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ABSTRACT
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons calls for states to meet regularly to consider measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapon programs. Key to this effort is mapping a comprehensive set of nuclear weapon program indicators and further developing international capacity to monitor them. Distinct from the deadlocked Conference on Disarmament, this new forum will have an opportunity to examine and elaborate disarmament verification concepts. One relevant concept is an international monitoring system for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation verification (NDN-IMS), elaborated from a proposal most recently noted by the United Nations Open-ended Working Group (A/71/371). As a flexible framework, an NDN-IMS, could help unite diverse technologies and mechanisms around the purpose of disarmament verification in ways that support the existing nonproliferation regime and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Elements could include satellite imagery from new constellations, wide area environmental sampling, and civil society reporting.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Tamara Patton is a doctoral student in Science, Technology and Environmental Policy at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Her research examines systems and technologies for verifying nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements. She works with virtual reality environments to design and simulate possible managed-access systems for verifying reductions or elimination of treaty-accountable items. Prior to coming to Princeton, she was a researcher at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (2014–2015) and at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2012–2013). She has also worked as a Researcher on arms control with the US Naval Postgraduate School's Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory and Remote Sensing Center (2011).
Notes
1 Certified true copy of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, 2017, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2003-42%20PM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf.
2 Zia Mian, Tamara Patton, and Alexander Glaser, ‘Addressing Verification in the Nuclear Ban Treaty’, Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today, June 2017; United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, ‘A Path to Universality Through Cooperative, Transparent, Verifiable and Irreversible Disarmament’, Submitted by Princeton University, A/CONF.229/2017/NGO/WP.46, June 22, 2017.
3 Membership of the UNAEC initially included: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, USSR, United Kingdom, United States; UN Resolution 1(1), Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its First Session, ‘Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problem Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy’, January 24, 1946. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm.
4 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, ‘Annex to the Official Record of the Seventh Meeting; Annex 4: Certain Items to Be Included among the Findings and Recommendations in the Forthcoming Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, Proposed by the Representative of the United States of America at the Seventh Meeting of the Commission’, December 5, 1946.
5 United Nations Security Council, ‘Amendments and Additions to the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council Submitted by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the Hundred and Either Meeting of the Security Council’, February 18, 1947, S/283.
6 United Nations Disarmament Commission, https://www.un.org/disarmament/institutions/disarmament-commission/ (accessed November 26, 2017); United Nations Report of the Disarmament Commission, General Assembly, Fifty-Fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42), May 6, 1999, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/42%20(SUPP).
7 Shannon Mandate, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1299, March 24, 1995. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/basicinfo/1299.pdf.
8 International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, https://www.ipndv.org.
9 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 2016, A/RES/71/67’, 14 December 2016, https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/67.
10 George Perkovich and James Acton, ‘Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2009, 233.
11 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Elimination, April 2007, United Nations General Assembly, (A/62/650); Updated from the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated in November 1997 as United Nations document A/C.1/52/7
12 Laura Rockwood, ‘The IAEA’s State-Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences’, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, August 28, 2014, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/Features/The-IAEAs-State-Level-Concept-and-the-Law-of-Unintended-Consequences.
13 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards: Report by the Director General to the General Conference’, GC(39)/17, August 22, 1995, annexes 1 and 4, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC39/GC39Documents/English/gc39-17_en.pdf.
14 Rockwood, ‘The IAEA’s State-Level Concept’.
15 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards: Report by the Director General to the General Conference’.
16 Z. Liu and S. Morsy, ‘Development of the Physical Model’, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007, IAEA-SM-367/13/07, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20les/Session%2013/Paper%2013-07.pdf.
17 Liu and Morsy, ‘Development of the Physical Model’.
18 ‘Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan 2012-2023’, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, January 2013, https://www.bnl.gov/ISPO/docs/STR-375-IAEA-Safeguards-Long-Term-Plan.pdf.
19 IAEA, ‘Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings’, International Atomic Energy Agency, Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/factsheet.html (accessed November 30, 2017).
20 IAEA, ‘Iraq Nuclear File’.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 ‘Work & Results’, International Atomic Energy Agency, Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/what.html (accessed November 30, 2017).
