Austrian Intelligence Reform: do intelligence and security studies have a future in Austria?

ABSTRACT

This essay examines the Austrian experience with intelligence, security and terrorism studies. After a brief discussion of the state of intelligence and security studies in Austria, the authors provide a comparison to Singapore, a nation with similar geopolitical issues as well as a different and, arguably, more developed and comprehensive academic program to confront and deal effectively with security challenges. The article concludes with four critical suggestions for the establishment of a ‘Central European’ Intelligence and Security Studies program in Austria. The authors recommend combining academics and practitioners on program faculties, emphases on domestic, regional and extra-regional factors in both program contents and the composition of student bodies, an interdisciplinary approach to the critical role of ideologies, and the development of specific expertise in order to understand and confront regional threats.

KEYWORDS:

• Intelligence
• security and terrorism studies
• Austria
• Singapore
• National security
• geopolitics

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

¹ The original is ‘Österreich ist nicht so unbedeutend, wie das gemeinhin angenommen wird’. From Nicholas Stockhammer, a lecturer at the University of Vienna, and former instructor at the Austrian National Defence Academy. See, Karl Oberascher, “Terrorismus-Experte: ‘Trugschluss, dass Österreich nicht im Fokus von Terror ist [Terrorism expert: Fallacy that Austria is not in the focus of terror],” interview with Nicholas Stockhammer, Die Kurier, 10 March 2017, https://kurier.at/politik/inland/terror-experte-trugschluss-dass-oesterreich-nicht-im-fokus-von-terror-ist/251.068.728.

² Reference was originally made to Indonesia. See Francis Chan and Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “ISIS Funded Attack in Jakarta,” The Straits Times, March 5, 2016, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/isis-funded-attack-in-jakarta.

³ For an excellent overview, see: Gert R. Polli, “Geheimdienstarbeit in Österreich, Im Spannungsfeld zwischen Politik und Spionageabwehr [Secret service work in Austria, In the crosshairs of Politics and Counterintelligene],” in Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik [Austrian Yearbook for Politics] eds. Andreas Khol, Günther Ofner, Stefan Karner, Dietmar Halper, (Vienna: Böhlau, 2013).

⁴ Compare “Directory of the Diplomatic Corps and Other Representations in Austria,” Austrian Foreign Ministry ([dataset]; accessed October 14, 2018) https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/oracle/gesamtliste_en.pdf with “The London Diplomatic List,” British Foreign Office ([dataset] accessed October 14, 2018) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/732199/London_Diplomatic_List_-_August_2018.pdf.

⁵ See, for example, Thomas Riegler Blog, “Österreichs Nachrichtendienste: Ein kurzer Abriss [Austria’s Intelligence Services, A Brief Aside],” https://thomas-riegler.net/2018/03/11/oesterreichs-nachrichtendienste-ein-kurzer-abriss/ and Johanna Hager, “7000 Agenten, Alltag in Österreich [7,000 Agents, commonplace in Austria],” Die Kurier, September 11, 2016, https://kurier.at/chronik/oesterreich/7000-agenten-alltag-in-oesterreich/220.467.947.

⁶ Anja Kroell, “Offizier aus Salzburg soll 30 Jahre fuer Russland spioniert haben,” Salzburger Nachrichten, November 9, 2018; https://www.sn.at/politik/innenpolitik/spionage-beim-bundesheer-offizier-aus-salzburg-soll-30-jahre-fuer-russland-spioniert-haben-60581974; (accessed on November 10, 2018).

⁷ See for example, Thomas Riegler, Im Fadenkreuz: Österreich und der Nahostterroismus 1973 bis 1985 [In the crosshairs: Austria and Mideast Terrorism 1973–1985], (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 2010). Additionally, Thomas Riegler, “Diplomatie und Terror: Die Operationen des PLO-Geheimdienstes 1979 in der BRD und in Österreich [Diplomacy and Terror: Operations of the PLO Secret Service in 1979 in West Germany and Austria],” Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies [JIPSS] 8, no. 1 (2014).

⁸ For information specifically on the OPEC hostage-taking see, Adrian Hänni, “The 1975 OPEC Attack: 3 Lessons to Fight Terrorism Today,” Medium, December 22, 2014 https://medium.com/@eselskind/the-vienna-opec-attack-and-what-we-can-learn-from-it-23b51edc89d0, as well as Adrian Hänni, “CARLOS der Schakal. Der Mythos des ersten globalen, “Superterroristen” und die Rolle von Geheimdiensten in Ost und West [Carlos the Jackal. The myth of the first global “super terrorist” and the roll of secret services in the East and West],” JIPSS 10, no. 1 (2016), Thomas Riegler, “Die OPEC-Geiselnahme in Wien 1975: Eine Analyse 40 Jahre danach [The OPEC hostage-taking in Vienna 1975: An Analysis 40 years later],” JIPSS 10, no. 1 (2016), and Thomas Riegler, Tage des Schreckens: Die OPEC-Geiselnahme 1975 und der moderne Terrorismus [Day of Terror: The OPEC hostage-taking in 1975 and Modern Terrorism], (Vienna: self-published, 2015).

