Existential Dependence and the Question of Emanative Causation in Protestant Metaphysics, 1570–1620

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Notes

¹ On the renewed interest in metaphysics at Protestant universities at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, see W. Sparn, Wiederkehr der Metaphysik. Die ontologische Frage in der lutherischen Theologie des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1976). Let me emphasize that, contrary to Sparn, I use the term ‘Protestant’ in an entirely non‐essentialist way. In particular, I do not wish to claim that there is anything about Protestant theology that necessitates any Platonic strand in the metaphysical thought of philosophers active in the Protestant territories.

² For overviews of the thought of Taurellus, see P. Petersen, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921), 219–58; U. G. Leinsle, Das Ding und die Methode. Methodische Konstitution und Gegenstand der der frühen protestantischen Metaphysik, 2 vols (Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 1985), vol. 1, 147–65; S. Wollgast, Philosophie in Deutschland zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung, 1550–1650 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1988), 148–53.

³ On Goclenius’s circumstances in Marburg, see H. Hotson, Commonplace Learning. Ramism and its German Ramifications, 1543–1630 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 230–1. For an overview of Goclenius’s thought, see Leinsle, Das Ding und die Methode, 175–96. On Goclenius’s conception of metaphysics as ontology, see P.‐F. Moreau, ‘Wolff et Goclenius’, Archives de philosophie, 65 (2002), 7–14; C. Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism. The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy (Leiden, Boston and Koeln: Brill, 2002), 24–5.

⁴ N. Taurellus, Philosophiae triumphus, hoc est, Metaphysica philosophandi methodus (Basel, 1573), d6 recto.

⁵ C. Lüthy, ‘David Gorlaeus’ atomism, or: the marriage of Protestant metaphysics with Italian natural philosophy’, in C. Lüthy, J. E. Murdoch and W. R. Newman, Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscularian Matter Theories (Leiden, Boston and Koeln: Brill, 2001), 245–90, especially 278–86. J. W. Feuerlein, Taurellus defensus (Nürnberg, 1734), contains a detailed account of the controversies that Taurellus’s metaphysics provoked at Protestant universities in Germany.

⁶ N. Taurellus, Synopsis Aristotelis metaphysices, par. 55; reprinted as an appendix to Feuerlein, Taurellus defensus (unpaginated).

⁷ A. da Villanova, Arnaldi Villanovi Opera, edited by N. Taurellus (Basel, 1585), col. 8.

⁸ Philosophiae triumphus, 123, defines a compositum as ‘per se multa simplicia quae per accidens composita sunt’.

⁹ Philosophiae triumphus, 124, 170.

¹⁰ C. Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics. Its Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 188.

¹¹ Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 189.

¹² Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 190–1.

¹³ J. Thomasius, Exercitatio de Stoica mundi exustione (Leipzig, 1676), 215–17.

¹⁴ Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 185.

¹⁵ J. A. Scherzer, Vade mecum sive Manuale philosophicum quadripartitum, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1675), vol. 1, 52–3. See C. Mercer, ‘Humanist Platonism in Seventeenth‐century Germany’, in Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy, edited by J. Kraye and M. W. F. Stone (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 238–58 (242).

¹⁶ C. Mercer, ‘Leibniz and Spinoza on Substance and Mode’, in The Rationalists. Critical Essays on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, edited by D. Pereboom (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 273–300 (285); see J. Micraelius, Lexicon Philosophicum, second edition (Stettin, 1662), col. 783–5 (first edition, 1653).

¹⁷ Mercer, ‘Leibniz and Spinoza on Substance and Mode’, 285.

¹⁸ See, for example, the entry on ‘essence’ in Goclenius’s Lexicon philosophicum.

¹⁹ Taurellus’s references are to Francesco Piccolomini’s De mundo and De creatione ex Philosophorum sententia. See F. Piccolomini, Libri ad Scientiam de Natura attinentes (Venice, 1596), pars secunda, fols. 1 recto–41 verso and fols 103 verso–118 recto. On Piccolomini’s methodological views, see N. Jardine, ‘Keeping Order in the School of Padua: Jacopo Zabarella and Francesco Piccolomini on the Offices of Philosophy’, Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy. The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, edited by D. A. Di Liscia, E. Kessler and C. Methuen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 183–209.

