Cooperation and Competition in Public-Sector Negotiations: A Laboratory Experiment

Figures & data

Figure 1. Process during experiment.

Table 1. Allocation of Participants During the Negotiation Game.

Group 1	Group 2	Group 2
High PSM	Low PSM	High PSM
↕	↕	↕
High PSM	Low PSM	Low PSM

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition.

	High-PSM/High-PSM	Low-PSM/Low-PSM	High-PSM/Low-PSM	Total	Test statistic
n	30 (29%)	40 (38%)	34 (33%)	104 (100%)	Chi-Squared χ^2 = 1.46 p = 0.481
Female-presenting	13 (43%)	20 (50%)	13 (38%)	46 (44%)	Chi-Squared χ^2 = 1.04 p = 0.593
Age (SD)	20.73 (2.44)	21.18 (1.66)	21.52 (2.69)	21.16 (2.27)	ANOVA F = 0.978 p = 0.338
PSM (SD) reliability = 0.72	3.54 (0.31)	3.30 (0.33)	3.19 (0.31)	3.33 (0.35)	ANOVA F = 9.76 p = 0.00***
Negotiation beliefs (SD) reliability = 0.76	2.80 (0.58)	2.69 (0.53)	2.58 (0.60)	2.69 (0.57)	ANOVA F = 1.18 p = 0.309
ROCI-II cooperation^2 reliability = 0.74	4.06 (0.33)	4.09 (0.36)	3.88 (0.40)	4.01 (0.37)	ANOVA F = 3.40 p = 0.037*
ROCI-II competition reliability = 0.82	3.2 (0.79)	3.1 (0.77)	3.3 (0.71)	3.91 (0.75)	ANOVA F = 0.635 p = 0.532
Pro-social	2 (15.4%)	6 (46.15)	5 (38.36%)	13 (100%)	Chi-Squared χ^2 = 2 p = 0.367
Pro-self	23 (28.75%)	31 (38.75%)	26 (32.5%)	80 (100%)	Chi-Squared χ^2 = 1.22 p = 0.542
Neither pro-social nor pro-self	5 (45.45%)	3 (27.27%)	3 (27.27%)	11 (100%)	Chi-Squared χ^2 = 0.727 p = 0.695

Figure 2. Contributions by experimental condition (left side), and by study type (right side).

Figure 3. Development of contributions over time during the experiment (left = raw data, right = smoothing applied).

Table 3. Hierarchical Tobit Estimates on Contributions During the Experiment (negotiation dyads as random effects.).

	Model 1 Conditions (mixed as reference)	Model 2 Period and gender expression	Model 3 Study type	Model 4 ROCI
Fixed effects
Intercept	9.373***	8.045***	9.327***	10.624***
	(6.84)	(5.90)	(11.77)	(9.54)
Study dummy (1 = PA)			0.784***
			(5.56)
High-PSM/High-PSM dummy	−0.048	−0.005
	(−0.02)	(−0.00)
Low-PSM/Low-PSM dummy	0.857	0.909
	(0.46)	(0.49)
Period		0.180***
		(12.56)
Male dummy		0.595***
		(4.82)
ROCI cooperation				0.049
				(0.31)
ROCI competition				−0.355***
				(−4.21)
Random effects
σ^2 Negotiation dyads	5.589***	5.549***	5.622***	5.630***
	(9.55)	(9.55)	(9.54)	(9.54)
σ^2 Residuals	3.503***	3.485***	3.494***	3.497 ***
	(98.38)	(98.43)	(98.39)	(98.38)
Wald χ^2 (df)	0.30 (2)	181.34 (4)	30.95 (1)	19.46 (2)
Log likelihood	−16777.20	−16685.35	−16761.87	−16767.624
Akaike information criterion	33564.406	33384.699	33531.743	33545.495
Bayesian information criterion	33600.654	33435.446	33560.741	33581.491
n	10,400	10,400	10,400	10,400
n-truncated (right)	4,853	4,853	4,853	4,853

Notes: *p < 0.05;

**p < 0.01;

***p < 0.001.

Standard errors in parentheses.