![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Discussion surrounding the announcement of a new NATO Maritime Command for the North Atlantic seems to have settled on the assumption that there is again a vital “sea-line of communication” (SLOC) between North America and Europe as there was supposed to be during the Cold War. The Soviet Union had a large fleet of nuclear and conventional submarines and it seemed very clear that Soviet admirals intended to fight a third “Battle of the Atlantic” in the event of war to prevent Western resupply of NATO. However, this scenario bore no resemblance to what the Soviet Navy actually intended to do in case of war. Changes in technology, notably in submarine propulsion, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and ballistic missile range and accuracy were the real drivers of the Cold War in the Atlantic. Cruise missile-armed submarines that can attack shore-based economic infrastructure are the real threat from the Russian submarine force.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of the Center for Naval Analyses or the United States navy.
Notes on contributor
Steven Wills is an expert in US Navy strategy and policy, and US Navy surface warfare programmes and platforms. His research interests include the history of US Navy strategy development over the Cold War and immediate, post-Cold War era, and the history of the post-World War II US Navy surface fleet. Prior to joining CNA, Wills completed a PhD in military history from Ohio University, and had a 20-year career as an active duty US Navy officer. He served on a variety of small and medium surface combatants. Wills holds a PhD and M.A. in History from Ohio University, an M.A. in National Security Studies from the United States Naval War College, and a B.A. in History from Miami University, Oxford, OH.
Notes
1 Jeffrey Barlow, From Hot War to Cold, The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955 (Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 2009), 164.
2 Ibid.
3 W.E. Albertson, Force requirements for Hunter-Killer Groups (Arlington, VA: The CNA Corporation, December 15, 1947), 1.
4 Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group, A History of Naval Operations Analysis (Annapolis, MD: The U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1984), 115.
5 “The Hartwell Report” (Cambridge, MA; The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1950), C1, electronic resource, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a800013.pdf (accessed April 27, 2018).
6 Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, The Admiral's Advantage, U.S. Naval Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2014), 383.
7 Frank H. Scofield, The Estimate of the Situation (Newport, RI: The U.S. Naval War College Summer Conference Lecture, June 1912), 6.
8 John Hattendorf, ‘Saving Nimitz’s “Graybook”’, Naval History 28, no. 3 (June 2014), online resource, https://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2014-05 (accessed April 19, 2018).
9 Ibid.
10 Owen R. Cote Jr., The Third Battle Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines (Newport, RI: The U.S. Naval War College Press, 2003), 18.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 34, 35.
14 James H. Irvin, Soviet Weapon Acquisition (China Lake, CA: The U.S. Navy Weapons Center China Lake Engineering Department, 1991), 4, electronic resource, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241165.pdf (accessed May 2, 2018).
15 “Intelligence Memorandum; The Soviet Attack Submarine Force; Evolution and Operations” (Washington, DC: The Central Intelligence Agency, 1971), 8, electronic resources, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0002013695.pdf (accessed May 2, 2018).
16 Svetlana V. Savranskaya, ‘New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2005), 243.
17 Ibid., 239.
18 Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy; Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: The U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1968), 67.
19 Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 237.
20 Ibid., 240.
21 Cote, The Third Battle Innovation, 60.
22 Ford and Rosenberg, The Admiral’s Advantage, 73.
23 Soviet Navy, Intelligence and Analysis During the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Central Intelligence Agency, 2017), 25, 26.
24 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 80.
25 Glen R. Asner, Series Editor, Elliot Converse, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense; Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960 (Washington, DC: The Department of Defense Historical Office, 2012), 297.
26 Alan Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1971), 224–7.
27 Ibid., 227.
28 Edward C. Keefer, Harold Brown, Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge, 1977–1981 (Washington, DC: The Defense Department Historical Office, 2017), 216.
29 Ibid., 124.
30 Ibid., 124.
31 Ibid., 215–7, 230–4.
32 Ibid., 560, 561.
33 Frank Leith Jones, Blowtorch, Robert Komer, Vietnam and American Cold War Strategy (Annapolis, MD: The U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2013), 250, 251.
34 Ibid., 234.
35 Ibid., 574.
36 Randall A. Greenwalt, Groerge F. Kause Jr., et al., Historical Examples of Competitive Strategies (Washington, DC: The SAIC Corporation, March 23, 1991), 1.2.
37 Cote, The Third Battle Innovation, 71.
38 Lehman, Oceans Ventured, 125–8.
39 Gary E. Weir and Walter J. Boyne, Rising Tide, The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines that Fought the Cold War (London, Penguin Books, 2004), 204.
40 Cote, The Third Battle Innovation, 64–7.
41 John F. Lehman Jr, Oceans Ventured, Winning the Cold War at Sea (New York; Norton, 2018), 55, 56.
42 Vladimir Kuzin and Sergei Chernyavskii, ‘Russian Reactions to Reagan's ‘Maritime Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2005): 429.
43 Maksim Y. Tokarev, ‘Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy’, Newport, RI; The Naval War College Review 67, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 71.
44 Ibid., 80.
45 The Russian Navy; A Historic Transition (Washington, DC: The Office of Naval Intelligence, December, 2015), iv.
46 Hank H. Gaffney and Dmitry Gorenburg, CNA’s Russia Program 1991–2004; A Valedictory (Alexandria, VA: The Center for Naval Analyses, August 2005), 8.
47 Pavel K. Baev, Putin’s Vision and Plans for Modernizing the Russian Military: Counter-Terrorism and Power-Projection (Oslo: The Oslo Peace Institute, December 2005).
48 Ilyá Kramnik, ‘Fixing the fleet: The new infrastructure of the Russian Navy’, Russia Beyond 13 (June 2016).
49 Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027 (London: Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, May 2018), 8.
50 Mike Kofman, ‘Russian Navy 3; Impressive Beneath the Waves’, Russia Military Analysis Blog, February 3, 2017.
51 Connolly and Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027, 16.
52 Mike Kofman, ‘Russia’s Fifth-Generation Sub Looms’, Russia Military Analysis Blog, October 9, 2017.
53 “Russia to change its nuclear submarine crew training methods,” Navy Recognition, March, 2019, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2019/march/6911-russia-to-change-its-nuclear-submarine-crew-training-methods.html (accessed August 20, 2019).
54 Mike Kofman, ‘Fire aboard AS-31 Losharik: Brief Overview’, Russia Military Analysis Blog, July 3, 2019.
55 Magnus Nordenman, The New Battle for the Atlantic, Emerging Naval Competition with Russia in the Far North (Annapolis, MD: The Naval Institute Press, 2019), 138.
56 Thomas Nilsen, ‘Russian Navy Drill Outside Northern Norway Ended Without Smoke’, The Barents Observer, August 18, 2019.