Much More Than a Phantom Menace! Assessing the Character, Level and Threat of Neo-Nazi Violence in Germany, 1977–2003

Abstract

Acts of politically motivated violence and terrorism have troubled many European states since the end of the 1960s. A general consensus holds that the most serious dangers and levels of politically motivated violent crime in the last three decades emanated from the left of the political spectrum, while those from the right were often downplayed or underestimated. Why and to what extent did and does far right violence constitute any significant danger? Can such violence be classified and who are the perpetrators? This article sheds light on such questions and focuses specifically on events in Germany where the violence stems largely from an array of small and explicitly neo-Nazi organizations. The article makes a clear distinction between the violent (and under-researched) offences of the self-styled neo-Nazi groups and the activities (which have been well documented) of the larger right-wing extremist political parties, namely Republikaner, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) and Deutsche Volksunion (DVU). Neo-Nazi inspired violence came to typify a particularly offensive and alarming feature of German society in the years immediately following unification in 1990, but it was far from new. This article explores militant neo-Nazism and seeks to provide an assessment of this most extreme variant of right-wing extremism since it emerged in its current form in the late 1970s until the end of 2003. In doing so, it accounts briefly for the origins of militant neo-Nazism and its key personalities before turning to chart the neo-Nazi propensity towards violence and even flirtations on occasions with terrorist-style activities. It explores the targets of neo-Nazism and its motivations before giving consideration to how the state has responded to this menace.

Keywords:

• Germany
• right-wing extremism
• neo-Nazism and violence

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their comments on this article.

Notes

¹ There is a growing amount of material on this theme. See, for example, Cheles, C., Ferguson, R. & Vaughan, M. (Eds) (1995) The Far Right in Western Europe, 2nd edn (London: Longman). See also Merkl, P. & Weinberg, L. (Eds) (2003) Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass).

² See El Refaie, E. (2004) Competing discourses about Austria's Nazi past and racist bomb attacks in the 1990s, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 12(2), pp. 215–230.

³ For a comparative perspective of right-wing extremist parties in Sweden, the UK and the USA see Eatwell, R. & Mudde, C. (Eds) (2004) Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge (London: Routledge).

⁴ Ginzel, G. B. (1981) Hitlers (Ur)enkel: Neo-Nazis, Ihre Ideologien und Aktionen (Düsseldorf, Germany, Droste Verlag).

⁵ However, while the NPD, the DVU and the Republikaner have been losing members in recent years, neo-Nazism has experienced an expansion in numbers, with membership increasing by some 15% in 2003.

⁶ In the late 1960s it had seemed very probable that the NPD would gain seats in the 1969 Bundestag elections on the back of a spate of good election results at the regional level across West Germany between 1966 and 1968 that gave the NPD representation in seven out of the ten regional parliaments. In terms of percentages the NPD polled 7.9% in Hesse, 7.4% in Bavaria, 5.8% in Schleswig-Holstein, 6.9% in the Rhineland Palatinate, 7.0% in Lower Saxony, 8.8% in Bremen and 9.8% in Baden Wurttemberg.

⁷ For details of the rise and fall of right-wing extremism in West Germany see McGowan, L. (2002) The Radical Right in Germany, 1870 to the present (London: Longman).

⁸ The author acknowledges that forces prior to this date can be categorized as neo-Nazi. For example, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), which was founded in 1949, is the most obvious example. One of its leading figures claimed that the difference between it and ‘the NSDAP lies only in the time period’. The SRP achieved notable electoral successes in 1951, particularly in Lower Saxony, where it polled 11% of the votes, and in Bremen, where it captured 7.7%. It was outlawed by the Federal Constitutional Court in October 1952 on the grounds that it constituted a subversive organization possessing unconstitutional aims.

⁹ The Hitler Wave swept through West Germany in the mid 1970s and centred on a general interest in Hitler and National Socialism. This found expression in the availability of Third Reich memorabelia and in a series of television programmes and major books on this subject, including Hitler by Joachim Fest.

¹⁰ Spiegel, 1979, 3 September, p. 129.