24 ‘Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) Plan, Annex 3, List of Items to be Reported to the IAEA’, International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/annex3/annex3_e.pdf.
25 IAEA, ‘Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) Plan, Annex 3, List of Items to be Reported to the IAEA’.
26 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1762 (2007), S/RES/1762, June 29, 2007.
27 See example in this section on Iran in particular.
28 International Atomic Energy Agency, General Conference, ‘The Denuclearization of Africa (GC(XXXVI)/RES/577), Report by the Director General, Attachment 1, Annex 2, Facilities Visited by the Agency Team’, September 9, 1993.
29 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors General Conference, Report by the Director General, Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Annex, GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24, September 2, 2011
30 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors General Conference, Report by the Director General, Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Section E.7. Paragraph 46, GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24, September 2, 2011.
31 International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Annex’, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011.
32 IAEA, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Annex’.
33 International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Annex’, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011, 3 pp.
34 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3, July 14, 2015, Annex 1, Section T; Activities related to multi-point explosive detonation systems and diagnostic systems could be used if approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes subject to monitoring.
35 Nuclear Suppliers Group, ‘NSG Part 2 Guidelines, Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology’, June 2017 Update, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/NSG_Part_2_Rev.11_tracked.pdf.
36 Ibid.
37 ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, Missile Technology Control Regime, http://mtcr.info/frequently-asked-questions-faqs/ (accessed November 30, 2017).
38 Missile Technology Control Regime, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’.
39 Missile Technology Control Regime, Equipment, Software and Technology Annex, MTCR/TEM/2017/Annex, October 19, 2017, http://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MTCR-TEM-Technical_Annex_2017-10-19-corr.pdf.
40 David Cliff, Hassan Elbahtimy, and Andreas Persbo, ‘Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament: Practical Steps Against Nuclear Rearmament’, VERTIC, September 2011.
41 Jon Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint, ‘The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad’, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014; Stephen Schwartz, ‘Atomic Audit’, Brookings Institution Press, June 1998.
42 Toby Dalton et al., ‘Toward a Nuclear Firewall: Bridging the NPT’s Three Pillars’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2017; A. Glaser, ‘Ceci N’est Past une Bombe: Toward a Verifiable Definition of a Nuclear Weapon’ (58th INMM Annual Meeting, Indian Wells, CA, July 2017).
43 Dalton et al., ‘Toward a Nuclear Firewall’.
44 ‘Remarks to The Research Conference – North Korea: Towards a New International Engagement Framework’, James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, February 13, 2004, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/29396.htm.
45 International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Annex’, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011.
46 Allan Krass, ‘Verification: How Much Is Enough?’ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1985, 6–8; Kostas Tsipis, David W. Hafemeister, and Penny Janeway, eds., Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Make It Possible (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 3–6; National Academy of Sciences, Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009); Amy Woolf, ‘Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control’, Congressional Research Service, December 2011, 3–5; ‘Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies’, US Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, January 2014, 12.
47 Krass, ‘Verification’, 6.
48 Ibid.
49 United Nations General Assembly, Second Session, Agenda item 98, General and Complete Disarmament, ‘Letter Dated 17 December 2007 from the Permanent Representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’, A/62/650, January 18, 2008.
50 Ibid.
51 For example, see Digital Globe, World View 4 Satellite Specifications, http://worldview4.digitalglobe.com/#/main.
52 For example, see Planet, https://www.planet.com/.
53 G. Levin et al., ‘Terrapattern: Open-Ended, Visual Query-by-Example for Satellite Imagery using Deep Learning’, May 24, 2016, http://terrapattern.com.
54 Ibid.
55 Jeremy Hsu, ‘AI Can Help Hunt Down Missile Sites in China’, Wired, November 21, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/ai-can-help-hunt-down-missile-sites-in-china/.
56 ‘Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2014-2015’, International Atomic Energy Agency, December 2013, STR-377, 52.
57 Ibid.
58 David Albright and Paul Brannan, ‘Satellite Image of Building Which Contains a High Explosive Test Chamber at the Parchin Site in Iran’, Institute for Science and International Security, March 13, 2012, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/satellite-image-of-building-which-may-contain-high-explosive-test-chamber-a/.
