Figures & data
Figure 1. Lack of Resilience of a system as defined in the Re-CoDeS compositional demand supply capacity
and consumption
framework (Didier, Citation2018).
![Figure 1. Lack of Resilience of a system as defined in the Re-CoDeS compositional demand Dsys,R/S(t), supply capacity Ssys,R/SC(t) and consumption Csys,R/S(t) framework (Didier, Citation2018).](/cms/asset/9a209671-35cc-4402-945a-e78c37a9b8f5/nsie_a_2052912_f0001_c.jpg)
Figure 2. iRe-CoDeS algorithm to quantify community disaster resilience (a); the “distribute independent R/Ss” step of the iRe-CoDeS algorithm (b); and the demand/supply-based interdependency modelling algorithm (c) imbedded in the “distribute interdependent R/Ss” step of the iRe-CoDeS community resilience assessment algorithm (a).
![Figure 2. iRe-CoDeS algorithm to quantify community disaster resilience (a); the “distribute independent R/Ss” step of the iRe-CoDeS algorithm (b); and the demand/supply-based interdependency modelling algorithm (c) imbedded in the “distribute interdependent R/Ss” step of the iRe-CoDeS community resilience assessment algorithm (a).](/cms/asset/f2f3ed79-41a7-48a4-b9d3-ddb3815a44f8/nsie_a_2052912_f0002_b.jpg)
Figure 3. Case study virtual community. Considered components in localities are Electric Power Plants (EPPs), Building Stock Units (BSUs), Base Station Controllers (BSCs), Potable Water Facilities (PWFs), Base Transceiver Stations (BTSs) and Cooling Water Facilities (CWFs).
![Figure 3. Case study virtual community. Considered components in localities are Electric Power Plants (EPPs), Building Stock Units (BSUs), Base Station Controllers (BSCs), Potable Water Facilities (PWFs), Base Transceiver Stations (BTSs) and Cooling Water Facilities (CWFs).](/cms/asset/d590c61f-ef53-4cdc-9dc3-023a53e33ae1/nsie_a_2052912_f0003_c.jpg)
Table 1. Pre-disaster demand for utility R/Ss per each component of the virtual community.