The rise and fall of intelligence: an international security history, by Michael Warner, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2014, 406 pp., £24.00 (paperback), ISBN 978-1-62616-046-0

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ORCID

Christopher Bailey http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7362-8187

Notes

¹ A good example of this might be the limited use of spies by either President George Washington or Abraham Lincoln, or even the “Black Chamber” that provided code breaking services to the US State Department during the 1920s.

² See also Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for a New American Century, January 2010, URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf (accessed 26 December 2014).

³ This focus on sovereign nation-states is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter of United Nations: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (New York: The United Nations, 1947).

⁴ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force on 7 December 1978, URL: https://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1 (accessed 25 December 2014). Note: the United States is not a signatory to this protocol, although it recognizes certain aspects as customary international law.

⁵ Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Boston, MA: Belknap Press, 1981). See also Colonel Matthew Moten, “Who Is a Member of the Military Profession?,” Joint Forces Quarterly 62 (3d Quarter 2011): 14–17, for alternative views by sociologist James Burk and historian Allan Millet on defining a “profession.” For a unique and stimulating perspective on what constitutes a profession, compare Arthur Isak Applbaum, “Professional Detachment: The Executioner of Paris,” 109 Harvard Law Review 2 (Dec. 1995) (Applbaum uses Sanson, who viewed himself as a practitioner of a necessary profession, as a case study to explore moral/ethical issues).

⁶ ODNI, “Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community,” URL: http://www.dni. gov/index.php/intelligence-community/principles-of-professional-ethics (accessed 21 July 2014). This set of principles has also been incorporated in the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy that was released on 8 August 2014.

⁷ James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, remarks delivered at the AFCEA/INSA National Security and Intelligence Summit, 18 September 2014, URL: http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-and-interviews/202-speeches-interviews-2014/1115-remarks-as-delivered-by-the-honorable-james-r-clapper-director-of-national-intelligence-afcea-insa-national-security-and-intelligence-summit (accessed 28 November 2014).

⁸ This fight for the “narrative,” the moral high ground, is sometimes referred to as “lawfare.” It constitutes an important center of gravity in the current fight against international terrorist organizations; it is a fight that we could lose through ill-conceived intelligence practices (witness the “strategic defeat” experienced by the United States in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal). See Charles J. Dunlap, “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts,” remarks prepared for the Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference, 29 November 2001, URL: http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf (accessed 26 December 2014).