With a little help from China: the Trump administration and the reinvigoration of the Quad

Abstract

This article examines the reasons underlying the re-emergence of the Quad in 2017 and the areas of convergence and divergence between U.S. and Indian views of it especially during the Trump administration. While doing so, it makes the following arguments. First, the current iteration of the Quad emerged because of changing threat perception regarding China among all four Quad countries. Second, President Trump’s hard line, bordering on adversarial, position vis-à-vis China was positively received by other members of the Quad and encouraged them to shed their inhibitions. In addition, Trump’s delegative style of leadership on the Quad allowed senior and mid-level officials to creatively engage with the other powers. Third, all this notwithstanding, there were still significant divergences, stemming from strategic and diplomatic worldviews, between the perspectives of the Quad countries on the future direction and purpose of the grouping. Put another way, the Quad will always be a work in progress because of the divergences between its member states and its inherently flexible design. The article concludes by analysing the prospects for the Quad.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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¹² Sushant Singh, “To check China, Navy to deploy mission-ready ships in Indian Ocean region,” The Indian Express, October 26, 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/navy-to-implement-new-deployment-plan-for-warships-in-indian-ocean-region-4906433/.

¹³ Ministry of External Affairs, Joint Statement – United States and India: Prosperity Through Partnership, June 27, 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28560/Joint+Statement++United+States+and+India+Prosperity+Through+Partnership.

¹⁴ Mark Boyer, et al. “Forum: Did ‘America First’ Construct America Irrelevant?” International Studies Perspectives, 22: 4, November 2021, Pages 458–494, https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekab013.

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¹⁹ Edward Ashbee and Steven Hurst, “The Trump administration and China: policy continuity or transformation?” Policy Studies, 42: 5–6, 2021, pp. 720–737, https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2021.1919299.

²⁰ Frederick Kliem, “Why Quasi-Alliances Will Persist in the Indo-Pacific? The Fall and Rise of the Quad,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 7(3), 2020, p. 284.

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²³ Stephen M. Walt, “Trump’s Final Foreign-Policy Report Card,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/05/trumps-final-foreign-policy-report-card/.

²⁴ In terms of the Quad, these officials included, at various times, General H.R. McMaster, Nadia Schadlow, Lisa Curtis, and Matt Pottinger at the National Security Council (NSC), Rex Tillerson, Mike Pompeo, David Stillwell, and Atul Keshap at the State Department and General Jim Mattis and Randy Shriver at the Department of Defense. For the role of some of these officials see Sumit Ganguly, “Obama, Trump and Indian foreign policy under Modi,” International Politics, No. 59, 2022, pp. 16–18.

²⁵ Hiroyuki Akita and Eri Sugiura, “Pompeo aims to ‘institutionalize’ Quad ties to counter China,” Nikkei Asian Review, October 6, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Pompeo-aims-to-institutionalize-Quad-ties-to-counter-China.

²⁶ Sriram Lakshman, “Quad should eventually become formalised, says top U.S. Official,” The Hindu, October 20, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/quad-should-eventually-become-formalized-says-top-us-official/article32903108.ece.

²⁷ Manjeet Pardesi, “India’s China strategy under Modi: continuity in the management of an asymmetric rivalry,” International Politics, 59, 2022, pp. 56–57, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00287-3.

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²⁹ Yogesh Joshi, Ippeita Nishida and Nishant Rajeev, “Institutionalizing the Quad: Can it Seize the Momentum for the Future?” ISAS Special Report No. 13, April 27, 2021, pp. 21–24.

³⁰ Shubajit Roy, “G-20 Osaka summit: India refuses to sign declaration on free flow of data across borders,” The Indian Express, June 29, 2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/g-20-osaka-summit-narendra-mod-india-declaration-on-free-flow-of-data-across-borders-shinzo-abe-5805846/.

³¹ Jagannath Panda, “Asian equilibrium: India’s overture to China,” in Jagannath Panda (eds.), India and China in Asia: Between equilibrium and equations (London: Routledge, 2019).

³² James Curran, “All shot and no powder in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” East Asia Forum, January 28, 2018, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/01/28/all-shot-and-no-powder-in-the-quadrilateral-security-dialogue/.

³³ Iain Henry, “Finally, some plain talk on the Quad,” Lowy Interpreter, October 25, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/finally-some-plain-talk-quad.

