Harder governance built on soft foundations: experience from OECD peer reviews

Figures & data

Table 1. Summary of the types of hardening in the OECD peer reviews, and the involved trade-offs and ambiguities.

	Review design choices		Elements of hardness and softness in OECD reviews			Types of hardening; ambiguities and trade-offs
	Hard	Soft	Environmental Performance Reviews	Energy Policy Reviews	Economic Surveys
Criteria of performance	Universally applicable, external criteria; and fulfilment of recommendations from previous review	Country’s own policy objectives	Soft: country’s own objectives; cost-effectiveness of policies Hard: indicators	Hard: Shared Goals of IEA; indicators	Hard: shared beliefs amongst the economist community; efficiency of policies; indicators	Blaming & shaming from comparability and objective criteria Precision from clearly defined criteria
Review topic(s)	Comprehensive review, covering the entire policy area	Focused review, (partly) on topics selected by the reviewed country	Hard: traditionally, comprehensive reviews Soft: constant demands for more focused reviews	Hard: traditionally, comprehensive reviews Soft: constant demands for more focused reviews	Hard: comprehensive reviews, with focus on links between macroeconomics and policy areas	Justification Blaming and shaming via cross-country comparison; comprehensiveness reduces the reviewed country’s influence Bundling & coupling through comprehensiveness can undermine blaming & shaming in advanced countries
Roles of different actors in drafting the review	Reviewed country has little influence on the review, esp. on drafting the conclusions and recommendations	Co-drafting by the secretariat and member countries	Hard: modest influence by the reviewed country; bundling and coupling via strong ‘peer element’	Soft: close interaction between the secretariat and the reviewed country government Hard: bundling and coupling via strong ‘peer element’	Soft: close interaction between the secretariat and the reviewed country government; weak peer element	Review team independence and dominant role of the secretariat: enhances precision and blaming & shaming, but may undermine bundling & coupling Precision and blaming & shaming may benefit from member country engagement (e.g. reviewed country demands for more precise, targeted and influential recommendations)
Language of recommendations	Precise and punchy, with detailed targets	Consensual, diplomatic, and general	Context-dependent	Context-dependent	Context-dependent	Precision, obligation, blaming & shaming Country-specific context (e.g. discussion culture) shapes the ability of blaming & shaming to operate
Peer review meeting	Long (full-day) meeting Spontaneous, free-flowing debate	Short meeting Discussion follows a strict predefined agenda	Hard: day-long meeting Soft: ceremonial meeting Bundling and coupling via cross-sectoral integration Sometimes ministerial participation	Soft: short meeting Bundling and coupling via cross-sectoral integration	Hard: secretariat active; free-flowing discussions Soft: short meeting Bundling: consolidation of the economist expert community	Blaming & shaming – peer meeting as a ‘semi-public’ event Precision and justification from central role of the secretariat Blaming & shaming via different pathways, depending on the background of the delegates Ministerial participation may enhance or undermine precision and blaming & shaming Bundling & coupling, in countries with a weak tradition of cross-sectoral work
	Affects hardness, depending on the context: Ministerial participation or not? Committee members from capitals or permanent OECD delegations?
Frequency of the reviews	Short review cycle, high frequency	Long review cycle	Soft: long review cycle	Harder: 4-year cycle	Hard: 18–24-month cycle	Blaming & shaming, at greater frequency
Follow-up and monitoring of review recommendations	Mandatory, according to clear guidance	Voluntary	Soft: voluntary follow-up reporting	Hard: interim annual reviews	Hard: follow-up in each review	Justification
Financing the review	Dedicated OECD budget funding	Funding dependent on short-term priorities of member countries	Soft: dependence on changing budgeting priorities	Soft: dependence on changing budgeting priorities	Hard: OECD flagship – secured funding	Provides the preconditions for hardness