The nexus between asylum seekers and defence spending in European NATO member states: a quantitative study of securitisation dynamics

Figures & data

Figure 1. Distribution of the dependent variables.

Figure 2. Evolution of the number of asylum seekers (using log transformation).

Figure 3. Evolution of right-wing populist votes and unemployment.

Table 1. Description of the variable territorial exposure Syria.

Category	Region	Variable takes value	Countries
	All	0 if year ≤ 2010	All NATO member states
1	Europe	1 if 2011 ≤ year ≤ 2014 2 if 2015 ≤ year ≤ 2016 1,5 if year ≥ 2017	Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, United Kingdom
2	Mediterranean Sea	3 if 2011 ≤ year ≤ 2014 4 if 2015 ≤ year ≤ 2016 3,5 if year ≥ 2017	France, Italy, Spain
3	Western Balkans route	5 if 2011 ≤ year ≤ 2014 6 if 2015 ≤ year ≤ 2016 5,5 if year ≥ 2017	Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia
4	Border with Syrian Arab Republic	8 if 2011 ≤ year ≤ 2016 7,5 if year ≥ 2017	Turkey

Table 2. Description of the variable territorial proximity North Africa.

Category	Region	Variable takes value	Countries
1	Northern Europe	1	Denmark, Iceland, Norway, United Kingdom
2	Eastern and Western Europe	2	Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Portugal, Romania
3	Central Europe	3	Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
4	Mediterranean routes	4	Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey

Figure 4. Evolution of GDP and population (using log transformation).

Table 3. Summary of the concepts, measurements, and hypotheses.

Concept	Measure	Hypothesis	Expectation
Dependent variables measuring defence spending Military expenditure Personnel spending Equipment spending Infrastructure spending O&M spending	% GDP spent on the military % GDP spent on defence personnel % GDP spent on defence equipment % GDP spent on defence infrastructure % GDP spent on defence operations and maintenance
Threat independent variables Asylum seekers Territorial exposure Syria Territorial proximity Africa	Log number of pending asylum applications Ordered categorical variable (own computations, see Table 1) Ordered categorical variable (own computations, see Table 2)	H1 H4 H5	+ + +
Political and institutional independent variables Right-wing populist votes Dublin regulations	Share of votes received by right-wing populist parties Dummy variable (0 – not part of Dublin Regulations; 1 – part)	H2 H6	+ +
Interaction asylum seekers*right-wing populist votes		H3	+
Control variables GDP Population Territorial proximity Moscow Unemployment	Log GDP Log population Log country $\mathit{i}$’s capital distance to Moscow Unemployment in % labour force		+ + - -

Table 4. Models of disaggregated defence spending.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Estimator VARIABLES	FE MILEX	FE DEF PERS	RE DEF EQUIP	RE DEF INFRA	FE DEF OM
ASYLUM	0,038* (0,022)	−0,020 (0,022)	0,017*** (0,007)	0,004* (0,002)	0,013 (0,011)
POPULISM	0,013** (0,006)	0,003 (0,004)	0,005*** (0,002)	−0,000 (0,001)	0,000 (0,002)
ASYLUM * POPULISM	−0,002** (0,000)	−0,001 (0,001)	−0,000** (0,000)	0,000 (0,000)	0,000 (0,000)
SYRIA	−0,041*** (0,011)	−0,039*** (0,010)	−0,009* (0,005)	−0,004*** (0,001)	−0,009 (0,006)
AFRICA	omitted	omitted	−0,027 (0,039)	0,002 (0,008)	omitted
DUBLIN	−0,155 (0,096)	−0,059 (0,062)	−0,062* (0,038)	0,008 (0,007)	−0,042 (0,035)
GDP	−0,225*** (0,076)	−0,211** (0,085)	−0,073*** (0,026)	−0,028*** (0,008)	−0,119** (0,044)
POPULATION	−1,136 (1,012)	−0,915 (0,632)	0,090** (0,038)	0,019** (0,009)	−0,308 (0,328)
MOSCOW	omitted	omitted	0,024 (0,048)	−0,041 (0,026)	omitted
UNEMP	−0,016** (0,006)	−0,007* (0,004)	−0,011*** (0,002)	−0,001* (0,001)	−0,006** (0,003)
Constant	25,917 (15,741)	21,676 10,232	0,014 (0,438)	0,753*** (0,267)	8,479 (5,257)
Obs. Number of groups Overall R-squared	354 23 0,090	321 21 0,056	353 23 0,139	353 23 0,210	353 23 0,017

Notes: Asterisks indicate *** p<001, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Results of the Hausman tests are: (1) Prob > chi2 = 0,007; (2) Prob > chi2 = 0,002; (3) Prob > chi2 = 0,240; (4) Prob > chi2 = 0,105; (5) Prob > chi2 = 0,068.

Table 5. Significance of the results.

Note: This is a summary of the results presented in Table 4. Blue backgrounds are used for variables that show the effect that was hypothesized, while grey backgrounds apply to variables whose effect shown in the model is the opposite of the expected one. Non-significant results are identified by the absence of a coloured background. ▴ is used to show when time-invariant variables are omitted in models using a FE Estimator.

Table A. Categories of defense spending (NATO, 2022b).

	Nomenclature of NATO defense expenditure
	Personnel	Equipment	Infrastructure	Operations and maintenance
Type of expenses covered	Military personnel and civilian personnel: pays and allowances, employer’s contributions to retirement funds, pensions	Missile systems, missiles (conventional weapons), nuclear weapons, aircraft, artillery, combat vehicles, engineering equipment, weapons and small arms, transport vehicles, ships, harbour craft, electronic and communication equipment, research and development devoted to major equipment	National military construction, NATO common infrastructure: expenditures as host nation, payments to other nations, land and utilities	Ammunition and explosives (excluding nuclear), petroleum products, spare parts, other equipment and supplies, rends, other operations and maintenance

Table B1. Summary statistics of the dependent variables.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Military expenditure	953	2,206	1,180	0,421	6,943
Personnel spending	728	1,146	0,620	0,171	4,342
Equipment spending	907	0,395	0,334	0,006	1,733
Infrastructure spending	760	0,071	0,067	0,000	0,581
O&M spending	758	0,497	0,373	0,068	2,615

Note: the distribution of the dependent variables is presented in graphs below.

Table B2. Summary statistics of the categorical and dummy independent variables.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Territorial exposure Syria	1266	0,640	1,543	0	8
Territorial proximity North Africa	1277	2,189	1,255	0	4
Dublin	710	0,720	0,449	0	1
Territorial proximity Moscow	1277	7,741	0,562	6,672	8,964

Data availability statement

The author confirms that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article and its supplementary materials.