²⁰ See Piccolomini, De creatione, II.2.

²¹ M. Ficino, Theologia Platonica, I.2. See Marsilio Ficino. Platonic Theology, translated by M. J. B. Allen, edited by J. Hankins with W. Bowen, I Tatti Renaissance Library, 6 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001–2006), vol. 1, 18–27.

²² N. Taurellus, De rerum aeternitate (Marburg, 1604), 448–9.

²³ Taurellus, De rerum aeternitate, 449: ‘Moles corporea seipsam non potest efformare. Credo equidem, sed dubium est, an aliquando sit efformata, vel semper eodem quo nunc modo suam habuerit formam, neque aliunde, neque ab alio acceptam.’

²⁴ See Piccolomini, De mundo, ch. 30.

²⁵ Taurellus, De rerum aeternitate, 275: ‘An non elementa suas ex seipsis vires habent? Mihi non satis intelligere videtur Piccolomineus, quid communes, & quid proprae sint rerum vires. A supernis quaecunque sunt indifferentes sunt. Et hae non a Deo sunt immediate, sed ab astris, quae naturali sua virtute moventur, & suas etiam pro sua quaeque essentia vires in haec demittunt elementaria corpora: quae tamen vires communes, & eaedem sunt, in quaedunque inciderint corpora […].’

²⁷ N. Taurellus, Alpes caesae, Hoc est, Andreae Caesalpini Itali, monstrosa & superba dogmata, discussa & excussa (Frankfurt, 1597), 133: ‘Nos duplicem huius […] dependentiae modum esse dicimus […] Primus est efficientis caussae: alter est constituentium: Priorem nos admittimus[.] Mundum namque naturamque totam […] a Deo infinito solo, & aeterno solo effecta esse dicimus. Sed improprie tamen haec dependentia dicitur. Non enim a Deo pendent amplius: quia non amplius ab eo fiunt […] Alter modus est caussarum contituentium. Ita hominis essentia a corpore, & anima pendet. Neutro certe modo coelum a primo movente pendet. Primus enim modus rerum est, quae ab aliquo factae sunt aliquando, & completae. Quis vero credit motorem illum coeli partem esse constituentem: cuius nec forma ipse est, nec materia, nec anima? […] Coelestia corpora suam & substantiam, & naturam, & vires habent: quibus in elementaria corpora agant […].’ On Taurellus’s opposition to the influence of the philosophy of Cesalpino at the University of Altdorf, see M. Mulsow, ‘Ambiguities of the Prisca Sapientia in Late Renaissance Humanism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 65 (2004), 1–13 (esp. 7–9).

²⁶ Taurellus, De rerum aeternitate, 450–51: ‘Quomodo etiam mundum servat Deus? Num adversus hostes mundum tuetur, qui nulli tamen sunt? Num alimenta mundo praebet, quibus sustentetur? Absurdum etiam est, Deum servare mundum, quam ipse non fecerit. Si vero fecit, fecit certe prius quam servaverit. Non ergo hoc cerservatione definienda est aeterna creatio […]. Non equidem inficior, quin homines, animalia quaedam brutis, & corpora quaedam providentia divina conserventur. At de mundo non videtur hoc esse asserendum. Coelestium namque corporum non est ulla metuanda mutatio […]. Corpora vero elementaria, non plus mutantur, vel corrumpuntur naturaliter, quam oporteat.’

²⁸ Taurellus refers the reader to Coimbricenses, Physica VIII, 2, qu. 1, art. 4.

