Women and risk-taking behaviour in local public finance

Figures & data

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variables
Municipal bonds/capita	39,349.54	48,688.39	0	2,954,098
Public investment/capita	1457.88	3448.40	0	100,055
Reserve funds/capita	15,195.34	66,685.53	3.89	2,976,746
Independent variable
Female councillors (%) (H1a)	12.17	8.18	0	40.9
Female mayor or vice-mayor (H1b)	0.04	0.19	0	1
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b)	8.70	6.47	0	44.1
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a)	16.57	14.90	0	79.17
Female councillors’ expertise/tenure (H3)	2.44	1.19	0	9
Controls
Mayor’s re-elections	1.76	0.99	1	10
Mayor’s vote share (%)	65.32	21.22	25.39	100
Mayor’s conservative party support	0.37	0.48	0	1
Unemployment rate (%)	6.21	1.66	2.4	18.20
Agricultural sector economy (%)	6.94	6.59	0.01	33.65
Municipal merger	0.50	0.50	0	1
Lag of accumulated debts/capita	440,994.00	235,014.40	25,727.03	4,173,950
Lag of accumulated reserves/capita	88,973.46	84,116.29	937.1074	1,536,181
Year dummy	3.50	1.71	1	6
Region dummy	3.47	1.99	0	7

Table 2. Correlation matrix.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1	Municipal bonds/capita	1
2	Public investment/capita	0.09	1
3	Reserve funds/capita	0.02	0.02	1
4	Female councillors (%)	−0.19	−0.12	−0.06	1
5	Female mayor or vice-mayor	−0.02	0.02	−0.01	0.12	1
6	Female mid-level managers (%)	0.02	0.08	−0.01	0.08	0.05	1
7	Conservative ideology (%)	−0.14	−0.05	−0.06	0.41	0.09	0.09	1
8	Female councillors’ expertise/tenure	−0.09	−0.01	−0.01	0.27	0.06	−0.01	0.14	1
9	Mayor’s re-elections	−0.09	−0.04	−0.02	0.18	−0.05	−0.02	0.16	0.05	1
10	Mayor’s vote share (%)	0.01	0.02	0.02	−0.13	−0.05	0.00	−0.13	−0.06	0.20	1
11	Mayor’s conservative party support	−0.08	−0.03	−0.05	0.15	−0.01	0.06	0.23	0.09	0.24	0.10	1
12	Unemployment rate (%)	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.03	−0.05	0.09	−0.01	0.04	0.00	−0.02	1
13	Agricultural sector economy (%)	0.21	0.10	0.08	−0.51	−0.09	−0.10	−0.47	−0.21	−0.22	0.11	−0.22	−0.08	1
14	Municipal merger	0.20	0.07	0.03	−0.43	−0.04	−0.04	−0.35	−0.13	−0.28	0.05	−0.16	−0.14	0.40	1
15	Lag of accumulated debts/capita	0.34	0.21	0.08	−0.41	−0.04	0.05	−0.25	−0.15	−0.20	0.07	−0.15	0.02	0.49	0.33	1
16	Lag of accumulated reserves/capita	0.07	0.04	0.22	−0.13	−0.03	0.07	−0.09	−0.10	−0.01	0.07	−0.05	−0.14	0.23	0.20	0.13	1
17	Year dummy	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.01	0.12	0.01	−0.08	0.08	0.02	−0.14	0.20	−0.07	0.00	−0.02	0.13	1
18	Region dummy	0.06	−0.12	−0.03	−0.21	−0.02	0.00	−0.15	−0.05	−0.09	0.00	−0.13	0.15	0.23	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.00	1

Table 3. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: random-effects model.

