Mobilizing precarious workers in Italy: two pathways of collective action intentions

Figures & data

Table 1. Mean (standard deviation) and standardized loading of each observed indicator on exogenous factors.

	M (SD)	Collective Identification	Politicized Identification
I identify myself with precarious workers	3.86 (1.05)	0.80
I feel strong bonds with precarious workers	3.71 (1.04)	0.70
I define myself as precarious workers	3.66 (1.20)	0.92
I feel I belong to the category of precarious workers	3.76 (1.14)	0.91
I identify myself with trade unionists	2.84 (0.99)		0.64
I would like to be part of trade union’s activities	3.09 (1.08)		0.92
I see myself as trade unionist	2.63 (1.26)		0.82
I would be proud of being part of a trade union	3.00 (1.07)		0.83

Exact wording of each indicator is reported on the left-hand side of the table, followed by means and standard deviations, and standardized factor loadings extracted from a SEM performed using AMOS 18.

Table 2. Mean (standard deviation) and standardized loading of each observed indicator on endogenous factors.

	M (SD)	Perceived collective efficacy	Perceived group-based injustice	Collective action intentions
The way workers are treated is unfair	3.84 (0.88)		0.83
Working conditions are unacceptable	3.63 (0.96)		0.79
Many workers are exploited	4.26 (0.86)		0.66
Together workers could lay claim to better working conditions	3.86 (1.01)	0.77
Things better if workers become aware of their power	3.90 (0.99)	0.87
Favourable to minimum income	7.06 (2.36)			0.63
Willing to sign petitions for minimum income	6.94 (2.45)			0.66
Favourable to increase protections for workers who have lost their job	7.96 (1.87)			0.86
Willing to demonstrate supporting workers who have lost their job	7.11 (2.43)			0.79

Exact wording of each indicator is reported on the left-hand side of the table, followed by means and standard deviations, and standardized factor loadings extracted from a SEM performed using AMOS 18.

Table 3. Total, direct and indirect effects of collective and politicized identifications on collective action intentions.

Total effect		Direct effect		Indirect effect
Collective identification	Politicized identification	Collective identification	Politicized identification	Collective identification	Politicized identification
0.56 (0.47; 0.65)	0.55 (0.42; 0.71)	0.35 (0.26; 0.44)	0.41 (0.29; 0.54)	0.20 (0.16; 0.27)	0.14 (0.08; 0.22)
p < .001	p < .001	p < .001	p = .001	p < .001	p = .001

Unstandardized estimates, confidence intervals, and p statistics are calculated performing Monte Carlo simulation with 4000 repetitions.

Figure 1. Dual pathway model of collective action intentions among precarious workers.

Estimates include standard errors and significance levels. The total variance explained is reported above each endogenous factor. For information about the measurement component and variables wording, see Tables 1 and 2. Model fit: χ² (107) = 223.92, p < .001; CFI = .965; RMSA = .057, 90% CI [.046; .067], p = .146; SRMR = .047. The results are consistent when gender, age, education and employment condition are introduced as controls (see Table S.4 for details).

Data availability statement

Dataset, main analyses and Supplementary online material can be found on the Open Science Framework repository. Identifier: Open Science Framework