59 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Iran Launch Forthcoming’, Arms Control Wonk, February 23, 2016, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201159/iran-launch-forthcoming/.
60 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Frank Pabian, ‘North Korea’s Hwasong-14 Missile Launch Site Identified: The Panghyon Aircraft Factory’, 38 North, July 6, 2017, http://www.38north.org/2017/07/panghyon070617/.
61 Hans Kristensen, ‘Is China Planning to Build More Missile Submarines?’ Federation of American Scientists, April 23, 2015, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/04/china-subs/; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. ‘North Korea’s Submarine Ballistic Missile Program Moves Ahead: Indications of Shipbuilding and Missile Ejection Testing’, 38 North, March 16, 2017.
62 Hans Kristensen, ‘Russian and NATO Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces’, NATO Advanced Research Workshop, Los Angeles, November 18–20, 2014, https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Brief2014_NATO-LAa.pdf.
63 Tamara Patton, ‘Emerging Satellites for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Verification’, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, January 2016.
64 Ashlee Vance, ‘The Tiny Satellites Ushering in the New Space Revolution’, Bloomberg Businessweek, June 29, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-06-29/the-tiny-satellites-ushering-in-the-new-space-revolution.
65 Michael Schoeppner and Alexander Glaser, ‘Present and Future Potential of Krypton-85 for the Detection of Clandestine Reprocessing Plants for Treaty Verification’, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 162 (October 2016): 300–9.
66 Scott Kemp, ‘Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs’, Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences 44 (2016): 17–35; R.S. Kips and M.J. Kristo, ‘Investigation of Chemical Changes in Uranium Oxyfluoride Particles Using Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry’, Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry 282 (2009): 1031–5.
67 M.B. Kalinowski and M.P. Tuma, ‘Global Radioxenon Emission Inventory Based on Nuclear Power Reactor Reports’, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 100 (2009): 58–70.
68 Kemp, ‘Environmental Detection’; R.J. Huang et al. ‘Determination of Alkylamines in Atmospheric Aerosol Particles: A Comparison of Gas Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry and Ion Chromatography Approaches’, Atmospheric Measurement Techniques 7 (2014): 2027–35; S.S. Nabiev and L.A. Palkina, ‘Current Trends in the Development of Remote Methods of Detecting Radioactive and Highly Toxic Substances’, in The Atmosphere and Ionosphere, ed. V.L. Bychkov, G.V. Golubkov, and A.I. Nikitin (Cham: Springer, 2014), 113–200; C.W. Van Neste, L.R. Senesac, and T. Thundat, ‘Standoff Photoacoustic Spectroscopy’, Applied Physics Letters 92 (2008): 234102.
69 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘IAEA Use of Wide Area Environmental Sampling in the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities’, STR-321, August 27, 1999.
70 Ned Wogman, ‘History of STR 321 – IAEA Use of Wide Area Environmental Sampling in the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities (1996–1998 Multi-country Effort)’, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Symposium, 2010, https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2010/Documents/PPTRepository/Wogman.pdf.
71 Ibid.
72 Schoeppner and Glaser, ‘Present and Future Potential of Krypton-85’.
73 M. Garces and A. Christe, Mic Flocks in the Cloud: Harnessing Mobile Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (University of Hawaii Infrasound Laboratory), http://www.hawaii.edu/arl/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Infrasound-1.pdf
74 Bharath Gopalaswamy, ‘Infrasound Detection of North Korea’s Launch’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 5, 2009, http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/05/05/infrasound-detection-of-north-korea-s-launch-pub-23054
75 Ibid.
76 Mian, Patton, and Glaser, ‘Addressing Verification in the Nuclear Ban’.
77 Levin et al., ‘Terrapattern’.
78 Virgil Gligor and Jeannette Wing, ‘Towards a Theory of Trust in Networks of Humans and Computers’ (presented at the 19th International Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, UK, March 28–30, 2011).
79 ‘Open and Crowd-Sourced Data for Treaty Verification’, JASON Advisory Group, JSR-14-Task-015, October 2014, 8, 47, 54.