ABSTRACT
The article examines the effect of state ownership on the relationship between investment and cash flow in Vietnam, a small transitional economy. Using a sample of companies listed on Vietnam’s stock exchanges, we find that the investment–cash flow relation for both state-owned and non-state-owned firms is U-shaped. In addition, state-owned companies have higher cash flow sensitivity of investment, which perhaps is due to their socioeconomic and political responsibilities, poor corporate governance, and agency problem. Moreover, the investment of high-growth companies, both with and without state ownership, has lower dependence on internal cash flow. Additionally, low-growth state-owned companies have higher cash flow sensitivity of investment than those without state ownership, suggesting inefficient investment by the former.
Acknowledgments
We specially thank Dr. Duc Vo for his critical comments and helpful correction that greatly improve the quality of the article.
Notes
2. According to Guariglia (Citation2008, 1802), 0.82% is calculated by (1.611/0.412) × 10% × 0.021.
3. According to Guariglia (Citation2008, 1802), 1.144% is calculated by (2.154/0.422) × 10% × 0.0224.
4. According to Guariglia (Citation2008, 1802), −0.058% is calculated by (0.243/0.387) × 10% × (−0.009).
5. Given that the means of IK and CFK are 0.337 and −1.91 for the SOE subsample, and 0.340 and −0.753 for the non-SOE subsample, respectively, when cash flow is negative, a 10% increase in negative cash flow leads to a 2.64% decrease in investment by SOEs but a 0.029% increase in investment by non-SOEs.