Southeast Asia’s human rights institutions and the inconsistent power of human rights

Abstract

This article argues that continuing ambivalence about the importance of rights in Southeast Asia is not based on a perception that rights are a hegemonic ideological imposition of the West, or on a desire on the part of some states to preserve the ability to treat domestic populations however they wish, unhampered by the constraints of international human rights law. Instead, I contend that ambivalence has to do with uncertainty in the application of rights. I use two case studies (Brunei’s introduction of a strict form of Islamic law in 2013; and the attack by Myanmar’s military forces on the country’s minority Muslim population, the Rohingya, in 2017) to test whether rights in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Human Rights Declaration can be specified to an extent that would allow the Declaration to fulfill its role as a common framework for human rights cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Notes

Notes

1 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) European Court of Human Rights.

2 Sensitivity of regional courts to state imperatives of security, health, and public morality, manifest in application by regional courts of the doctrine of margin of appreciation, has been criticized as giving undue deference to states and undermining the principle of universality.

3 Article 34 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration states: “ASEAN member states may determine the extent to which they would guarantee the economic and social rights found in this Declaration to non-nationals, with due regard to human rights and the organisation and resources of their respective national economies.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Catherine Michelle Renshaw

Catherine Renshaw is a Professor in the School of Law at Western Sydney University. She teaches Human Rights in the Asia Pacific, International Human Rights Law, Human Rights in Theory and Practice. She is a Director of the Network for Law and Human Rights.