ABSTRACT
This article maps out how domestic scope conditions in Moldova have influenced and shaped the emergence of resilience in EU-Moldova relations and the implementation of EU resilience-building during the period 2014–2020. Drawing on scholarly works addressing the ‘resilience turn’ in the study of European foreign policy, this article argues that EU external action towards Moldova post-2014 is marked by (i) a narrow and minimalist conception of resilience-building in so far as it revolved almost exclusively around EU demands for anti-corruption measures and the de-politicisation of the Moldovan judiciary, (ii) the responsibilization of local elites to pursue corresponding reforms, and (iii) the absence of a clear-cut resilience-building strategy for Moldova. It is suggested that the EU pursued a wavering course, made itself dependent on ruling elites, committed several U-turns and neglected the empowerment of local, non-governmental actors in making Moldova more resilient and free of corruption and oligarchic interests. The article demonstrates that EU resilience-building attempts in Moldova between 2014 and 2020 were a function of domestic scope conditions and the extent to which governing elites’ reform rhetoric was perceived as credible by EU stakeholders.
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Notes
1. See Transparency International ‘Corruption Perception Index’ 2014 and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator 2014.