The Orthodox Church of Georgia: challenges under democracy and freedom (1990–2009)

Abstract

This article focuses on the complexity of Georgian Church–State relations during the period of transition from communist rule to democracy. It analyses the position of the Orthodox Church of Georgia, a powerful symbol of the Georgian nation, vis-à-vis the newly formed State, the relations between the government and the Orthodox Church of Georgia, and attitudes within Georgian society to the Church–State partnership. Finally, it addresses the influence of the political conflict between the neighbouring states of Russia and Georgia, as reflected in the Georgian Church–State partnership.

Keywords:

• Orthodox Church
• Georgia
• nationalism
• democracy
• Church–State relations
• Georgian society
• Russian–Georgian relations

Acknowledgements

My gratitude for their comments goes to Zaal Andronikasvhvili, Nick Awde, Alexander Belopopsky and Levan Menagarishvili.

Notes

¹In view of the focus on events in the period 1990 to 2009, the resource material for this article comes mainly from the official website of the Orthodox Church of Georgia (www.patriarchate.ge) and from a number of other internationally acknowledged news agencies (www.civil.ge; www.rferl.ge).

²The Economist, ‘The Russia–Georgia War'.

³On April 9, 1989 Soviet troops in Tbilisi brutally intervened in opposition to a peaceful protest against existing Soviet rule. As a result of the attack on the protestors, 20 people died, mostly young women. Since then, Georgia has commemorated this day as the day of the nation's struggle for independence.

⁴On May 26, 1918 the Act of Independence of the newly created Georgian Democratic Republic was signed, following the February 1917 revolution in Russia, which spread later to Georgia.

⁵In spite of the fact that religions and nationalities were oppressed in the Soviet Union, there were also moments when the Soviet régime did favour certain nations and churches, especially the Orthodox Churches. In the last decade of Soviet rule oppression of the Orthodox Church of Georgia was softened.

⁶When used in reference to the Georgian context, throughout this paper the term ‘nationalism’ implies the ethno-religious identity formed over the centuries on the basis of common literary language and confession and maintained as a common memory and culture. The most visible signs of such affinity have been a shared territory and statehood (although subject to change).

⁷It is an issue in itself why the Church of Georgia withdrew from the ecumenical/international organisations under the pressure of the new forms of nationalism. Previously, to be a member of these bodies among the other representatives of world Christianity was a matter of national pride.

⁸There is a large Muslim population in Georgia, amounting to about 9% of the total population of the country, residing mainly in the south-west, near the border with Turkey; in Adjara are mostly ethnic Georgians, and in the south-east, near the border with Azerbaijan, mostly ethnic Azeris. Since the sixth century bc there have also been Jews residing in the Georgian lands.

⁹This point was articulated by the heads of the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church at the enthronement of Patriarch Kirill I in Moscow in February 2009.

¹⁰See Matt. 16.18, ‘You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church [ekklesia]’. See also Matt. 18.17, and Acts 19.39, ‘If there is anything further you want to know, it must be settled in the regular assembly [ekklesia]’ [in Ephesus].

¹¹Greek: people, as Church.

¹²Greek: people, as component of democracy.

¹³See on this subject Fr George Florovsky (1893–1979), ‘Boundaries of the Church’. This essay was one of Florovsky's key contributions to ecclesiology.

¹⁴Grdzelidze,‘Using the Principle of Oikonomia’, 236.

¹⁷Ibid., 112–13.

¹⁵Sabanadze, Globalisation and Nationalism, 88.

¹⁶Ibid., 94.

¹⁸The United National Movement is the current governing party in Georgia.

¹⁹Sabanadze, Globalisation and Nationalism, 112.

²⁰This is the reason why the author of this article always uses the Orthodox Church of Georgia rather than Georgian Orthodox Church.

²¹Rev. Prof. Dr Grigorios Papathomas, ‘La relation oppositionnelle'.

²²In both cases the emphasis falls on the ethnicity; a state where the Georgian language, culture and a traditional confession dominate.

²³ http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_show&mode=news&id=512.

²⁴Schöpflin, ‘Liberal Pluralism and Post-Communism’, 116.

²⁵ http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079456.html.

²⁶ http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20125.

²⁷Sermon preached on September 27, 2009 in the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity, Tbilisi.

²⁸ http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=kons_shet [in Georgian].

²⁹Abashidze, ‘Abolition of Autocephaly’, 113.

³¹Zhmakin, ‘The Georgian Catholicos Anthony II in Russia’, 111.

³⁰Paichadze, Georgievsk Treaty, 74.

³²See footnote 4.

³⁴http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba.

³³On one occasion, during the April uprising, when a number of young opposition activists were imprisoned by the internal police, the Patriarch called for their release and urged the opposition not to step outside the law. The prosecutor-general said in a statement that the prisoners had been released in response to the Patriarch's request.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶ http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgian_Orthodox_Church_Patriarch_Criticizes_Saakashvili_ For_War_/1853790.html.

³⁷The Liberty Institute played a crucial role in bringing President Michael Saakashvili to power after the Rose Revolution in 2003 and still remains in close proximity to the present government.