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ABSTRACT
Scholars debate elites’ capacity to shape the parameters of national belonging. Hard constructivists believe elites have tremendous leverage, while soft constructivists caution that elites face severe constraints in this process. We address this debate in our study of Muslim Americans. Recently political elites tried to integrate Muslim Americans by expanding an ascriptive interpretation of American identity: from WASP, to white Christian, to pan-Abrahamic. This attempted incorporation was met by a potent wave of Islamophobia after 11 September 2001. One consequence of this rejection was an increasing number of Muslim Americans identifying themselves as, and being perceived by others as, people of colour. Elites underestimated deeply-entrenched beliefs that resist expanding American-ness beyond white Christians. They face fewer constraints integrating new groups into the non-white category. We contend the debate over hard and soft construction must be circumscribed by the particular aspects or features elites are attempting to objectify.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Thomas Jefferson (1993, 243) – a man who sired several children with his slave Sally Hemings – classified blacks as ‘inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind’.
2. The US federal census does not ask questions regarding religious identification. The Pew Research Center estimated that there are around 4 million Muslims in the United States (Mohamed Citation2021). Of these, 63% are first-generation immigrants (“Muslim Americans” Citation2011, 8). A far higher percentage are US citizens than is the case with other immigrant communities: 81% of Muslim Americans are US citizens, whereas among the general immigrant population only 47% are citizens (“Muslim Americans” Citation2011, 8). Linguistically, culturally, ethnically and phenotypically they are diverse. Approximately 41% are from the Middle East and North Africa, 26% are South Asian, 11% some from sub-Saharan Africa, 7% from Europe and 5% hail from Iran (“Muslim Americans” Citation2011, 8).
3. Indian missionary Mufti Muhammad Sadiq, who arrived in New York City in 1920, learned that African Americans were more receptive to his message than whites (Curtis Citation2009, 31). Preaching racial equality, Sadiq and other members of his Ahmadiyya sect of Islam forged a cooperative relationship with Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (Curtis Citation2009, 32). Other indigenous African American Islamic movements would emerge in this era, including the Moorish Science Temple and the Nation of Islam (Curtis Citation2009, 34–35).
4. While the Democratic Party is committed to civil rights there is no guarantee that it has purged bigots from its ranks.
5. The primary goal of those using the term ‘Judeo-Christian’ is not to embrace Jews, per se. Popular with white Evangelicals, the term is employed to convey a biblically-centred interpretation of American identity (Barreto and Kim Citation2022; Durbin Citation2013).
6. Muslim Americans’ shift towards the Democratic Party was gradual. The 2001 Zogby poll indicated that more Muslim Americans supported the Republican Party than the Democrats. By 2007 more leaned towards the Democrats − 48% – than the Republicans − 40% (“Muslim Americans” Citation2011, 53). Four years later 70% supported the Democrats and only 11% identified with the Republicans (“Muslim Americans” Citation2011, 9). In 2016 the Republican Party’s standard bearer, Donald Trump, could only count on the support of 8% of the Muslim American vote while his Democratic rival Hillary Clinton amassed 78% support (“U.S.” Citation2022). Among Muslim American women Clinton earned 88% of their support (“U.S.” Citation2022).
7. Underscoring the role of religion in shaping racial identity, (Shryock Citation2008, 89) study of Arab Americans in the Detroit area revealed Arab Christians were far more likely to self-identify as white than their Muslim co-ethnics. As Naber (Citation2000, 53) noted, ‘it is primarily the distorted use of Islam, rather than phenotype, that marks Arab Americans as non-white Others’. Guhin (Citation2018, 90) corrected pointed out, however, that ‘to say that Islam is racialised is not quite the same as to say that Islam is a race’.
8. The difference in how Latinos racially self-identity and how most Americans racialise them is rooted in the distinct racial schemas found in Latin America versus the US. Racial categories in the US are dichotomous: one drop of non-European ancestry makes someone non-white (Yancy Citation2003, 48–49). Whereas in Latin America racial identities are far more fluid and continuous (Telles Citation2004). Hence, in Latin America someone can be racially mixed and still be perceived as white which is not the case in the US.
9. There is among Muslim Americans greater acceptance of homosexuality among those born and raised in the US. Back in 2007, 61% of Muslim Americans said homosexuality should be discouraged (Muslim Americans Citation2011, 10). Four years later that dropped to 45% (Muslim Americans Citation2011, 10). These attitudes come from a community where 69% say that religion is an important part of their lives and 47% attend mosque prayers weekly (Muslim Americans Citation2011, 10). These statistics for Muslim Americans compare favourably with Christian Americans. About 70% of Christian Americans say religion is important to them and about 45% attend church services weekly (Muslim Americans Citation2011, 10).
10. Pew’s 2011 survey revealed that 30% of American Muslims see themselves as white, 23% as black, 21% as Asian, and 19% as mixed race (Muslim Americans Citation2011).