Examining decentralization, patronage, and rent seeking: lessons from Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in Uttar Pradesh

ABSTRACT

The present study delves into the complex interplay of decentralization, patronage, and rent seeking within the context of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA, Act) in Uttar Pradesh (UP). It addresses some pertinent questions: How does decentralization promote corruption? What tactics and strategies does the local implementer (pradhan) adopt to manipulate this Act? Have these manipulations benefited the pradhan? How have these strategies affected poor households? Drawing on data collected through household surveys, and semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats, sitting pradhans, and local power holders, I investigate whether decentralization has enabled marginalized communities to access employment opportunities or has facilitated patronage and rent seeking practices. The findings suggest that political actors and power brokers exploit decentralized structures for personal gains, manipulating resource allocation and beneficiary selection. Such practices of rent seeking can dilute the demand-driven principles of the Act and defeat the objective of equitable development.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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^11. BPL cards entitle cardholders to various subsidies on housing, food, fuels, pensions, and scholarships.

^12. Lieten and Srivastava, Unequal Partners, 171.

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^15. The district departs from the state average in four ways – adult literacy rate, gender gap in literacy, poverty headcount ratio, and deprivation index. At 61.1%, its adult literacy rate is below the state literacy rate of 67.7%; the gender gap in literacy in Sitapur is around 19.6% compared with the state’s 20.1%; the poverty headcount ratio is 53.3%, comparatively higher than the state’s, which stands at around 43.2%. Finally, there is a huge gap in the deprivation index, which stands at around 70.55 for UP, compared to the state, which is at 54.53.

^16. See MGNREGA website: https://nrega.nic.in (accessed on September, 20, 2023)

^17. See M. N. Srinivas, “The Dominant Caste in Rampura,” American Anthropologist 61, no. 1 (1959): 1–16, https://www.jstor.org/stable/666209; Srinivas defines dominant castes as upper/middle castes that are socially and economically powerful based on their numerical strength.

^18. Lean seasons are from April mid- to mid-June and from mid-September to mid-November.

^19. Interests vary based on various factors. Generally, monthly interest rates range between 10 and 12% per month.

^20. Village assistants have no fixed responsibility. They directly report to and execute orders of the pradhan.

^21. The gram vikaas adhikari works with the pradhan. His responsibilities include administrative tasks and keeping financial records pertaining to income and expenditure of the villages.

^22. James Manor and Rob Jenkins, Politics and the Right to Work (Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan, 2017).

^23. UPA is a center-left political alliance of predominately left-leaning political parties. The largest party in UPA was the Indian National Congress, which formed the government in 2004 with the support of left-aligned parties after no single party was able to receive a majority.

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^25. The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) was launched in the semi-arid regions of Maharashtra with the objective to provide guaranteed employment at wage level to rural households to ensure a minimum level of subsistence. The idea was to reduce the risks faced by poor households by constructing productive assets and infrastructure in villages.

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^27. Rajesh Veeraraghavan, Patching Development. Informational Politics and Social Change in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2021).

^28. Ibid., 29.

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^33. Manor and Jenkins, Politics, 82.

^34. Grance Carswell and Geert De Neve, “MGNREGA in Tamil Nadu: A Story of Success and Transformation?” Journal of Agrarian Change 14, no. 4 (2014): 564–85, doi: 10.1111/joac.12054. Also see, S. S. Gill, S. Singh, and J. S. Brar, “Functioning of NREGS in a Prosperous State: A Study of Punjab,” in The Long Road to Social Security: Assessing the Implementation of National Social Security Initiatives for the Working Poor in India, ed. K. P. Kannan and Jan Breman (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 504–42.

^35. Tanya Jakimow, “Breaking the Backbone of Farmers:’ Contestations in a Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 2 (2014): 263–81, doi: 10.1080/03066150.2014.890932.

^36. Carswell and De Neve,”MGNREGA in Tamil Nadu,” 569.

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^44. Pattenden, Labor State, 119.

^45. Kumbhar, The Long Road, 68.

^46. Pattenden, Labor State, 115–17.

^47. Kumbhar, The Long Road, 408.

^48. Jakimow, “Breaking the Backbone,” 264.

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^51. Reddy, “Innovation,” 110.

