The First World War, the End of the Ottoman Empire, and Question of Kurdish Statehood: A ‘Missed’ Opportunity?

Abstract

Historians who have examined the ‘failure’ of the Kurds to obtain statehood in the immediate aftermath of the First World War have, understandable, closely examined the lobbying efforts engaged in by the Kurdish elites in Istanbul, specifically those activists associated with the Society for the Betterment of Kurdistan (est. 1918). These efforts culminated in the summer of 1920 with the inclusion of clauses within Treaty of Sèvres which provided Kurdish-inhabited regions of the dying Ottoman Empire with a pathway to independence. Yet, only a few years later, Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), a treaty which made no provisions for Kurdish self-rule. This reversal of fortunes is accounted for in a number of ways, divisions amongst the Kurdish nationalists, the military success of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s ‘nationalist’ forces in the Greco-Turkish War (1920–1922), and the ‘betrayal’ of the Kurds by perfidious European powers. However, often overlooked in this story is the geopolitical legacy of the First World War. It will be argued here that the failure of Kurdish nationalists in the immediate aftermath of the war can in large part be explained by developments that occurred over the four years of conflict.

Notes

1 Tharoor ( 2 017).

2 United States. Dept. of State (2017). For the US position on the referendum, see Morgan Kaplan’s article in this issue.

3 It should be noted here that this paper primarily deals with the Ottoman Kurdish population, namely the future Kurdish populations of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. ‘Iranian Kurdistan’, which was subject to a separate administrative regime from the rest of Kurdistan even before the end of the First World War, lies beyond the scope of this current study.

4 His twelfth point says,

 [t]he Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development … (Torr, 2002, p. 78)

5 Saeed ( 2 017).

6 Haydarzade İbrahim, “Bir Hasbihal” Jîn, 7 November 1918.

7 Following the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion, Turkish authorities executed Sheikh Abdülkadir Efendi.

8 FO 608/95, Constantinople, 2 January 1919.

9 See Memduh Selim, “Kürd Kulübünde Bir Musahabe” Jîn, 18 June 1919. Also see İhsan Nuri, “Wilson Prensipleri ve Kürdler” Jîn, 30 March 1919.

10 See Seyyid Abdülkadir, “Kürdler ve Osmanlılık”, İkdam, 27 February 1920 (Göldaş, 1991, pp. 282–283); Also see “Leaders in the Turkish Senate Greatly Worried over Kurdish Independence”, Leavenworth Times, 6 March 1920.

11 FO371 4192, Constantinople, (12 July 1919).

12 See FO 608/95, Paris, 14 February 1919; FO371 4192 29 June 1919; FO 371/5067, Constantinople, 3 February 1920; FO 371/5067, Turkey, 1 March 1920; also see Jîn, 2 October 1919.

13 For a copy of the joint declaration see FO371 4193, Paris, 20 November 1919.

14 Major Noel noted in December 1919 that they were making

frantic efforts to win over the Kurds to the nationalist cause by pan islamic and anti-Christian propaganda … No organization for counter propaganda exists. The Kurdish intelligentsia, the majority of whom have been banished from their county, are debarred from all communications with the compatriots. FO 371 4193, London, 18 December 1919.

15 See “Şarki Anadolu Türki ile Kürdi tefrik edilemez”, Albayrak, 20 October 1919.

16 Also see FO 371 4193, Constantinople, 29 November 1919.

17 Speaking to The Nation, Iraqi Kurdistan’s then president and leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP), Masud Barzani declared the Sykes-Picot agreement “the mistake of the century … ” noting that: “The borders were drawn by hand in the name of the great powers.” Gutman ( 2 016).

18 On the legacy of Sykes-Picot in the reconstruction of the Middle East see Nick Danforth, (10 August 2015). Forget Sykes-Picot. It’s the Treaty of Sèvres That Explains the Modern Middle East. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from www.foreignpolicy.com.

19 AIR2/512, Baghdad, 31 October 1918; Major Noel noted that prior the war “no part of the Ottoman dominions in such a state of turmoil and anarchy as the district of Sulaimaniyah … ” and that the “prime mover” in this unrest was Sheikh Mahmud and his supporters. However, he argued that “[t]here is a natural tendency to characterize the influence he waged as a malign one, but if we bear in mind what the policy of the Turks was, there is a good deal of justification for viewing the Shaikh’s activities as the natural expression of revolt on part of an oppressed people.” See FO 608/95, Suleimani, 8 December 1918.

20 For Noel’s account of his journey, see On Special Duty in Kurdistan (1920).

21 Damad Ferid Pasha served as Grand Vizier between March and October 1919 and again between April and October 1920.

22 On the diplomatic activities of Mustafa Kemal’s Ankara-based government in 1921 see Soysal (1983, pp. 24–60).

23 “That Russia shall annex the regions of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, up to the point, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, up to a point subsequently to be determined on the littoral of the Black Sea to the west of Trebizond. 2) That the region of Kurdistan to the south of Van and of Bitlis between Mush, Sert, the course of the Tigris, Jezireh-ben-Omer, the crest-line of the mountains which dominate Amadia, and the region of Merga Var, shall be ceded to Russia; and that starting from the region of Merga Var, the frontier of the Arab State shall follow the crest-line of the mountains which at present divide the Ottoman and Persian Dominions.” (Hurewitz, 1979, p. 64)

24 On the development of Russian ‘Kurdology’ see Leezenberg (2011, 2015); also see Alakom (1987).

25 See FO 195/2284, Bitlis, 10 August 1908; FO 195/2284, Harput, 26 August 1908.

26 Indeed, within a year of the revolution two of the ancien régime most high-profile supporters, Sheikh Said Berzenci of Suleimani (Sheikh Mahmud’s father) and the infamous Hamidiye commander İbrahim Milli Pasha, were dead. FO 195/2308, Mosul, 14 January 1909. Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti Mosul Şubesi, “Musul Hadise-i Feciası”, Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi, 16 January 1909; FO 195/2284, Diyarbakır, 13 October 1908.

27 As one British official observed in 1914:

nothing has been done to improve the material conditions of this part of Turkey, and on the other hand taxes are more rigorously collected than under the old regime, whilst the tribal cavalry has been deprived of the privileges it used to possess. FO 195/2458, Van, 14 February 1914.

28 For an overview of Abdürrazzak Bedirhan’s career see Reynolds (2011); also see Bedirhan (2000).

29 FO 195/2375, Van, 22 May 1911; FO 195/2375, Van, 26 June 1911.

30 FO 195/2375, Van, 26 June 1911; also see Bedirhan (2000, pp. 27–29).

31 FO 195/2405, Erzurum, 5 November 1912; FO 195/2449, Diyarbakır, 22 April 1913.

32 On Abdürrezzak Bey’s activities during the war see Reynolds (2010, 2011); also see Hakan (2013).