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ABSTRACT
The United States and Russia, in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine, seem to have ditched entirely the “reset” in their political relations. Despite this odor of Cold War redux, there remain the opportunities and necessities for renewed attention to strategic nuclear arms control as between the two governments. US and NATO missile defenses as planned for European deployment figure into this equation, although in somewhat unpredictable ways, given technological uncertainties in existing and foreseeable defenses, as well as the possibility of improved delivery systems for offensive conventional or nuclear weapons.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 For example, see: Maxim Tucker, ‘Russia Launches Next Deadly Phase of Hybrid War on Ukraine’, Newsweek.com, March 31, 2015, in Johnson’s Russia List 2015 - #64, April 1, 2015, [email protected]; and Elisabeth Braw, ‘Putin is ‘Playing the Madman’ to Trick the West’, Newsweek.com, April 1, 2015, in Johnson’s Russia List 2015-#64, April 1, 2015, [email protected].
2 For expert assessments, see: Graham Allison, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Dicey Dilemma: Russia Stands at a Fateful Fork in the Road’, The National Interest, November 11, 2014, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/24724/vladimir_putins_dicey_dilemma.html (accessed November 12, 2014); and Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Putin’s Deadly Doctrine: ‘Protecting’ Russians in Ukraine Has Fatal Consequences’, New York Times, July 20, 2014, in Johnson’s Russia List 2014-#157, July 20, 2014, [email protected].
3 Andrew Higgins, ‘Norway Reverts to Cold War Mode as Russian Air Patrols Spike’, New York Times, April 1, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/world/europe/a-newly-assertive-russia-jolts-norway:html (accessed April 2, 2015).
4 Lawrence Korb and Alex Rothman, ‘Obama Plan to Reduce Nukes Is Good for Budget, Boosts Moral Authority on Global Proliferation’, February 15, 2012, [email protected], http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/02/15/426332/obama-plan-to-reduce-nukes-is-good-for-budget-boosts-moral-authority-on-global-proliferation/. See also: Arthur Blinov, ‘Obama’s Anti-Nuclear Signal to Russia: The United States Suggests a Dramatic Reduction of Nuclear Warheads’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 16, 2012, in Johnson’s Russia List 2012 - #29, February 16, 2012, [email protected].
5 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf.
6 See: Keir Giles with Andrew Monaghan, European Missile Defense and Russia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2014); Andrew Futter, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy: Normalization and Acceptance after the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2013); and Rebecca Slayton, Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949–2012 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2013), esp. 205–226. For historical perspective on US and Soviet-Russian missile defenses, see: Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992); Frances FitzGerald, Way out there in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the end of the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); and Jennifer G. Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). On Russian views of missile defenses as related to arms control, see Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Russia’s Future Arms Control Agenda and Posture’, Ch. 1, 1–62 and Steven Pifer, ‘The Russian Arms Control Agenda after New START’, Ch. 2, 63–92, both in Russia and the Current State of Arms Control, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 2012).
7 US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2014), 7.
8 Podvig, Pavel, ‘New START Treaty in numbers’, from his blog, Russian strategic nuclear forces, April 9, 2010, http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml.
9 The Obama European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense will retain and improve some technologies deployed by the George W. Bush administration, but shift emphasis to other interceptors, supported by improved battle management-command-control-communications (BMC3) systems and launch detection and tracking. See: Karen Kaya, ‘NATO Missile Defense and the View from the Front Line’, Joint Force Quarterly no. 71, 4th Quarter (2013): 84–9. See also: Association of the US Army (AUSA), US Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities: Enabling Joint Force 2020 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, 2014); Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni, NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: The Implications of Burden Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the US Army (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2013); LTG Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense Overview, presented to 10th annual missile defense conference (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, March 26, 2012, 12-MDA-6631), http://www.mda.mil/news/downloadable_resources.html (accessed May 23, 2012); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Fact Sheet (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 22, 2012) http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120520_media-backgrounder_NATO_ballistic_missile_defence_en.pdf (accessed May 23, 2012); and The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on US Missile Defense Policy: A “Phased, Adaptive Approach” for Missile Defense in Europe (Washington, DC: The White House, September 17, 2009) http://www. whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-html. For critical assessment of US missile defense plans by expert scientists and other commentators, see: David Willman, ‘$40-Billion Missile Defense System Proves Unreliable’, Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-missile-defense-20140615-story.html (accessed June 16, 2014); Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for US Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for US Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington, DC: National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, National Academies Press, 2012), prepublication copy, www.nap.edu (accessed September 17, 2012); William J. Broad, ‘US Missile Defense Strategy Is Flawed, Expert Panel Finds’, New York Times, September 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/science/us-missile-defense-protections-are-called vulnerable (accessed September 13, 2012); Tom Z. Collina, ‘Failure to Launch: Why did America Just Spend $30 Billion on a Missile Defense System that Doesn’t Work?’, Foreign Policy, September 12, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/12/failure to launch? (accessed September 13, 2012); Philip Coyle, ‘The Failures of Missile Defense’, The National Interest, July 26, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-failures-missile-defense-7248 (accessed August 2, 2012); and, George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, ‘A Flawed and Dangerous US Missile Defense Plan’, Arms Control Today, May 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol (accessed August 2, 2012).