^52. Das, “Political Activism,” 205–07; also see Diego Maiorano, Upasak Das, and Silvia Masiero, “Decentralisation, Clientelism and Social Protection Programmes: A Study of India’s MGNREGA,” Oxford Development Studies 46, no. 4 (2018): 536–49, doi: 10.1080/13600818.2018.1467391.

^53. Ronald J. Herring and Rex M. Edwards, “Guaranteeing Employment to the Rural Poor: Social Functions and Class Interests in the Employment Guarantee Scheme in Western India,” World Development 11, no. 7 (1983): 575–92, doi: 10.1016/0305–750× (83)90003–7.

^54. D. Brun and I. H. Diamond, eds., Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

^55. Akshay Mangla. Making Bureaucracy Work (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2022)

^56. Anoop Sadanandan, Why Democracy Deepens (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

^57. Nisha Srivastava, “Social Security in UP: Moving beyond Policy to Government,” in Social and Economic Security in India, ed. S. Mahendra, P. Antony, V. Gayathri, and R. P. Mamgain (New Delhi: Institute for Human Development, 2001), 83–117.

^58. Ravi Srivastava, “Panchayats,” 129.

^59. Jean Drèze and Harris Gazdar, “Uttar Pradesh the Burden of Inertia,” in India Development Selected Regional Perspectives, ed. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 33–128.

^60. Ibid., 94–100. Also see Peter Lanjouw and Nicholas Stern, Economic Development in Palanpur over Five Decades (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

^61. The debate on rural decentralization in India is argued on two strands, one favorable to decentralization and based on a communitarian vision of independent and self-sufficient rural society, and the other that is less favorable to decentralization, based on the perception of deep-rooted socio-economic inequalities. For details, see Sten Widmalm, “The Return of the Periphery,” Forum for Development Studies 34, no. 2 (2007): 347–57, doi: 10.1080/08039410.2007.9666385; and Lieten and Srivastava, Unequal Partners, 153.

^62. Rémy Prud’homme, “The Dangers of Decentralization,” The World Bank Research Observer 10, no. 2 (1995): 201–20, doi: 10.1093/wbro/10.2.201.

^63. Akshay Mangla. Making Bureaucracy Work, 329.

^64. Raghav Gaiha and Vani Kulkarni, “Panchayats, Communities, and the Rural Poor in India,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 37, no. 2 (2002): 38–82, doi: 10.1177/002190960203700203.

^65. Lant Pritchett, “Is India a Failing State? Detours on the Four Lane Highway to Modernization” (Harvard University, John. F. Kennedy School of Government Working Paper Series rwp 09–13:1–47, 2009).

^66. Prud’homme, “Dangers,” 211.

^67. In UP, the pradhan is elected by his electorates. The panchayat is headed by the pradhan, and in his absence by the upa-pradhan (deputy pradhan). His duties include, agricultural extension, land reforms, rural housing, electrification, social and water management and taking care of the public distribution system. To execute these functions, the pradhan is assisted by various committees - vikas samiti (development group), shikasha samiti (education group) and samata samiti (welfare group). To finance these committees, the panchayats receive grants from higher levels of administration.

^68. Srivastava, “Panchayats,” 138.

^69. Thibaud Marcesse, “Public Policy Reform and Informal Institutions: The Political Articulation of the Demand for Work in Rural India,” World Development 103 (March 2018): 284–96, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.024.

^70. H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction,” in Patrons, Clients and Politics: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, ed. H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–49.

^71. See note 68 above.

^72. Marcesse, “Public Policy Reform,” 291–92.

^73. Gaiha and Kulkarni, “Panchayats, Communities,” 65.

^74. Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

^75. Craig Jeffrey, Patricia Jeffery, and Roger Jeffery, “Dalit Revolution? New Politicians in Uttar Pradesh, India,” The Journal of Asian Studies 67, no. 4 (2008): 1365, doi: 10.1017/s0021911808001812.

^76. Gaiha and Kulkarni, “Panchayats, Communities,” 50.

^77. Srivastava, “Panchayats,” 142.

^78. Dutta, “Power, Patronage,” 347.

^79. Srivastava, “Social Security,” 100–102.

^80. Siddhartha Mukerji, “The 2015 Gram Pradhan Elections in Uttar Pradesh Money, Power, and Violence,” Economic and Political Weekly 53, no. 24 (2018): 58–63.