	Municipal bonds		Public investment		Reserve funds
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Independent variable
Female councillors (%) (H1a)	−144.84*** (48.13)	−140.60*** (51.42)	−31.40*** (11.69)	−31.63*** (12.27)	−137.57 (127.18)	−154.49 (126.84)
Female mayor or	−158.96	−127.84	688.81	687.45	−355.84	−473.63
vice-mayor (H1b)	(1359.34)	(1339.56)	(737.42)	(738.49)	(1588.87)	(1584.08)
Female	51.36	52.64	18.85*	18.80*	−319.17	−324.29
mid-level managers (%) (H1b)	(57.06)	(57.41)	(10.18)	(10.25)	(231.97)	(230.40)
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a)	−72.89***	−56.32	−4.57	−5.67	−171.64**	−240.68**
	(26.09)	(51.92)	(5.99)	(11.96)	(81.97)	(110.72)
Female councillors x conservative ideology (H2b)		−1.22		0.08		5.11
		(3.08)		(0.64)		(5.99)
Female councillors’ expertise/tenure (H3)	−925.23	−940.14	48.13	48.56	1771.66	1821.35
	(691.91)	(709.74)	(57.42)	(57.02)	(1149.58)	(1150.63)
Controls
Mayor’s re-elections	41.87	44.58	64.14	64.05	−1547.80	−1553.75
	(352.95)	(350.97)	(44.52)	(44.36)	(1368.37)	(1368.58)
Mayor’s vote share (%)	−50.48	−50.92	−1.07	−1.05	−0.34	1.27
	(36.56)	(37.04)	(2.26)	(2.25)	(52.90)	(52.64)
Mayor’s conservative party support	150.97	177.37	−138.00	−138.82	−336.18	−436.67
	(823.01)	(809.64)	(133.21)	(134.78)	(1938.48)	(1902.89)
Unemployment rate (%)	364.08	363.01	101.88	102.05	2302.88***	2307.26***
	(253.43)	(253.21)	(76.12)	(76.17)	(846.07)	(843.62)
Agricultural sector economy (%)	213.22	216.34	−3.47	−3.63	−140.49	−152.20
	(142.92)	(146.88)	(21.00)	(21.14)	(204.81)	(198.52)
Municipal merger	7019.71***	7013.22***	−19.86	−18.77	−6632.08	−6587.93
	(1888.35)	(1895.22)	(236.91)	(236.24)	(5534.65)	(5536.60)
Lag of accumulated debts/capita	0.06***	0.06***	0.00*	0.00*	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Lag of accumulated reserves/capita	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.22***	0.22***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Year dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummy	No	No	No	No	No	No
Constant	5890.83	5931.31	−23.20	−27.10	−21,241.64**	−21,381.53**
	(5143.57)	(5184.69)	(847.81)	(843.85)	(9661.87)	(9612.97)
Observations	4547	4547	4547	4547	4547	4547
Number of municipality	764	764	764	764	764	764
R-sq within	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.12
R-sq between	0.62	0.62	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08
R-sq overall	0.14	0.14	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table 4. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: random-effects model with region dummy.

	Municipal bonds		Public investment		Reserve funds
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Independent variable
Female councillors (%) (H1a)	−150.91*** (53.92)	−153.55*** (56.25)	−25.35** (11.38)	−26.01** (11.90)	−71.58 (113.07)	−68.63 (112.21)
Female mayor or vice-mayor (H1b)	776.44	763.36	758.13	754.76	−2183.63	−2170.02
	(1267.56)	(1269.94)	(751.04)	(751.22)	(2034.81)	(2012.30)
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b)	24.86	23.52	14.85	14.60	−257.17	−255.75
	(65.45)	(66.09)	(9.69)	(9.77)	(243.84)	(239.31)
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a)	−83.14**	−95.69	−4.03	−8.37	−146.14**	−131.77
	(32.35)	(58.57)	(7.01)	(13.78)	(70.51)	(107.39)
Female councillors x conservative ideology (H2b)		0.92		0.34		−1.06
		(3.00)		(0.70)		(7.29)
Female councillors’ expertise/tenure (H3)	−890.04	−879.48	69.43	70.68	1519.07	1506.95
	(710.05)	(714.11)	(50.62)	(50.51)	(1123.26)	(1116.93)
Year dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	14,831.82	14,830.20	1924.07*	1916.74*	−23,758.12**	−23,742.62**
	(18,955.80)	(18,957.08)	(1022.73)	(1021.36)	(10,371.74)	(10,365.91)
Observations	4481	4481	4481	4481	4481	4481
Number of municipality	752	752	752	752	752	752
R-sq within	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.11	0.11
R-sq between	0.61	0.61	0.17	0.17	0.14	0.14
R-sq overall	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.08

Control variables are not reported.

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table A1. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: random-effects model without agricultural sector economy variable.

