The East is different, isn’t it? – Poland and Hungary in search of prestige

ABSTRACT

This cross-disciplinary contribution asks, why the erosion of rule of law as part of the democratic backlash has taken place in ‘Eastern Europe’. It is argued that the question is about prestige, in which Poland and Hungary are struggling for a greater status and social recognition as ‘middle powers’. In this search of prestige long history matters, and prestige and power is easily considered to have a priority before the rule of law, as practice before theory, and ‘realism’ before ‘liberalism’. At first, the article revisits the politics of cartography and updates debates of naming, as the concepts of ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Central Europe’, or ‘East Central Europe’ remain contested. Furthermore, the experience of difference is located in ideas of separating ‘East’ and ‘West’ and to the status of democracy on the continent. As the article particularly compares Poland and Hungary, special chapters are dedicated to their centuries old histories and mutual friendship. Empirical examples come from current discussions on ‘illiberal’ and ‘flawed’ democracy as the Polish Three Seas Initiative.

KEYWORDS:

• Illiberal
• democracy
• rule of law
• prestige
• identity

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Moreover, there is a distinction between politics of definition and politics of identification. Thus, different languages adapt concepts from other languages, create new and question the present ones. For Finns the name Itämeri (‘The East Sea’) represents the Swedish (Östersjön) and German (Ostsee) points of views, while in English it is known as the Baltic Sea. More well-known is the recent dispute, whether the sea between Japan and continental Asian should be called The East Sea (South Korea) or Sea of Japan (Japan) (The Korea Herald 2012).

2. As the result of the problems ensued through the unambiguous classification of some states and territories as Western or Eastern, the area between them was in time defined as a separate being. This view was shared, among others, by Oskar Halecki (2000), who saw it as a zone separating the Holy Roman Empire or Teutonic and Romanic nations from Eurasian Russia. On the other hand Juros (2003, 22) stresses the semantic meaning of the analysed expression, as the term ‘Central Western Europe’ does not exist (see, e.g. Gerner 1991).

3. However, even more important is to remember that ‘playing out the result’ is not one-sided, as also ‘them’ have views, even perceptions of ‘us’. Think the city of Ho Chi Minh, which still after 40 years persist the name Saigon.

4. One of the most famous is Hans Kohn’s (1944) idea of Eastern and Western nationalism. The starting point of his essentialist perspective can be traced to his 1944 book, in which he made a distinction between Western and Eastern nationalism. For him, descendant of a Jewish family in Austria-Hungary, the criterion was geographical – on the Rhine. Indeed, again the question of Germany and its relation to Poland and Hungary comes to the fore.

5. As existing EU member states, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania share borders with Russia, whilst Poland and the two Baltic states have a common border with Belorussia. Moreover, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania shared borders either with Ukraine or Moldova.

6. The Economist i.e. Democracy Index measures democracy in five categories: electoral process, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties.

7. In some cases the graph resembles ‘a saw’ with ups and downs but still the 2006 result is higher than in 2016.

8. The special report was drafted by the Dutch Green MEP Judith Sargentini. It states that the situation in Hungary exposes ‘a clear risk of a serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2 of the Treaties’ (HungaryToday 2018). Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty refers to respect for democracy and the rule of law, among others.

9. In the Hegelian thought it was typical for ‘historical nations’ that they had an ability to form a state. Thus, in the Hegelian spirit Marx and Engels stressed revolutionary actions of the historical nations in 1848, contrary to smaller Slavic nations supporting counter-revolution.

10. In his 2017 Băile Tușnad speech Orbán considered the strengthening of the Visegrád Four even ”the most important Hungarian and European event of the past year”.

11. The Polish diaspora, around 20 million Polish origins, is one of the largest on the globe. In Hungary the mythical 5 million outside national borders has played a role, particularly since the Prime Minister József Antall declared that he would be the PM of 15 million Hungarians in his spirit.

12. This is particularly true in their Russian relations, in which countries like Hungary or Slovakia, as some Western states, represent more moderate views than Poland and the Baltic.

13. Both even commemorate their friendship on March 23, and in 2016 the Hungarian Parliament declared the whole year as the ‘Year of Hungarian–Polish solidarity’.

14. Less known is that after the capitulation Bem escaped to Turkey, converted to Islam and ended as a governor of Aleppo.

15. Recently, Pew Research Center (2017) included nine EU countries in its survey, which comprised 37 countries and 40 000 people. Hungary was the most pro-Trumpian 29% before Italy 25% and UK and Poland respectively 22%.

16. ‘The saying goes that if you trust someone, you can steal horses together. The Hungarians will gladly steal horses with the Poles’ (Reuters 2016).