New public management marketizers versus Neo-Weberian state modernizers? Institutional configurations of social impact bond utilization among 18 OECD countries

Figures & data

Table 1. Alignment of paradigms, reform trajectories and administrative culture.

Paradigm	Reform trajectory	Administrative culture	Convergent countries
New Public Management	Marketizers	Public Interest Model	US, UK, Australia, New Zealand
Neo-Weberian State (+ New Public Governance)?	Modernizers(participatory)	Mixed Model (Participatory/Consensual, Pluralist or Corporatist)	Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland**
Neo-Weberian State	Modernizers(managerial)	Rechtsstaat	France*, Italy, Germany (regional/local), Belgium (regional/local), South Korea**, Portugal**
Neo-Weberian State	Maintainers	Rechtsstaat	Austria, Germany (Federal), Belgium (Federal), Japan**

Authors’ configurations based on concepts and definitions of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017, 49, 116–117, 120, 122).*France is identified as ‘predominantly Rechtsstaat’ (p.49). **South Korea (Kim and Han 2015; Park and Wilding 2016), Japan (Hood 1995; Norton 2007; Yamamoto 2003), Portugal (Corte-Real 2008; Mendes 2006) and Switzerland (Schedler and Keller 1998; Schedler and Proeller 2001) are not encompassed in Pollitt and Bouckaert’s analysis, and have been notionally classified by the authors based on the noted citations.

Table 2. Configurations to high and low SIB utilization.

	High SIB utilization		Low SIB utilization
Conditions	1	2	3	4	5	6
Income Inequality	●	⊗
Labor Movement			⊗			●
Intensity of Privatization		●		●		⊗
Financialization	●				⊗
Austerity	●	●	⊗	⊗	●	●
Consistency	0.89	0.88	0.93	0.96	0.88	0.89
Raw Coverage	0.60	0.45	0.37	0.34	0.55	0.46
Unique Coverage	0.24	0.17	0.004	0.05	0.04	0.003
Countries	Australia	The Netherlands	Chile	South Korea	Austria	Austria
	UK	France	South Korea	Sweden	Germany	Belgium
	US		Switzerland		Japan	Germany
						New Zealand
Overall Consistency	0.85		0.83
Overall Coverage	0.80		0.80

●: Core Condition; ●: Peripheral Condition; ⊗: Absence of Core Condition; ⊗: Absence of Peripheral Condition; Blank Space indicates it is not relevant to the outcome.

Table A1. Measures and calibrating thresholds.

	Measures	95th Percentile	50th Percentile	5th Percentile
Outcome
SIB Utilization	Total US dollar amount of SIB investment (in millions)	113.04	3.92	0.32
Conditions
Income Inequality	Gini coefficient	0.40	0.32	0.26
Labour Movement	Trade union density	0.67	0.18	0.10
	Collective bargaining Coverage	0.98	0.57	0.13
Intensity of Privatization	Voluntary private social expenditure as % of total social expenditure	0.26	0.08	0.04
Financialization	Financial sector value as % of GDP	0.09	0.05	0.04
Austerity	The change in fiscal balance (fall in deficit), 2009 to 2015	0.07	0.03	0.0005

Note: SIB investment data was current as of April 2021, with data primarily from the INDIGO Impact Bond Database (2021) covering 166 SIB projects with investment data available, with five projects added from the Social Finance Impact Bond Database (Social Finance 2019) and project level sources, with details on the SIBs added listed in Table A2. Data for the causal conditions are calculated from the OECD.Stat database (OECD 2021) and are averaged from 2010 to 2018 unless otherwise noted.

Table A2. Projects added to government outcomes project data.

SIB project name	Location	Year launched	Investment(US, $millions)
Shared Lives	Manchester and Lambeth, UK	2015	$1.68
Sticking Together Social Impact Bond	New South Wales, Australia	2019	$3.56
SIB to Enhance Rahat Students’ Math Achievement	Rahat, Israel	2019	$4.12
Restoring the Sacred Bond	Manitoba, Canada	2019	$1.95
Smoking Cessation	Manitoba, Canada	2020	$1.53

Table A3. Calibrated set-membership scores.