⁹ See Ibid, as well as See Thomas Riegler, “‘Vom ’Gendarmeriekommando Bad Vöslau’ zur ‘Cobra’: Der Aufbau der österreichischen Antiterrorkräfte [From ‘Gendarmerie Command Bad Vöslau’ to ‘Cobra’: The History of Austrian anti-terror forces],” JIPSS 7, no. 1 (2013) and Thomas Riegler, “Ein Österreichischer Weg: Die Reaktion auf den Internationalen Terrorismus der 1970er und 80er Jahre [An Austrian Approach: The Response to International Terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s],” JIPSS 6, no. 1 (2012), and Thomas Riegler, “Einsatzkommando Cobra – Austria’s gradual “awakening” to the terrorist threat,” (Paper presented at the Terrorism Research Initiative 2013, Vienna, Austria) https://www.academia.edu/2906501/Einsatzkommando_Cobra_-_Austrias_gradual_awakening_ to_the_terrorist_threat.

¹⁰ See, Riegler, Im Fadenkreuz and Lisa Sophie-Horntrich, “Als der Terror nach Wien-Schwechat kam [As terrorism arrived at Vienna-Schwechat airport],” Die Presse, December 26, 2015, https://diepresse.com/home/zeitgeschichte/4892554/Als-der-Terror-nach-WienSchwechat-kam.

¹¹ Paul Schliefsteiner, “Austria’s Homegrown Lone Actor: Franz Fuchs and the Letter Bomb Campaign from 1993 to 1997,” JIPSS 12, no. 1 (2018; forthcoming).

¹² See Tamara Abu-Hamdeh, “Muḥammad Maḥmūd: Ein globaler österreichischer Dschihadist [Muhammad Maḥmūd: An international Austrian jihadist],” JIPSS 10, no. 1 (2016).

¹³ Rüdiger Lohlker, “Dschihadismus im Internet – Gespräche aus Österreich [Online Jihadism – Conversations from Austria],” JIPSS 10, no. 1 (2016).

¹⁴ See for example Martin Staudinger/Anna-Giulia Fink, “Dschihad am Riesenrad: Die ISIS und ihre Sympathisanten in Österreich [Jihad on the Riesenrad: ISIS and their sympathizers in Austria],” Profil, July 7, 2014, https://www.profil.at/ausland/dschihad-riesenrad-die-isis-sympathisanten-oesterreich-376592, “Großrazzia in Österreich gegen mutmaßliche Islamisten-Helfer [Large raid in Austria against alleged Islamists and supporters],” in: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/oesterreich-razzia-gegen-mutmassliche-islamisten-unterstuetzer-a-1005572.html, Spiegel/Reuters, November 28, 2014, Thomas Hoisl/Paul Donnerbauer, “IMAN – Wie Islamisten in Österreich missionieren [IMAN – How Islamists proselytize in Austria],” Vice, April 6, 2014, https://www.vice.com/de_at/article/kbjnaz/iman-wie-islamisten-in-osterreich-missionieren, Steffen Munter, “Wiener Imam fordert islamischen Staat und Scharia in Österreich [Viennese Imam calls for Islamic State and Sharia in Austria],” Epochtimes, May 11, 2018, https://www.epochtimes.de/politik/europa/wiener-imam-fordert-islamischen-staat-und-scharia-in-oesterreich-kriegsspiele-in-moscheen-in-wien-und-herford-a2432197.html, Andrea Beer, “Maßnahmen gegen “politischen Islam” Österreich schließt mehrere Moscheen [Measures against “political Islam”, Austria closes more mosques],” ARD, August 8, 2018, https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/oesterreich-politischer-islam-101.html, and, Werner Reisinger, “Islamismus größte Gefahr [Islamism remains the greatest threat],” Wiener Zeitung, June 28, 2018, https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/oesterreich/politik/973952_Islamismus-weiter-groesste-Gefahr.html.

