Rethinking cynicism: Parrhesiastic practices in contemporary workplaces

Abstract

This paper looks at the concept of cynicism as a form of employees' resistance to managerial control. Some studies tend to view cynicism as a potentially conservative and self-defeating form of resistance that inherently thwarts the possibilities for confronting managerial control. We argue, however, that cynicism can also be viewed as a disruptive force, if we look at it in its original meaning. Drawing inspiration from the works of Foucault and Sloterdijk, we pay attention to the ethics of antiquity and more specifically to parrhesia, with the aim of rethinking cynicism and emphasizing its potential applicability to organizational life.

Keywords:

• cynicism
• kynicism
• parrhesia
• power
• resistance

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Simon Lilley, Christiana Tsaousi, Valerie Fournier and Stephen Dunne for their help in developing this paper. Thanks also to the members of the 27th Standing Conference on Organizational Symbolism (SCOS) held at Copenhagen Business School, Denmark in 2009 at which an earlier version of this paper was presented. Finally, we would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions. Any shortcomings that remain, however, are of course our own.

Notes

Although Foucault (2001) does not use the word kynicism in his lectures, in this paper we use it as a synonym for ancient cynicism in order to avoid any confusion.

For the reader interested in how Sloterdijk's later works have been applied to organization theory or are related to organizing more broadly theory see ten Bos (2009) and Borch (2010).

For instance, Deleuze suggested that this production of ourselves is problematic because it is based ‘on the basis of old modes which do not correspond to our problems’ (cited in Lea 2009, 72)

For a possible continuity between Sloterdijk and Lyotard see Jones (2003, 517), and for a good analysis of Lyotard's relation to Kant see Hutchings (1996).

On ideology critique and its differences with Foucauldian discourse analysis see Vighi and Feldner (2007).

Of course Foucault's interest in Kant goes back to 1961 when he translated Kant's Anthropology and wrote the preface of that book. On Kant's primacy of practical reason and the relation between Kant and Foucault see Sharpe (2005).

On Kant's notion of freedom see also Zupančič (2000).

We borrow the subtitle from Sorgner (2003).

Of course there are important differences between the ‘later Foucault’ and Žižek; in this case the way they conceive transgression. However, Armstrong (2008) sees a homology in the way they conceptualize resistance.

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this paper to our attention.