Country	Income inequality	Labour movement	Intensity of privatization	Financialization	Austerity	SIB utilization	Year of first SIB	# of SIBs as of April 2021, with investment data
United States	0.94	0.06	0.96	0.83	0.981	0.991	2012	26
United Kingdom	0.79	0.6	0.86	0.77	0.871	0.931	2010	71
Australia	0.59	0.54	0.14	0.92	0.541	0.761	2013	8
Finland	0.05	0.95	0.07	0	0.051	0.631	2015	4
France	0.23	0.95	0.56	0.03	0.601	0.571	2017	6
Netherlands	0.18	0.87	0.92	0.86	0.511	0.571	2013	10
Israel	0.81	0.59	0.68	0.3	0.841	0.551	2015	3
Canada	0.41	0.63	0.95	0.77	0.651	0.521	2014	6
Portugal	0.62	0.79	0.34	0.46	0.861	0.501	2015	15
New Zealand	0.64	0.52	0.03	0.56	0.511	0.431	2012	2
Switzerland	0.22	0.49	0.04	0.97	0.051	0.281	2015	1
South Korea	0.77	0.05	0.78	0.59	0.361	0.211	2016	2
Belgium	0.04	0.95	0.2	0.59	0.501	0.191	2014	2
Sweden	0.10	0.95	0.62	0.03	0.091	0.091	2016	1
Austria	0.11	0.95	0.08	0.03	0.731	0.071	2015	1
Japan	0.63	0.46	0.62	0.15	0.921	0.051	2017	3
Germany	0.19	0.51	0.06	0.05	0.701	0.051	2013	1
Chile	1	0.28	0.04	0.3	0.261	0.051	2014	1

Table A4. Truth table for high SIB utilization.

Income inequality	Labor movement	Intensity of privatization	Financialization	Austerity	cases	raw consist.	PRI consist.
1	1	1	1	1	Austria Germany	0.96	0.85
0	1	1	1	1	Australia New Zealand	0.93	0.64
1	0	1	1	1	Dutch, Canada	0.92	0.82
0	0	0	1	0	Chile	0.89	0.48
0	1	1	0	1	Finland	0.88	0.48
1	1	0	1	1	Sweden	0.86	0.51
0	1	0	1	1	Switzerland	0.84	0.40
1	1	1	0	1	Korea	0.84	0.40
1	0	1	1	0	Portugal	0.80	0.15
0	1	1	0	0	Japan	0.77	0.11
1	0	1	0	1	France	0.77	0.33
1	1	0	0	1	Israel	0.75	0.12
1	0	0	0	0	Belgium	0.67	0.08
0	1	0	0	0	United States	0.67	0.21
0	1	0	0	1	United Kingdom	0.59	0.06
0	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	1	0
1	1	0	1	0
0	0	1	1	0
0	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	1
1	0	0	0	1
0	0	1	0	1
0	0	0	1	1
1	0	0	1	1
0	0	1	1	1

Table A5. Truth table for low SIB utilization.

Income inequality	Labor movement	Intensity of privatization	Financialization	Austerity	cases	raw consist	PRI consist
1	0	0	0	0	Austria Germany	0.97	0.92
0	1	1	0	0	Australia New Zealand	0.97	0.89
0	1	0	0	1	Dutch Canada	0.97	0.94
1	0	1	1	0	Chile	0.97	0.85
1	1	0	0	1	Finland	0.95	0.84
0	0	0	1	0	Sweden	0.90	0.52
0	1	0	1	1	Switzerland	0.89	0.60
0	1	1	0	1	Korea	0.88	0.52
1	0	1	0	1	Portugal	0.88	0.67
1	1	1	0	1	Japan	0.88	0.55
1	1	0	1	1	France	0.86	0.49
0	1	1	1	1	Israel	0.85	0.22
0	1	0	0	0	Belgium	0.84	0.61
1	1	1	1	1	United States	0.77	0.15
1	0	1	1	1	United Kingdom	0.64	0.18
0	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	0
1	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	0
0	1	0	1	0
1	1	0	1	0
0	0	1	1	0
0	1	1	1	0
1	1	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	1
1	0	0	0	1
0	0	1	0	1
0	0	0	1	1
1	0	0	1	1
0	0	1	1	1

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