Turning inward: Tocqueville and the structuring of reflexivity

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I argue that the dominant view of reflexivity in contemporary social science is overly decontextualized, despite the value that reflexivity scholars have placed on the dynamic and active nature of individual thought and action. While this problem has been highlighted before, in terms of how habitual actions shape the way that individuals engage in reflexive thought, little attention has been given to the ways in which non-internalized elements of the environment condition this process. I illustrate my argument with examples from Tocqueville’s classic text Democracy in America. I demonstrate how Tocqueville provided a framework for analyzing the way that societal-level norms and opportunity structures impact personal reflexive capacities. In this respect, his work is unparalleled and as such remains relevant to contemporary debates. I therefore argue for the application of Tocqueville’s work into arenas it has seldom entered.

KEYWORDS:

• Tocqueville
• reflexivity
• Margaret Archer
• structure
• agency
• Durkheim

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Lawrence H. Williams is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Toronto. His research interests lie primarily in sociological theory and the sociology of culture, with a focus on decision-making, identity, and careers. His current research focuses on how individuals working in the field of customer service understand their careers and find meaning at work.

ORCID

Lawrence H. Williams http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1520-3591

Notes

1. Indeed, this theme was key in the work of Durkheim (1893) on the role of ‘work associations’ in preventing anomie or strong apathy in industrial societies as well as in Habermas’s (1989) ideas about the role of salons and coffee houses in providing spaces of free communication and open dialogue between individuals of different classes.

2. As right by birth actually did cease to be, individuals did have less means of realizing their commonality with one another in some ways. However, as opportunities to realize one’s likeness with others were still plentiful – through voluntary associations, for example – I believe Tocqueville saw this as more of a perception than a reality.

3. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who pointed out that it is on this point that he differs from scholars who emphasize reflexivity’s apophatic qualities, such as Mouzelis (2010) and Brock (2017). The latter scholars assert that individuals may actively seek to challenge themselves in ways that often cause them to feel sorrow, anguish, and pain. Moreover, they assert that these tendencies are not mere reactions to perceived social ills, as will be later discussed when Durkheim’s anomie is used as an example of the negative aspects of reflexivity inherent in Tocqueville’s work.

4. Indeed, Tocqueville (2002, 44) sees the development of nations as ‘analogous’ to that of children, and claims that the most puzzling behaviours found in a nation could surely be explained by looking to the ‘national character’ it had in its founding years.