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Abstract
Two scholars of the international relations (IR) of Eurasia consider the “geopolitical identity” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They first outline that most of the existing analysis and comment on the SCO assumes its raison d’etre to be countering the “West” in Eurasia and beyond and suggest that this narrow perspective does not afford the SCO enough agency, which leads to a distorted picture of the variety of SCO discourse and behavior. Second, they outline a framework based on a combination of the literatures on Critical Geopolitics and identity-focused IR for examining the “geopolitical identity” of the SCO. The article then traces the SCO’s geopolitical discourse on its own collective identity, its relationship to the West in wider international affairs, Eurasia, and in areas in which it seeks active collaboration with the West. It is argued that while in many contexts the SCO’s geopolitical discourse is indeed built upon a Self/Other dynamic that contrasts their common positions on certain international issues against those of the West, in others it identifies similarity to the West and suggests a larger in-group between itself and the West.
Notes
1. The term “Western” has come under increasing interrogation in recent years, particularly with regard to the discussion about the division between Western and non-Western international relations. In this paper, however, the question of the West is approached from the point of view of the existing literature on the SCO that itself tends to label this particular regional organisation as “anti-Western” as will be outlined in the review literature. Therefore the point of departure is to examine whether this is indeed the way in which the SCO itself constructs itself and its Others. For a greater discussion of the “West” as opposed to the “non-West” see Tickner, Citation2003; Bilgin, Citation2008; Tickner and Wæver, Citation2009; Acharya and Buzan, Citation2010; Acharya, Citation2011; and Hutchings, Citation2011.
2. Ambrosio (Citation2008, Citation2009) has examined the norms and discourse articulated by the SCO in relation to democracy.
3. For an analysis of the framing of Central Asia in Western academia, including the role of Mackinder’s “Eurasian Heartland” thesis in this, see Megoran, Citation2004; Heathershaw, Citation2007; Sengupta, Citation2009; and Heathershaw and Megoran, Citation2011.
4. Cohen (Citation2006) states that the “SCO primarily serves as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States,” while a US Senator proclaimed that the SCO is “the most dangerous organization Americans have never heard of” and “a potential Warsaw Pact” (Brownback Citation2006).
5. Ambrosio (Citation2008, 1322) outlines that the SCO “represents a formidable challenge to the ideas of universal democracy and human rights through its de facto legitimisation of authoritarianism and by establishing itself as a counterweight to external democratic norms”. Bailes and Dunay (2007, 13) noted that “up to very recently, analytical writing about the SCO….[has] liked to stress how far away the Organisation actually is from European traditions and norms in its way of dismissing human rights concerns and forbidding mutual ‘interference in internal affairs’.”
6. Hanova (Citation2009, 80) argues that “Russian and Chinese interests in the SCO are often reduced to a common objective of anti-Americanism.” Troitskii (Citation2007) states that “Western assessments sometimes view the SCO as increasingly becoming a mechanism to oust the USA and its Western allies from Central Asia, and thus to threaten Western security interests.”
7. A BBC report (Citation2012) notes it is “widely viewed as a countermeasure to curb the influence of Western alliances, such as NATO.” Sky News (Citation2008) outlined that “the alliance was established in 2001 to counter NATO influence in the Central Asian region.” Tony Halpin (Citation2007) writing in The Times noted that it is “increasingly regarded by Moscow and Beijing as a counterweight to US global influence.”
8. This dynamic is interpreted by many as part of the wider context of growing competition for energy resources in Kazakhstan, involving primarily Western, Russian, and Chinese companies (Wishnick Citation2009; Marketos Citation2009; Pannell Citation2011).
