Abstract
In some views, philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over. While philosophers were especially important in the early days of the field, so the argument goes, the majority of the work in bioethics today involves the “simple” application of existing philosophical principles or concepts, as well as empirical work in bioethics. Here, we address this view head on and ask: What is the role of philosophy in bioethics today? This paper has three specific aims: (1) to respond to skeptics and make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics, (2) to discuss some of the current challenges to the meaningful integration of philosophy and bioethics, and (3) to make suggestions for what needs to happen in order for the two fields to stay richly connected. We outline how bioethics center directors, funders, and philosopher bioethicists can help.
Keywords:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This paper arose out of a panel discussion at a Philosophical Bioethics Workshop, which was funded in part by the Seminar Series. We would like to thank Eric Mathison who helped organize the Workshop and panel. We would like to thank the following philosophers for helpful comments during presentations of this paper in Works-In-Progress groups: Gwen Bradford, Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Nick Evans, Brent Kious, Maria Merritt, Bryanna Moore, Ryan Nelson, Govind Persad, Andrew Peterson, Tim Schroeder, Danielle Wenner, Vida Yao.
Notes
1 This is especially this case for clinical bioethics, they argued, in contrast to “new” areas such as artificial intelligence or population level bioethics where philosophers might still have more of a place.
2 For a discussion of these issues see Frick Citation2015.
3 Rice University, October 9th 2020.
5 See, e.g., philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, who has articulated an idea of human agency or authentic agency whereby a person is capable of (and acts on) the basis of a reason that she embraces or endorses rather than disowns.
6 Conversely, philosophy arguably also needs people who can translate empirical and scientific findings and their implications into philosophical and theoretical discourse.
7 See, for example, the entry on the non-identity problem in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which surveys some implications for the ethics of procreation.
8 See, among many other things: Clarke Citation2010.
9 See, for instance, Dempsey and Dougherty Citation2021.
10 It is important to distinguish relativism from the idea that there are sometimes multiple rationally justifiable views on a topic. We thank [removed for blind review] for this point.
11 There is debate, however, about the nature of “moral expertise” (Veatch Citation1973). For a helpful analysis of the types and nature of moral expertise and especially the way in which an ethicist/philosopher may have moral expertise, see Veatch Citation1978.