Language or ideology? Studying the sources of the ethnic gap in geopolitical preferences in the Association Agreement countries. Evidence from Georgia (2015-2021)

ABSTRACT

The existence of differences in geopolitical preferences between the titular nationalities and ethnic minorities has been thoroughly documented for the Association Agreement countries and other post-Soviet states. This paper goes beyond simply identifying the existence of this “ethnic gap” in geopolitical preferences, by also testing some of the common theories that try to explain it. To do so, I use different regression analyses based on survey data from Georgia (2015–2021). The results of a first multivariate analysis that aims to explain the ethnic gap show that the linguistic differences between the titular nationalities and the ethnic groups explain a higher percentage of the gap in support for the EU than differences related to ideology, values, and information. Furthermore, a second analysis that divides the sample into different ethnic groups reveals that certain variables influence the geopolitical preferences of members of the titular nationalities and members of each of the studied ethnic minorities in different ways.

KEYWORDS:

• Geopolitical preferences
• EU
• EAEU
• Georgia
• ethnic gap
• ethnic minorities

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Guillem Rico for his advice and suggestions. I also thank the reviewers and the editor for their time and comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. The AA countries are those former Soviet Socialist Republics that have signed Association Agreements with the EU (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Due to the signing of these collaboration agreements, these countries are often perceived as the most pro-EU post-Soviet states (excluding Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).

2. Due to the difficulties in collecting and accessing data from some parts of Georgia, when this paper refers to Georgia, I speak of the territory of the Republic of Georgia not including the Russian-backed breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

3. Even though Armenia is a current member of the EAEU, its governments and, especially, its population, have a relatively positive relationship with the EU (Delcour and Wolczuk 2021). Azerbaijan is neither a member of the EU nor of the EAEU.

4. Excluding the areas controlled by the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

5. While Azerbaijanis are mostly Muslim, most Armenians and Georgians, (with some exceptions, such as the Adjarian Georgians, who follow Islam), are Christians, belonging two different Churches (the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church) (Broers 2008).

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Ministerio de Educación y Formación Profesional [FPU16/01493].