¹⁵ See, for example, the statement of Konrad Kogler, the General Director of Public Security in the Austrian Ministry of the Interior in 2016, ‘Because of Austria’s geographical location, the country is affected by migration through the western Balkan route and the Mediterranean route. We will be on alert if any routes through Bulgaria, for example, are extended’, and from Emir Numanovic, “Austria takes steps to control migration on Balkan route,” DW, July 1, 2016, https://www.dw.com/en/austria-takes-steps-to-control-migration-on-balkan-route/a-19372251.

¹⁶ See, Austrian Federal Armed Forces, Auslandseinsätze des Bundesheeres [Foreign deployments of the Federal Armed Forces], August 2018. http://www.bundesheer.at/ausle/zahlen.shtml.

¹⁷ See, Ibid.

¹⁸ See, Günter Rath, “Der österreichische Beitrag zur Aufklärungskomponente am Balkan [The Austrian contribution to reconnaissance components in the Balkans],” Truppendienst 323, no. 5 (2011).

¹⁹ Ingo Mayr-Knoch, “Is there an Austrian Intelligence Community? Recommendations for the Austrian Intelligence Community,” Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po, Paris, http://www.sciencespo.fr/psia/sites/sciencespo.fr.psia/files/MAYR_KNOCH_Ingo_2014_IRSEM_PSIA_Prize.pdf, Fall 2014 (accessed November 4, 2018) .

²⁰ Conrad Seidl, “Bundesheer ruestet Geheimdienste nach,” Der Standard, September 29, 2016, https://derstandard.at/2000045138958/Heeresnachrichtenamt-wird-zum-Bundesnachrichtenamt; (accessed November 7, 2018).

²¹ Norbert Swoboda, “Keine Gelder mehr für Grazer Spionage-Zentrum [No more money for the Graz Espionage Center],” Kleine Zeitung, July 14, 2018, https://www.kleinezeitung.at/steiermark/graz/5464037/Politik-intern_Keine-Gelder-mehr-fuer-Grazer-SpionageZentrum. A loose English translation of the article is available on the ACIPSS website at www.acipss.org (accessed November 2, 2018).

²² The title of this article is part of a longer quote, which is poignant here in its entirety, “There have always been threats. Many in Austria believe that we are not the target of such [Islamist] threats or that there exists an explicit danger of terrorism. Both are false. Austria is discussed. I think about Mohammed M. [meant is Mahmud], who was in the leadership etage of IS. That alone more than suggests that Austria was known and most likely a topic for strategic attacks. Austria is not so irrelevant as commonly assumed,” in Oberascher, Kurier, March 10, 2017.

²³ Gudrun Biffl, Lea Rennert, Petra Aigner, “Migrant Workers in Austria and Europe,” Danube University Krems, October 2011. The research shows that 67% of migrant labor work in five industries (construction, entertainment, transport, manufacturing, tourism, and trade). https://www.donau-uni.ac.at/imperia/md/content/department/migrationglobalisierung/forschung/biffl-migrant-workers-oenb-2011.pdf (accessed November 3, 2018).

²⁴ The Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs provides an annual report on the threat of terrorism in the country, its 2017 edition can be viewed here: Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2017, https://www.mha.gov.sg/docs/default-source/press-releases/singapore_terrorism_threat_ assessment_report_2017.pdf. Secondary reporting on the matter likewise exists. See, Lydia Lam, “8 key points from MHA’s terror report,” Straits Times, June 1, 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-under-highest-terror-threat-in-recent-years-8-key-points-from-mhas-terror-report, Bilveer Singh, “Why Singapore is a Terrorist Target,” The Diplomat, June 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/why-singapore-is-a-terrorist-target/, Fathin Ungku/John Geddie, “It’s when, not if: Singapore worries, and prepares, for militant attack,” Reuters, February 4, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-singapore-security/its-when-not-if-singapore-worries-and-prepares-for-militant-attack-idUSKBN1FO04L.

²⁵ See, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, “Introduction,” https://www.rsis.edu.sg/about-rsis/introduction/#.W9rpxNUzbIU, RSIS Website (last accessed November 2, 2018).

²⁶ According to the 2018 QS World University Rankings, NTU is ranked 12^th globally. See, https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2019; The 2018 Times Higher Education University rankings places NTU at rank 52 globally, see: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2018/world-ranking#!/page/2/length/25/sort by/rank/sort order/asc/cols/stats (both accessed 1 November 2018).

²⁷ See RSIS Website, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ (accessed November 2, 2018).

²⁸ Prashanth Parameswaran, “What Singapore’s Radical Preacher Ban Says About ASEAN’s Terror War,” The Diplomat, November 2, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/what-singapores-radical-preacher-ban-says-about-aseans-terror-war/.