³⁴ Teesta Prakash, “Abe Shinzo: the Quad stands as his Indo-Pacific legacy,” The Print, July 9, 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/abe-shinzo-quad-stands-his-indo-pacific-legacy.

³⁵ William Gallo, “In Tokyo, Pompeo Touts Quad Forum as Way to Counter China,” VOA News, October 6, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_tokyo-pompeo-touts-quad-forum-way-counter-china/6196788.html.

³⁶ Abhijnan Rej, “Quad Foreign Ministers Meet in Tokyo Amid Post-Pandemic Concerns,” The Diplomat, October 7, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/quad-foreign-ministers-meet-in-tokyo-amid-post-pandemic-concerns/.

³⁷ Thomas S. Wilkins, “The Quad process: The evolution of diplomatic and maritime security cooperation in the Indo Pacific,” Policy Brief, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, December 17, 2019, pp. 6–7, https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/policybrief/pdf/Wilkins_Dec_17_2019.pdf; also see Rory Medcalf, “Indo-Pacific Visions: Giving Solidarity a Chance,” Asia Policy 14:3, 2019, p.82.

³⁸ For instance, see the comments of U.S. officials, on background, after a ministerial meeting, “Readout of U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Ministerial (‘The Quad’),” October 3, 2019, https://in.usembassy.gov/readout-of-u-s-australia-india-japan-ministerial-the-quad/.

³⁹ Sameer Lalwani and Heather Byrne, “The Quad: alliance or alignment?” Seminar No. 715, March 2019, https://www.india-seminar.com/2019/715/715_lalwani_and_byrne.htm and Nick Bisley, “Is There a Problem With … The Quad?” Policy Brief, China Matters, July 2018, https://chinamatters.org.au/policy-brief/policy-brief-july/.

⁴⁰ Dhruva Jaishankar, “The Real Significance of the Quad,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), October 24, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-real-significance-of-the-quad/.

⁴¹ Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “How China Strengthens the Quad,” The Diplomat, September 4, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/how-china-strengthens-the-quad/.

⁴² Harsh Pant and Kashish Parpiani, “The Trump presidency and China,” in America and the Indo-Pacific: Trump and Beyond (NY: Routledge, 2022), pp. 24–43.

⁴³ Rohan Mukherjee, “Chaos as opportunity: the United States and world order in India’s grand strategy,” Contemporary Politics, 26:4, 2020, pp. 427–431; for a good assessment of U.S.-India relations during the Trump years, see Sharad Joshi, “US-India Ties During the Trump Years and Beyond: Continuity and Convergences,” in Tsuneo Akaha, Jingdong Yuan and Wei Liang (eds.), Trump’s America and International Relations in the Indo-Pacific: Theoretical Analysis of Changes & Continuities (Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2021), pp. 121–152.

⁴⁴ Cara Abercrombie, “Realizing the Potential: Mature Defense Cooperation and the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership,” Asia Policy, 14:1, January 2019, pp. 119–144.

⁴⁵ For more on U.S.-India relations and its approach to other states, see Walter C. Ladwig III and Anit Mukherjee, “India and the United States: The Contours of an Asian Partnership,” Asia Policy, 14: 1, 2019, pp. 11–17.

⁴⁶ Sameer Lalwani and Heather Byrne, “Great Expectations: Asking Too Much of the US-India Strategic Partnership,” The Washington Quarterly, 42:3, 2019, pp. 41–64. Also see Paul Staniland, “America Has High Expectations for India. Can New Delhi Deliver?” War on the Rocks, February 22, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/america-has-highexpectations-for-india-can-new-delhi-deliver/.

⁴⁷ Ashley J. Tellis, “Waylaid by Contradictions: Evaluating Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly, 43:4, 2020, pp. 123–154.

⁴⁸ Terence Roehrig, “The United States and Asia in 2021: Change, Continuity, Some of Each?” Asian Survey, 62: 1, 2022, pp. 1–14.

⁴⁹ Dhruva Jaishankar and Tanvi Madan, “How the Quad Can Match the Hype,” Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-15/how-quad-can-match-hype.

⁵⁰ Vinay Kaura, “India’s Quadrilateral conundrum,” India Review, 20:3, 2021, pp. 337–343.

⁵¹ Tanvi Madan, “India and the Quad,” in Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2022: Key Development and Trends (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022), pp. 214–216.