¹¹ His ‘career’ as a right-wing extremist was representative of many of his generation and began with the NPD, before progressing to espouse outright sympathy for Nazism and the formation of neo-Nazi groups in and around the Hamburg area. One commentator argued that ‘without his persona, his intelligence and his capabilities the neo-Nazi “movement” would never have succeeded in presenting themselves as a fundamental opposition factor to be taken seriously’. See Dudek, P. (1985) Jugendliche Rechtextremisten, p. 170 (Köln, Germany: Bund Verlag).

¹² According to the BfV, terrorism is defined as an ‘enduring struggle for political goals, which are to be realised through the aid of attacks on people and personal property, particularly by serious criminal offences (above al1 murder, manslaughter, extortion, arson, causing death through bombs or other acts of violence, which serve in the preparation of these offences)’. For details on this incident see Verfassungschutzbericht 1977, p. 32.

¹³ Roeder's career in right-wing extremist circles dates back to the 1950s and he has consistently argued that democracy is simply incompatible with being German. His contribution to the development of neo-Nazism has been substantial, as has his once ardent belief in the use of force as a political weapon. He argued that the right should use the same psychological warfare against the state that had been conducted by the militant left. However, since the early 1980s and in the 1990s he has toned down his pronouncements on violence, as he steered a closer path to the NPD. For a fuller discussion on Roeder's views in the 1970s and early 1980s see Ginzel (1981), p. 49.

¹⁴ Upon his release in the early 1990s he quickly resumed links with like-minded right-wing extremists, including Manfred Roeder, and was handed down a further prison sentence in the autumn of 1999 for inciting racial hatred, by his outright denial of the Holocaust.

¹⁵ The WSG Hoffmann was, in essence, a paramilitary organization run in a strict disciplinarian fashion. Its members resembled soldiers in their appearance and activities; they wore grey and green uniforms and engaged in combat, undertook target practice with guns and conducted manoeuvres in their jeeps and even (pre-war manufactured) tanks [von Hellfeld, M. (1987) Modell Vergangenheit: Rechtsextreme und Neokonservativen Ideologien in der BRD, p. 331 (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein)].

¹⁶ This ban was confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court, which regarded the WSG Hoffmann as deliberately intent on undermining and destroying the constitutional order of the West German state.

¹⁷ Franz-Josef Strauss continued to stress their harmless nature. ‘My goodness, if someone wants to enjoy himself and goes walking on Sundays into the country with a rucksack and in battle dress, then he should be left alone’. See Spiegel, 1984, 20 August, p. 37.

¹⁸ Hoffmann returned four months later and was arrested in June 1981 and in 1986 was sentenced to nine years imprisonment. His arrest and temporary removal from the scene enabled others to seize the mantle of neo-Nazi leadership. For further details of life in this camp see Müller, R. (1984) Schule des terrorismus, in: W. Benz (Ed.) Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Fischer-TB).

¹⁹ Ideologically the VSBD/PdA campaigned for greater national awareness, a revision of the Nuremberg trials, measures against the falsifying of German history, the liberation of Germany from foreign occupation and a staunch hostility to ‘bolshevism’.

²⁰ Friedhelm Busse was already a renowned neo-Nazi personality in the 1980s. He belonged to an older generation of neo-Nazi advocates and had been involved in right-wing extremist activity since the 1950s, traversing the leading political forces, including the NPD. Upon expulsion from the latter because of his militancy he established the Partei der Arbeit (Party of Work) or PdA in 1971.

²¹ In an interview in Stern, 1984, 12 July, p. 54.

²² For further information see Dudek, P. & Raschke, H. G. (1984) Entstehung und Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 343 (Opladen, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften).

²³ Immediately prior to this international fixture the ANS/NA had distributed leaflets that not only castigated the Turkish supporters but openly appealed for violence against them. The atmosphere on the evening was tense and the scenes of mobs of chanting neo-Nazis to a large extent overshadowed the match in terms of media coverage. It is also worth pointing out that some 6,000 police officers were deployed to prevent and quell the outbreak of any violence.

²⁴ Welt, 1989, 10 February, p. 1.

²⁵ A modest revival in the fortunes of right-wing extremist parties can be traced back to the mid 1980s, but they scored their most impressive results in a series of regional elections between 1987 and 1989. Most notably, the DVU/Liste scored 5.1% at the elections in Bremen in September 1987, while the Republikaner polled 7.5% of the vote in West Berlin in January 1989 and 7.1% (14.6% in Bavaria) at the European parliament elections in June 1989. These results sent reverberations across West Germany. See McGowan (2002) pp.147–172.