²⁹ Austrian Press Agency, “Zehn Atib-Imamen droht die Ausweisung [10 Atib Imams are threatened with expulsion],” Der Standard, June 27, 2018, https://derstandard.at/2000082348455/Zehn-Atib-Imamen-droht-die-Ausweisung.

³⁰ See, PIPVTR Website, http://www.pipvtr.com (accessed November 2, 2018).

³¹ See, CAPS Website, http://www.caps.af/ (accessed November 2, 2018).

³² See, RSIS Website https://www.rsis.edu.sg/ (accessed November 2, 2018).

³³ Boston University in the United States (an R1: Doctoral Research Facility, the highest classification) has emphasized the importance of this approach, consistently recruiting ‘Professors of Practice’ from amongst the world of national security (after their retirement, naturally). At present, Joseph Wippl and John D. Woodward Jr., both retired CIA officers instruct students at BU. See, Duncan Bare and Siegfried Beer, “Watching the grass grow, A conversation with former CIA operations officer Joseph Wippl,” JIPSS 11, no. 2 (2017).

³⁴ Markus Sulzbacher, “BVT-Affäre und Russland-Skepsis erreichen Heeres-Nachrichtenamt [BVT Affair and Russia skepticism reach the Army Intelligence Service],” Der Standard, August 21, 2018.

³⁵ John Keegan, Intelligence in War (London: Random House, 2003).

³⁶ It must be said that roughly 30,000 of those holding foreign passports are Germans, cynically referred to as ‘Numerus-Clausus refugees’, while another 9,000 are German-speaking Italians from South Tyrol. See, APA, “Anteil an ausländischen Studenten konstant bei rund 27 Prozent [Share of foreign students remains constant at 27%],” Der Standard, September 28, 2017, https://derstandard.at/2000064955708/Anteil-an-auslaendischen-Studenten-konstant-bei-rund-27-Prozent, and Media Service Point for New Austrians, “Kosovarische Community in Österreich [Kosovar Community in Austria],” June 8, 2017, http://medienservicestelle.at/migration_ bewegt/2017/06/08/kosovarische-community-in-oesterreich/.

³⁷ See, Ibid. It is unclear whether these numbers include ‘Pre-university students’ or those prospective students enrolled in intensive German and high school equivalency courses offered by a special educational institute, the Vorstudienlehrgang (‘Pre-Study Course Program’). In one of the author’s personal experiences with this organization, the overwhelming majority of those enrolled (in 2009) were from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo.

³⁸ M. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 4, and U. S. Marine Corps University, The Islamic State: An Unrecognized State? 9.12.2015, retrieved 15.6.2016. https://www.scribd.com/doc/292745023/Is-the-Caliphate-Revision-Nov-2015#scribd 2015.

³⁹ BIRN, “ISIS Threatens Terror Campaign in the Balkans,” Balkan Insight, August 6, 2017.

⁴⁰ Kaitlin Lavinder, “Exporting Jihad: Bosnia and Kosovo,” The Cipher Brief, June 24, 2016.

⁴¹ Total Croatia News, “Jihadist Flag Raised in Croat-Majority village in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Total Croatia News, May 29, 2017, https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/19326-jihadist-flag-raised-in-croat-majority-village-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina.

⁴² See BIRN, “Ukraine lists Serbs fighting for Russian Unit,” Balkan Insight, February 2, 2018.

⁴³ Roughly three Central Europeans fight for the separatists for every Central European who fights for the Ukrainians, see: Ryszard Machnikowski, Arkadiusz Legieć, “The Favored Conflicts of Foreign Fighters from Central Europe,” Jamestown, October 12, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/favored-conflicts-foreign-fighters-central-europe/.

⁴⁴ Kim Schibilla, “Aus Duisburg in den Krieg: Darum kämpfen deutsche Linke für eine kurdische Utopie [From Duisburg to war: Why German leftists fight for a Kurdish utopia],” Focus, May 26, 2018.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andreas Wimmer

Andreas Wimmer, MSc (RSIS), CTS, is the Director of the Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum based in Singapore. The Centre, founded in 2008, specialises in studying the radicalisation of civil society groups and actors as well as the role of media, social media, and new media structures. The Centre also focuses on blue-wave research on national security issues in relation to Asia and Europe. Contact: [email protected]

Duncan Bare

Duncan Bare, MA is an Associate Fellow at large for the Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum as well as former member of the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (ACIPSS) and long-time editor for its Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies.

William B. Duncan

William B. Duncan, PhD is a Senior Research Analyst for the Deutsches Asienforschungszentrum as well as a former professor of government and sociology whose research interests include radicalisation, civil society movements, transnational nongovernmental organisations and non-state societies.