	Municipal bonds		Public investment		Reserve funds
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Independent variable
Female councillors (%) (H1a)	−188.59***	−193.22***	−25.96**	−26.58**	−25.47	−20.55
	(62.41)	(64.24)	(11.57)	(12.05)	(110.58)	(113.45)
Female mayor or vice-mayor (H1b)	525.71	503.71	755.67	752.43	−1909.73	−1887.08
	(1242.53)	(1245.77)	(750.23)	(750.35)	(1939.68)	(1921.31)
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b)	15.30	12.83	14.76	14.51	−246.53	−243.97
	(66.95)	(67.79)	(9.64)	(9.72)	(238.26)	(233.51)
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a)	−110.00***	−133.97**	−4.56	−8.97	−112.52*	−86.04
	(41.06)	(65.32)	(7.06)	(13.72)	(60.12)	(116.42)
Female councillors x conservative ideology (H2b)		1.79		0.35		−1.98
		(2.99)		(0.70)		(7.66)
Female councillors’ expertise/tenure (H3)	−946.57	−925.33	68.98	70.30	1571.31	1549.11
	(738.99)	(737.97)	(50.83)	(50.70)	(1124.61)	(1115.46)
Year dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	17,307.25	17,270.88	1975.72*	1963.42*	−26,719.01**	−26,661.78**
	(20,482.46)	(20,473.12)	(1051.98)	(1049.17)	(11,103.58)	(11,049.00)
Observations	4481	4481	4481	4481	4481	4481
Number of municipality	752	752	752	752	752	752
R-sq within	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.11	0.11
R-sq between	0.62	0.62	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.15
R-sq overall	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.08

Control variables are not reported.

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table A2. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: population-averaged model.

	Municipal bonds		Public investment		Reserve funds
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Independent variable
Female councillors (%) (H1a)	−106.98*	−108.70*	−25.30**	−25.97**	−59.43	−63.72
	(55.34)	(58.47)	(11.33)	(11.86)	(106.04)	(106.81)
Female mayor or vice-mayor (H1b)	461.98	453.59	757.66	754.48	−2298.76	−2320.29
	(1310.09)	(1310.94)	(748.54)	(748.76)	(2040.44)	(2021.88)
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b)	11.61	10.75	15.01	14.71	−260.11	−262.29
	(71.19)	(71.45)	(9.67)	(9.75)	(230.87)	(227.45)
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a)	−89.21***	−97.11*	−3.96	−8.25	−135.32**	−156.04
	(33.47)	(53.65)	(6.96)	(13.69)	(62.66)	(98.36)
Female councillors x conservative ideology (H2b)		0.58		0.33		1.53
		(2.83)		(0.70)		(6.24)
Female councillors’ expertise/tenure (H3)	−829.67	−822.58	69.66	70.82	1208.08	1224.03
	(667.79)	(674.10)	(50.47)	(50.36)	(970.16)	(967.17)
Year dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	8968.93	8969.80	1916.12*	1911.31*	−21,386.34**	−21,383.95**
	(14,247.64)	(14,248.49)	(1020.18)	(1018.62)	(9810.61)	(9807.02)
Observations	4481	4481	4481	4481	4481	4481
Number of municipality	752	752	752	752	752	752

Control variables are not reported.

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table A3. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: pooled OLS model.

	Municipal bonds		Public investment		Reserve funds
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Independent variable
Female councillors (%) (H1a)	−150.91***	−153.55***	−18.62	−16.23	−53.37	−61.35
	(53.92)	(56.25)	(12.33)	(12.58)	(103.08)	(104.62)
Female mayor or vice-mayor (H1b)	776.44	763.36	560.61	572.40	−2346.90	−2386.37
	(1267.56)	(1269.94)	(684.02)	(684.01)	(2057.62)	(2040.19)
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b)	24.86	23.52	43.44***	44.65***	−259.69	−263.73
	(65.45)	(66.09)	(15.12)	(15.47)	(224.53)	(221.78)
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a)	−83.14**	−95.69	1.78	13.10	−129.67**	−167.53*
	(32.35)	(58.57)	(7.24)	(14.48)	(59.16)	(94.80)
Female councillors x conservative ideology (H2b)		0.92		−0.83		2.78
		(3.00)		(0.73)		(5.78)
Female councillors’ expertise/tenure (H3)	−890.04	−879.48	128.79*	119.27	1057.10	1088.94
	(710.05)	(714.11)	(75.77)	(76.95)	(903.19)	(901.64)
Year dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	14,831.82	14,830.20	779.34	780.80	−20,250.26**	−20,255.15**
	(18,955.80)	(18,957.08)	(1089.88)	(1092.11)	(9577.12)	(9576.79)
Observations	4481	4481	4481	4481	4481	4481
R-squared	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.08	0.08

Control variables are not reported.

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.