^81. Satendra Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh Local Elections 2015: Money, Muscle and Manipulation in a Village,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 58, no. 1 (2019): 43–62, doi: 10.1080/14662043.2020.1700018.

^82. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

^83. Anjani Kochar, “The Effectiveness of India’s Anti-Poverty Programmes,” The Journal of Development Studies 44, no. 9 (October 2008): 1289–308, doi: 10.1080/00220380802265074.

^84. Drèze and Sen, India, 88.

^85. Ibid., 91.

^86. Kochar, “The Effectiveness,”1293.

^87. Lieten and Srivastava, “Unequal Partners,” 55.

^88. Craig Jeffrey, “Caste, Class, and Clientelism: A Political Economy of Everyday Corruption in Rural North India,” Economic Geography 78, no. 1 (January 2002): 21, doi: 10.2307/4140822.

^89. Diego Maiorano, Suruchi Thapar- Björket, and Hans Blomkvist “Politics as Negotiation: Changing Caste Norms in Rural India,” Development and Change, 53, no 1 (June, 2021), 217–248, doi: 10.1111/dech.12654.

^90. Widmalm, “The Return,” 351.

^91. Pattenden. “Gatekeeping,” 178.

^92. Atul Kohli, Poverty amid Plenty in the New India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

^93. Ibid., 175.

^94. Ravi Srivastava and Rahul Ranjan, “Deciphering Growth and Development,” Economic and Political Weekly 71, no. 53 (2016): 32–43 https://www.jstor.org/stable/44166049.

^95. Ashok Pankaj and Rukmini Tankha, “Empowerment Effects of the NREGS on Women Workers: A Study in Four States,” Economic and Political Weekly 45, no. 30 (2010): 45–55 https://www.jstor.org/stable/20764337.

^96. Retika Khera and Nandini Nayak, “Women Workers and Perceptions of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act,” in Social Policy, ed. Jean Drèze (Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan, 2016), 300–19.

^97. Ibid., 311.

^98. Social audits are the examination and assessment of MGNREGA records. Conducted with the active involvement of the villagers, it involves comparing official records with actual ground realities. Social audits are powerful tools for social transformation, community participation and government accountability.

^99. Neera Chandhoke, “Global Civil Society and Global Justice,” Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 29 (2007):3016–3022, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4419813.

^100. According to the norms of MGNREGA, the demand for work should emerge from the claims made by those villagers willing to undertake manual labor. However, in both panchayats surveyed, it was the village assistant who was responsible for choosing the workers.

^101. Manor and Jenkins, Politics, 83.

^102. Interview with the village secretary of the second panchayat, 3^rd January 2020.

^103. Interview with ex-pradhan of the first panchayat, January 3, 2020.

^104. Ibid.

^105. The wages in the construction industry varies. In cities of Lucknow and Sitapur (located within 90 kilometers), wages vary between Rupees 400 and 450 per day, whereas in locations in the vicinity of the villages, it can be between Rupees 300 and 350 per day. All these places are approachable by rail and road networks.

^106. Interview with a worker in the first panchayat, October 18, 2018.

^107. 1US$ equals INR 83.

^108. Factions are organized on the basis of certain aims, objectives, aspirations, and considerations common to all members. In a village, religious, social, economic, and political considerations determine the formation of factions.

^109. In both panchayats, the largest landowner owns 45 acres of land. In central UP, 7 bigas of land is equivalent to one acre.

^110. René Véron, Glyn Williams, Stuart Corbridge, and Manoj Srivastava, “Decentralized Corruption or Corrupt Decentralization? Community Monitoring of Poverty-Alleviation Schemes in Eastern India,” World Development 34, no. 11 (2006): 1922–41, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.024.

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^113. Herring and Edwards, “Guaranteeing Employment”

^114. Jeffrey, “Caste, Class,” 28.

^115. Mona M. Lyne, The Voter’s Dilemma and Democratic Accountability (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2010).

^116. Zoya Hasan, Quest for Power (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

^117. Ibid., 251.

^118. Paul Brass, The Politics of India since Independence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

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^121. James Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review 66, no. 1 (1972): 91–113, doi: 10.2307/1959280.