The politics of securitization: China’s competing security agendas and their impacts on securitizing shared rivers

ABSTRACT

Managing transboundary river basins proves a challenge for China when encountering disagreements with its neighbors that experience different political and social conditions. This paper analyzes what happens when China characterizes water as a security issue, examining China’s fluid securitization practices, where changes can be identified indicating that the Chinese government values the various water security concerns differently. Two cases are adopted for comparison. In the case of China sharing the Mekong River, the Chinese government has shown a willingness to incorporate more issues found both inside and outside of the water sector. In contrast, in the case of the sharing of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, China’s security agenda has been limited to the consideration of water availability and has led to military security concerns. The findings indicate that China’s water security agenda is not only driven by a concern for water management over specific rivers, but also judgments that incorporate strategic military consideration with regard to countries that they are involved with. The case of China thus suggests that water security is a complex domain that demonstrates competing values and concerns in (de)politicizing water. Therefore, water-related security issues cannot be understood solely from an environmental policy perspective.

KEYWORDS:

• Mekong River
• Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna
• India
• governance
• water security
• securitization

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Jonna Nyman and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. These neighbors are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam.

2. While the Copenhagen School generally sees securitization as negative in light of the real risk of militarization and secrecy, securitization can be a positive outcome if it helps the speedy resolution of a pressing issue. Whether this resolution is “positive” for all concerned (at all levels) is a different matter.

3. Despite being opened in 1997 following a vote by 103 countries, it took very long for countries to actually sign this convention. It was not until 2014 that this convention was ratified by 35 countries, endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations and officially entered into force as a global legal document on transboundary water management. China is one among three countries (along with Turkey and Burundi) that voted against the adoption of the convention at the UN General Assembly.

4. Interview with China-based scholar of International Relations, June 2016.

5. The Chinese company undertook the construction of the Sanghe II Hydropower Station and put it into operation, 9 January 2019, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, official website, Accessed 10 December 2020. http://www.lmcchina.org/sbhz/t1628002.htm; the Mekong Infrastructure Tracker Dashboard, Accessed 18 December 2020. https://www.stimson.org/2020/mekong-infrastructure-tracker-tool/

6. See Mekong River Commission’s introduction on its Navigation program, Accessed 10 December 2020. http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/programmes/navigation-programme/

7. Interview with government officials from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2016.

8. IbId.

9. Interview with government officials from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2016.

10. China has since 2002 provided the MRC Secretariat with daily water level and rainfall data from two Lancang River hydrological stations at Yunjinghong and Man’wan during the flood season from 15 June-15 October each year.

11. Interview with Officer from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2019.

12. Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, official website, Accessed 18 December 2020. http://www.lmcchina.org/

13. First Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation Held Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation Mechanism Officially 12 November 2015, Accessed 18 December 2020. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1315515.shtml

14. Ibid.

15. It is agreed that China provides India with information of water level, discharge and rainfall frequently (twice a day from June 1st to October 15^th) each year in respect of three hydrological stations situated on the mainstream Brahmaputra river.

16. On 23 October 2013, the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) was signed between China and India.

17. The Indian side is led by the Commissioner, Ministry of Water Resources, while in China, it is led by Director, International Economic and Technical Cooperation and Exchange Center, Ministry of Water Resources, People’s Republic of China.

18. Interview with Indian elite, May 2014.

19. Interview with staff from WWF India, International Rivers India, April, 2014.

20. Interview with Chinese scholar of International Relations, June 2017.

21. Interview with Indian scholar, October2020.

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by Shandong University, funding number 61060089963026.