Deterrence, Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion

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Notes

1. For a version of these events provided by Ambassador Glaspie in an “informal conversation” with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Don Oberdorfer, “Glaspie Says Saddam is Guilty of Deception”, Washington Post, 21 March 1991, pp. 23–24.

2. Charles H. Holbrow, “Scientists, Security, and Lessons from the Cold War”, Physics Today, July 2006, pp. 39–44.

3. The Economist, 10–16 June 2006, p. 22.

4. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 2005, p. 77.

5. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 207.

6. 20 million deaths was the figure commonly cited at the time. Later research has indicated that the actual number may have been significantly higher.

7. For a detailed discussion of the Soviet understanding of nuclear deterrence, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation (rev. edn), Washington DC: Brookings, 1994, pp. 847–865. For a Russian perspective, see also Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

8. A good discussion of the use of deterrence in a variety of cases is found in James Steinberg, “Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy”, Survival, Winter 2005–2006, pp. 55–72.

9. Presidential foreword to “The President's Strategic Defense Initiative”, January 1985.

10. For a discussion of these negotiations, see Maynard Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War, New York: Macmillan, 2006.

11. Hans Blix et al, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms (Report of the WMD Commission), Stockholm: Fritzes ett Wolters Kluwer-foretag, 2006, p. 73.

12. An important, but frequently overlooked, document is the “Basic Principles”, agreed by Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972, in which the sides agreed to avoid “efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other”. Department of State Bulletin, 66, 26 June 1972, pp. 898–899.

13. Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, 1 May 2001.

14. Quoted in the Washington Post, 4 October 2006, p. 18.

15. See, for example, Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper 380, 2006, p. 21.

16. Garthoff, op. cit., p. 867.

17. National Academy of Sciences, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy, Washington DC: National Academies Press, 1997. This study assumed that the recommended reductions would follow implementation of the 1997 Helsinki Framework, agreed between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. This did not happen, but the levels agreed between Presidents Bush and Putin in the Moscow Treaty of 2002 are similar.

18. Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, What are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring US Strategic Nuclear Forces, Washington DC: Arms Control Association, April 2005.

19. An interesting discussion of how US Presidents from Roosevelt to Bush managed nuclear weapons is contained in James E. Goodby, At the Borderline of Armageddon, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

20. For a discussion of tailored deterrence, see M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?”, Strategic Forum, No. 225, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, January 2007.

21. An early discussion of the possible replacement of nuclear weapons by conventional weapons is found in Stephen Younger, “Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century”, Los Alamos National Laboratory, June 2000.

22. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 20 June 2001.

23. “Russian Federation Military Doctrine”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, 22 April 2000. For an English translation, see Arms Control Today, May 2000.

24. Sergei Ivanov, “Russia Must be Strong”, Wall Street Journal, 11 January 2006, p. 14.

25. See, for example, AWE, Confidence, Security & Verification, Aldermaston: Atomic Weapons Establishment, 2000.

26. Forward to the White Paper, “The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent”, London: HMSO, December 2006.

27. Margaret Beckett, address to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, 25 June 2007.

28. Jacques Chirac, “Speech to the Strategic Air and Maritime Forces” at Landivisiau/L'lle Longue, 19 January 2006. For more detailed discussion of French policy, see Bruno Tertrais, “France Stands Alone”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2004, pp. 48–55. See also David S. Yost, “France's Evolving Nuclear Strategy”, Survival, Autumn 2005, pp. 117–146.

29. “The Alliance's Strategic Concept”, NATO Public Diplomacy Document SC99ENG0604, para. 46, Brussels: NATO, available at http://www.nato.int.

30. “China: Arms Control and Disarmament”, Article 6 of “White Paper” issued by the Information Office of the People's Republic of China, November 1995.

31. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Policy Brief, London: IISS, 2006.

32. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, p. 43.

33. A useful discussion of the uncertainties of nuclear deterrence is found in Keith Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996.

34. A detailed discussion of collective deterrence is found in Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 5–7, 2003.

35. See, for example, Peter Dombrowski and Rodger A. Payne, “The Emerging Consensus for Preventive War”, Survival, Summer 2006, pp. 115–136.

36. A more detailed analysis with similar conclusions is found in David S. McDonough, Nuclear Superiority, Adelphi Paper 383, Ch. 4, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2006. For further discussion of deemphasizing nuclear weapons, see Jack Mendelsohn, “Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons”, Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 2006.