Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the notion of ‘reasonableness’ that is, for many, at the heart of the Philosophy for Children (P4C) approach particularly and education for democratic citizenship more broadly, is constituted within the epistemology of ‘white ignorance’ and operates in such a way that it is unlikely to transgress the boundaries of white ignorance so as to view it from without. Drawing on scholarship in critical legal studies and social epistemology, I highlight how notions of reasonableness often include consensus, ‘racialised common sense’ and the ‘typical’ view. In addition the promotion of particular dispositions on the grounds of ‘reasonableness’ both promotes stability and limits how one may think otherwise. Thus, P4C practices that fail to historicise, examine and challenge prevailing notions of reasonableness establish an epistemically ‘gated’ community of inquiry.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Judith Suissa for her editorial guidance and comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Notes
1. ‘A group of people used to thinking together with a view to increasing their understanding and appreciation of the world around them and each other’ (SAPERE Citation2010, 15).
2. ICPIC is the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children. Conferences are held biennially. In 2017 the conference was held in Madrid.