10 For additional perspective on this topic, see: Daniel Wagner and Diana Stellman, ‘The Prospects for Missile Defense Cooperation Between NATO and Russia’, Foreign Policy Journal, February 10, 2011, www.foreignpolicyjournal.com, in Johnson’s Russia List 2011 - #24, February 10, 2011, [email protected]; and Stephen J. Blank, Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November 2011), 32–3.
11 See Blank, Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy, passim.
12 Mike Gruntman, Intercept 1961: The Birth of Soviet Missile Defense (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 2015) is a recent expert appraisal. See also: Sayre Stevens, ‘The Soviet BMD Program’, Ch. 5 in Ballistic Missile Defense, eds. Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984), 182–220.
13 Mark B. Schneider and Peter Huessy, ‘Russian Deployment of Missile Defenses: Hidden in Plain Sight’, February 18, 2013, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3590/russia-missile-defense.html (accessed November 6, 2014).
14 Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine referred to “dangers” as well as “threats,” whereas prior editions made reference only to threats. Although “dangers” might seem less menacing than “threats” to interested readers, the dangers mentioned are concrete and specific compared to the threats, the latter of a more general nature. Listed dangers include the desire of NATO to globalize its force potential and move its military infrastructure closer to the borders of Russia. See: Daniel Goure, ‘Moscow’s Visions of Future War: So Many Conflicts Scenarios So Little Time, Money and Forces’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, no. 1 (2014): 63–100, esp. 67–75, and Marcel de Haas, ‘Russia’s Military Doctrine Development (2000–10)’, Ch. 1 in Russia’s Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine, ed. Stephen J. Blank, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2011), 1–61, esp. 39–43. An updated version of Russia’s Military Doctrine was signed by President Putin and approved by the Russian Security Council in December, 2014. The updated version describes NATO’s military buildup and its expansion toward Russian borders as the main external threats to Russia’s security. See: GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Russian Military Doctrine’, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/doctrine.htm (accessed April 17, 2015).
15 For additional historical perspective on Russian threat perceptions and views of future war, see Jacob W. Kipp, ‘ ‘Smart’ Defense from New Threats: Future War From a Russian Perspective: Back to the Future after the War on Terror’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, no. 1 (2014): 36–62; and Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Russian Military Doctrine: Past, Present, and Future’, Ch. 2 in Russia’s Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine, ed., Blank, 63–151. See also: ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, text, www.Kremlin.ru, February 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List 2010 - #35, February 19, 2010, [email protected].
16 Nicholas Khoo and Reuben Steff, ‘This Program will not be a Threat to them”: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China’, Defense and Security Analysis, no. 1 (2014): 17–28.
17 Force structures are the author’s. For expert estimates, see: Joseph Cirincione, ‘Strategic Turn: New US and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons’, New America Foundation, June 29, 2011, http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/strategic_turn, and Podvig, “New START Treaty , http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml.
18 Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr James Scouras for use of his Arriving Weapons Sensitivity Model (AWSM) in this study. Dr Scouras is not responsible for its use here, nor for any arguments or opinions presented.
19 New START counting rules are used, counting each bomber as one weapon although bombers obviously can be equipped with more.
20 Ballistic missile defenses even if greatly improved solve only one part of the emerging threat. Another is the possibility of attack by nuclear armed cruise missiles. Expert commentators note that “ … the United States and its NATO allies have neglected air and cruise missile defense for over twenty years” and that, as a result, a gap in air and cruise missile defense has developed in NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. Mikhail Tsypkin and David Yost, Responding to Russian Noncompliance with Nuclear Arms Control Agreements (Monterey, CA: US Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 42.
21 For example, a study by Global Zero discusses the possibility of missile defenses augmented by passive defenses (such as hardening and sheltering) and advanced US conventional missions against regional adversaries such as Iran or North Korea. See Gen. (Ret.) James Cartwright, Chair, Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission Report, Modernizing US Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, May, 2012, www.globalzero.org (accessed May 18, 2012).
22 Expert assessment of this concept appears in: Jan Van Tol, with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010). See also: Jeremiah Gertler, US Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), R43049, www.crs.gov.
23 Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Posture Statement (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 2012), 15–16, cited in Gertler, US Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization, 5–6.
24 Slayton, Arguments that Count: Physics, 216–219 and passim.
25 Mark B. Schneider, ‘The State of Russia’s Strategic Forces’, American Foreign Policy Council, October 2014, www.afpc.org/defense_dossier (accessed November 4, 2014).