Achieving national security: comparing four state security models

Abstract

A murky line separates the tactics and objectives between counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, United Nations Peacekeeping, and international civilian policing. Deploying the wrong national security model at the wrong time can escalate or prolong violence rather than mitigate it. However, prior to 2001, very few criminal justice scholars compared state security models on any level. This paper examines all four state security models in a comparative framework. It is divided into three sections. The first section defines each national security model and provides examples. The second section examines the differences or similarities that exist between the models. Finally, the third section addresses why it is critical to understand the security context and model integration in order to achieve long-term national security.

Keywords:

• national security
• counterterrorism
• counterinsurgency
• peacekeeping
• International Civilian Police
• conflict
• security model

Notes

1. Conflict defined as war, civil war, genocide, terrorism, or a complete lack of military or civil order.

2. Accessed July 2010: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/24/AR2010052403842.html

3. Members of the NCTC engage in integrating and analyzing intelligence pertaining to international terrorism. As a result of their mission NCTC members are some of the primary advisors to the Director of National Intelligence and are the primary organization for CT strategic planning.

4. In 1988, only 35 UN police officers from a few source nations were serving in a peace operation in Cyprus (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, para. 11). In 1998, the UN deployed nearly 3000 police, then in July 1999 it increased to 4613 after six months and eventually to nearly 8000 a year later (January 2001), mostly due to the two massive transitional administration missions in Kosovo (authorized on 10 June 1999) and East Timor (authorized on 25 October 1999). As of May 2009, there are more than 11,000 police officers from 90 countries serving in 15 UN field operations around the world (UN DPKO, 2009).

5. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches to the use of force, although it may employ the full range of military power to erode the adversary’s power, influence, and will (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009, pp. 3–27).

6. Though law enforcement activity is a vital component to COIN it is distinguished from a UN mandated multinational force. Police deployed under a COIN security model can also be involved in traditional war fighting engagements because a ceasefire does not exist. Shifting from war fighting to traditional police duties is not the role of CivPol, or UN Peacekeepers. Therefore, police deployed in COIN are unique to the overall mission of defeating a counterinsurgency rather than maintaining peace.

7. COIN military forces may support HN police operations by assisting in the arrest of war criminals, supporting police patrols, providing logistic support, detaining suspect criminals, and assisting in controlling crowds and civil unrest.

8. Specific examples of offensive CT and COIN operations include: killing senior terrorist leaders, killing foot soldiers, destroying safe havens and training camps, disrupting ideological dissemination and recruiting efforts, and other times it is denying resources that terrorists need to operate and survive.

9. Various levels of force used by UN Peacekeepers and CivPol occur when supervising of ceasefire measures, active patrolling, demining operations, and static posts.

10. HN development establishes essential services such as water, electricity, sanitation, and medical care. Protecting efforts isolate crime, political violence, terrorist/insurgent coercion, and retaliation.

11. Intelligence gathering for UN Peacekeeping missions refers to its common use, rather than the forbidden activity it once was. Traditionally, monitoring did not require a need for a substantial amount of intelligence, but Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia demonstrated an increasing need to obtain tactical and strategic intelligence (Friis, 2010).