²⁶ How far Kuhnen could have steered events in the 1990s must be open to speculation as he succumbed to an AIDS-related illness in April 1991.

²⁷ See Panayi, P. (1994) Racial violence in the New Germany, 1990–93, Contemporary European History, 3(3), pp. 265–288.

²⁸ An interesting glimpse of life inside the world of these neo-Nazis is presented in Svory, Y. & Taylor, N. (1995) In Hitler's Shadow: Journey Inside Germany's Neo-Nazi Movement (London: Constable).

²⁹ See Bergman, W. (1994) Anti-Semitism and xenophobia in the East German Länder', German Politics, 3(2), pp. 265–276.

³⁰ According to this new definition of politically motivated crime an offence is defined as politically motivated if the circumstances of the offence or the attitude of the offender lead to the conclusion that it is directed against individuals due to their political beliefs, nationality, ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, ideology, origin, sexual orientation, disability, appearance or social status. See BfV report for 2003, p. 27.

³¹ The NF had been founded by Meinholf Schönborn in 1985 and had around 130 members.

³² Bundesamt fűr Verfassungsschutz (BfV) report for 2001, p. 56.

³³ The NSAN has promoted several campaigns, such as the ‘Popular movement to stop foreigners—don't immigrate, go home’, and also been directly responsible for a series of historical and topical issues, such as a march in honour of Rudolf Hess. The NSAN comprises neo-Nazis from Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Bremen and Niedersachsen. See BfV report for 2001, p. 58 and report for 2003, pp. 50–51.

³⁴ The anti-US message can be traced back to the 1970s. Opposition to NATO military action in ex-Yugoslavia and especially the participation of German soldiers have become a central theme of all the right-wing extremist parties. This action is condemned as US involvement in European affairs as a means of establishing a new world order under American hegemony. The authorities do not believe that any significant links have yet been developed between the neo-Nazis and Islamic fundamentalists. For further information see the BfV report for 2001, p. 31.

³⁵ Virchow, F. (2004) The groupuscularization of neo-Nazism in Germany: the case of the Aktionsbuero Norddeutschland, Patterns of Prejudice, 38(1), pp. 56–70.

³⁶ Principally articles 86 and 86a of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) outlaw the use and spreading of the emblems and flags, the sale of Mein Kampf, and other materials relating to the Nazi Party.

³⁷ According to the BfV report for 2003 ‘with an average of 2.08 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, the rate was more than three times that in the western Länder’ (p. 34).

³⁸ From 2001 it is impossible to compare the statistics on offences in the annual BfV reports with those from previous years because the BKA has opted to use a different way of compiling the statistics, which are now determined by the concept of politically motivated crime (politisch motivierte Kriminalität or PMK). Basically, a PMK occurs if it can be proven that the perpetrator carried out the action on account of their political beliefs. Prior to this direct evidence had to exist about a perpetrators links to extremist associations.

³⁹ The French Interior Minsiter stated before the French parliament that neo-nazi groups were responsible for 65 acts of violence in 2004. See Deutsche Well at http://www.dw-world/de/dw/article/0,1564,1476883,00.html.

⁴⁰ See for example the German nightly news Tagesthemen, 6 August 2000. As another example Wolfgang Thierse, the speaker of the Bundestag, has called for efforts to focus the battle against right-wing extremist sympathies in the five states of Eastern Germany. See Tagesschau, 24 August 2000.

⁴¹ For issues relating to the social composition of neo-Nazism see Heitmeyer, W. (1995) Rechtextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen (Munich, Germany: Juventa).

⁴² Brown, T. S. (2004) Subcultures, pop music and politics: skinheads and Nazi rock in England and Germany, Journal of Social History, 38(1), pp. 157–178.

⁴³ For further information on this debate see Deutsche Welle at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1460235,00.html.

⁴⁴ BfV report for 2001, p. 32.

⁴⁵ See Hasselbach, I. (1996) Fűhrer-X: Memoirs of a Neo-Nazi (London: Random House).