Between reasoning

Abstract

In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog]_{referent_expression} is to the left of [the frog]_{relatum_expression}; [the snake]_{referent_expression} is between [the donkey and the deer]_{relatum_expression}). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given–new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise.

This research was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (FOR 375/1–1). We would like to thank Artur Schneider and Annekatrin Vogel for their assistance in conducting the experiments.

Notes

¹ Of course, one adheres to the instruction Put the deer _new such that the snake _given is to its left by putting the deer to the right of the snake. From this, one might want to conclude that reasoners convert a premise involving a new relatum, The snake _given is to the left of the deer _new, into its converse involving a given relatum, The deer _new is to the right of the snake _given. Conversion of premises has been repeatedly suggested in the literature (e.g., Baguley & Payne, 2000; Hunter, 1957; Huttenlocher, 1968; Johnson-Laird, 1983). We make no such claim on how reasoners treat premises involving a new relatum.

² We failed to observe a difference in P2 comprehension times for canonical premises in two further experiments, one of which is documented as Experiment 2 in Oberauer, Hörnig, Weidenfeld, and Wilhelm (2005); the other one has not been published.

³ Hörnig, Oberauer, and Weidenfeld (2005), who had included descriptions of two-dimensional layouts in their material, did not test participants with verbally presented conclusions, but with a picture verification task.