Demographic Turbulence in the Arab World: Implications for Development Policy

Figures & data

Figure 1 Impact of Cohort Flows on Life-cycle Stages, World and Arab Region, 1950 to 2045–2050

Figure 2 Impact of Cohort Flows on Life-cycle Stages in Lebanon, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, 1950 to 2045–2050

Figure 3 Impact of Cohort Flows on Life-cycle Stages in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran and Pakistan, 1950 to 2045–2050

Appendix Table Key Demographic Indicators for Arab and Non-Arab Muslim Territories

Large (10 million+)	Window of opportunity ^1	Population (millions)	Growth (percentage)	Fertility rate
Algeria	2005–2045	35	1.5	2.4
Egypt	2020-	84	1.8	2.9
Iraq	2035-	31	2.2	4.1
Morocco	2010–2050	32	1.2	2.4
Saudi Arabia	2015-	26	2.1	3.2
Sudan North & South	2035-	43	2.2	4.2
Syria	2025-	23	3.3	3.3
Tunisia	2005–2040	10	1.0	1.9
Yemen	2040-	24	2.9	5.9
Total: nine		308
Medium (5 – 10 million)
Jordan	2025-	6	3.0	3.1
Libya	2015–2050	6	2.0	2.7
Somalia	Not in period	9	2.3	6.4
UAE^2	1975-	5	2.8*	2.0
Total: five		26
Small (less than 5 million)
Bahrain	2000–2045	1	2.1	2.3
Comoros	2030-	1	2.3	4.0
Djibouti	2030-	1	1.8	4.0
Kuwait^3	1995–2045	3	2.4*	2.3
Lebanon	2005–2040	4	0.8	1.9
Mauritania	2035-	3	2.4	4.5
Occupied Palestine	2045-	4	3.2	5.1
Oman	2015-	3	2.1	3.1
Qatar^4	1985-	2	10.7*	2.4
Western Sahara	2010–2050	1	3.7**	2.7
Total: 10		23
All Arab territories: 24			357
Non-Arab Muslim Countries
Bangladesh	2015-	153	1.4	2.4
Indonesia	2005–2045	219	1.2	2.2
Iran^5	2005–2045	71	1.2	1.8
Pakistan	2035-	166	2.2	4.0
Source: Population Division (2009).
Notes: 1 A dash indicates if the window of opportunity comes after the projection series finishes. ‘Not in period’ means the window of opportunity starts after projection series finishes.
2 In UN data, presented as one figure. UAE's dynamics are complex. Until 1995 the proportion 0–14 years remained under 30%; but the percentage of people older than 65 was low because workforce migration sometimes affected growth extremely (especially in the 1970s). But fertility levels were high. Thus, during 1960–75, the child population grew by 273%; 1975–90 by 274%; but 1990–2005 only 44%. Population (0–14) less than 30% of total by 1975; population (65+) still less than 15% in 2050.
3 Workforce inflows were particularly marked in the 1960s.
4 Inflows were heavy 1960–75, and since 2000. Like UAE, the dynamics are complex. Consequently, the child population grew very rapidly: 211% (1960–75), 130% (1975–90), but only 23% (1990–2005). Population (0–14) less than 30% of total by 1985; population (65+) still less than 15% in 2050.
5 See text on disordered cohort flows affecting development planning, which accounts for fluctuations in the size of the child population.
* Workforce migration affects figures.
** Partly affected by migration through conflict.