9. China’s adoption of a soft power strategy towards the Central Asian Republics has been noted by many scholars and is considered aimed at “demystifying” the Chinese presence in the region and altering the prevailing negative perception of China within these states (Pan Citation2008; Aris Citation2009a; Pannell Citation2011). This also includes not being seen as a bully in pushing the Central Asian Republics into making statements that they do not wish to. Another dimension to this strategy is said to be gaining access to much-needed energy resources from this region. Pannell argues that China’s adoption of a “soft power” approach to Central Asia since 1991 is “a tale of increased administrative and military capacity, but perhaps more importantly on the other hand, is a matter of expanding economic and diplomatic influence and a good example of the flowering of China’s soft approach to the application of power and the success of its diplomacy and commercial thrust. At the same time China has serious need for various resources, especially oil, and this too requires attention and analysis to assess its significance” (2011, p. 107-8). This increasing mutual-interest and interdependence (Pannell Citation2011) in relation to the Central Asian Republics for material needs also encourages China not to act overly forcefully towards states within the SCO. Hence, for example, China is competing with Western energy firms for contracts in Kazakhstan, which in turn incentivizes Beijing not to push Astana into any statements it feels uncomfortable with regarding the West, in order to avoid unnecessarily pressurizing this relationship.
10. It is also arguable that there was some disagreement over the 2005 Astana summit declaration (Shaimergenov and Tusupbaeva 2006).
11. Thus, it bridges the gap between critical geopolitics and critical security studies by putting forward an interdisciplinary analytical framework that draws on insights from both these fields of enquiry (Mamadouh and Dijink 2006; Dalby Citation2008, Citation2010a, Citation2010b).
12. For an up-to-date summary of the debate on identity and the Self/Other dynamics see Epstein, Citation2011; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; and Prozorov, Citation2012.
13. For a more extensive discussion on this see Wæver Citation1995; Rumelili, Citation2004; Diez, Citation2004, Citation2005; Prozorov, Citation2012; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012.
14. The main methods by which the SCO seeks to express its views on the international stage are by the issuing of statements with regard to international events, and more importantly, the common declarations issued at the annual summit meetings of the Heads of State.
15. For more on recent development in Kazakhstan’s relationship with Western companies investments see Weitz, Citation2012, and Kilner, Citation2012.
16. Russia, and to a lesser extent the Central Asian Republics, seek to keep economic cooperation in the SCO limited to large-scale infrastructural projects and are reluctant to engage in negotiations for creating an SCO free trade, which is seen as a long-term Chinese aim. From the Russian perspective, this reluctance is due to a fear that it will lose economic influence in the region in open competition with China, and thus prefers to keep micro-economic cooperation within the EurAsEC and Single Economic Space projects (Bailes and Dunay 2007; Oldberg Citation2007; Aris Citation2011).
17. The Central Asian Republics are concerned that if China is allowed too much access to their economies, they will be overwhelmed by the size and competitive advantages of the Chinese economy.
18. The city of Osh experienced large-scale violent rioting and looting between 11 and 14 June 2011. The violence is said to have occurred along multiple dividing lines: ethnic, in particular in the form of ethnic Kyrgyz attacking ethnic Uzbeks; political, with groups loyal to the ousted President Bakiyev and opposed to the interim government seeking to create chaos ahead of a nationwide referendum on a new constitution; and criminal, with organized criminal groups who capitalised on the ensuing chaos for their own purposes. The resultant violence cost many lives and led to widespread destruction of homes, businesses, and infrastructure in and around the city, which highlighted that the interim government was not in control of events.
19. The 2009 SCO summit declaration noted that “the current situation in the global economic and financial sector points to the need to increase cooperation of the international community in the field of controlling and managing international finances, making joint efforts to prevent the growth and spread of financial crisis risks, maintaining economic stability” (Yekaterinburg Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Citation2009).
20. The SCO Summit declaration (2006) stated that the “SCO owes its smooth growth to its consistent adherence to the “Shanghai spirit” of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for multi-civilizations and pursuit of common development”. This spirit is the underlying philosophy and the most important code of conduct of SCO. It enriches the theory and practice of contemporary international relations and embodies the shared aspiration of the international community for realizing democracy in international relations. The “Shanghai spirit” is therefore of critical importance to the international community's pursuit of a new and non-confrontational model of international relations, a model that calls for discarding the Cold War mentality and transcending ideological differences”.
21. For a detailed account of the member states’ and the SCO’s interpretation of the “colour revolutions” as an extra-regionally inspired threat to prevailing regional norms and regime security see (Ambrosio Citation2009, 166–167).
22. The 2011 Astana summit noted that “The member states stated that the unresolved situation in Afghanistan coupled with the continuing tension and confrontation in the country remains one of the key sources of threats to the regional security and stability.”(Joint Communiqué…10th Anniversary, Citation2011).