void following the U.S. model of a separate Homeland Security Council” which could cloud decision-making (2009, 21).

24. The UAE has since changed the mandate of this agency and its cyber

25. Some US officials, such as former NSA Director Keith Alexander, have also argued that this would be valuable in the US context (see Chalfant 2017). Arguably the recent establishment of the National Cyber Director position is a move in this direction. I am thankful to Mark Montgomery for this point.

26. See https://iadc.edu/.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Samuel R. Greene

Samuel R. Greene is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Global Studies and Director of Study Abroad at Shepherd University in Shepherdstown, WV. His first book, Pathological Counterinsurgency (Lanham: Lexington, 2018), critiques US counterinsurgency policy in Latin America and the Middle East.