Consciousness from the standpoint of behaviour analysis

ABSTRACT

Recent developments in neuroscience have greatly increased interest in the study of consciousness, without solving the puzzles about its nature and function. This paper reviews the problem of introspection, the current approach within cognitive psychology, some neuroscientific data on brain activity and the possible neural correlates of consciousness, current philosophical accounts that emphasize the role of qualia, and alternative behavioural account of consciousness. Experimental and conceptual analysis shows that there are flaws both in the traditional view that consciousness is a private event that is causally related to action, and in the cognitive psychological assumptions that consciousness must be an element in a mediating cognitive system that will be shown to be identical with a specific brain location or process. Alternatively, behaviour analysis treats consciousness as verbal behaviour and is developing an account of it through applying and extending the explanatory principles used to account for other human behaviour. However, the lack of consensus within behaviour analysis on the status of private events is an obstacle in explaining this account to the wider community. Recent empirical work has extended behaviour analysis into areas of human language and cognition, but more empirical work is needed to address the many types of activity that fall in the area of consciousness. Workers in other fields are also identifying the shortcomings of a conventional cognitivist approach, and we should make common cause with them.

KEYWORDS:

• Consciousness
• behaviour analysis
• behaviourism
• cognitive psychology
• cognitivism
• neuroscience
• qualia