²⁹ N. Taurellus, Kosmologia, hoc est physicarum et metaphysicarum discussionum de mundo libri II adversus Franciscum Piccolomineum aliosque Peripateticos (Amberg, 1603), 235–6: ‘Verum ut res haec bene discutiatur: modi nobis sunt exquirendi: quibus conservari quid possit. 1. Primus itaque rerum est consistentium: quae semel factae, & completae alieno conservantur auxilio. 2. Alter vero modus est eorum, quae assiduo essentiae effluxu sustentantur. Utro igitur modo corpora coelestia conservat Deus? Si continuata creatione Deus coelum tueri & conservare dicatur: multa sese offeret difficultas. […] Heracliti sententia de assiduo rerum omnium fluxu confirmabitur. Quid enim salvum, & integrum vel temporis momento persistat: si corpora coelestia generentur, & corrumpantur assidue? Ita enim necesse est: si semper creantur: ut quantum adjicitur essentiae, tantum ante absumptum sit. Quid quaeso cogitari possit monstrosius?’

³⁰ Taurellus, Kosmologia, 236: ‘Motus localis certus, & firmus: quales sunt astrorum: substantiae sunt non fientis & fluxae: sed firmae, & permanentes […] Idem quoque docet astrorum certa, permanensque figura: quae factarum est, & consistentium: non fientium & fluentium substantiarum.’

³¹ Taurellus, Kosmologia, 237–8: ‘Si mundus essentiae Divinae defluxus quidam sit, vel corporeus est Deus: vel mundus est incorporeus. Omnis enim defluxus naturam eius substantiae refert: ex qua prodierit […].’

³² N. Taurellus, Philosophiae triumphus, 249: ‘[S]i substantia mundi a Deo separatus non sit, sed coniunctus ab eo semper ut nunc existerit, sicque sit in aeternum perduraturus, per se nequaquam subsistet, […] sed accidens eius esset, quod ab eo separari, vel separatim consistere non possit […].’

³³ Taurellus, Philosophiae triumphus, 250–1: ‘[M]undus tamen caeteraque omnia nec numero nec magnitudine vel substantiae sunt infinita. Porro an accidentia Deo possint ascribi, postea vere discutiemus, nunc sufficiat ipsam Dei substantiam nihil quod finitum sit sustinere.’

³⁴ Taurellus, Philosophiae triumphus, 273: ‘Infinitus substantia Deus existens, suscipit nihil quo possit ipse definiri, quae causa est ut accidentia sint ab eo quam alienissima, quod substantias vel circunscribant, vel alias definiant.’

³⁵ Taurellus, Philosophiae triumphus, 325–6: ‘Deus […] tale quid est, ut existat perfectissime, nullam sustinens accientium rationem, quo fit ut ab eius definitione removendum sit, quicquid actionem ab ipsa substantia diversa indicat […]. Videmus hominem vel infantia, vel morbo, vel somno sic affici nihil ut intelligat, quod indicium fuerit accidens hanc esse, cum salva substantia possit abesse: Licet autem hoc ipsum Deo non debeat adscribi, cum nil eius intelligentiam vel tollere queat, vel impedire […].’

³⁶ Kosmologia, 238.

³⁷ See Taurellus, Philosophiae triumphus, 165, 176; Taurellus, Alpes Caesae, 48–9; Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 243; Micraelius, Lexicon philosophicum, col. 18; Scherzer, Vade mecum, vol. 1, 3.

³⁸ Taurellus, De rerum aeternitate, 458: ‘Extra Deum nihil emanare potest, cum enim sit infinitus, & omne compleat spatium, omnia etiam intra se continet. Proinde si quid extra Deum esse dicatur, locali hoc positu describendum non est, sed substantiae diversitate. Solum id igitur in Deo est, quod eius complet essentiam.’

³⁹ Taurellus, Kosmologia, 62–3.

⁴⁰ Taurellus, Kosmologia, 238 and De rerum aeternitate, 459.

⁴¹ Taurellus, De rerum aeternitate, 459: ‘Ita siquidem in Deo sumus, ut extra Deum simus, ob maximam essentiae, virtutis, & voluntatis diversitatem [… E]sse extra Deum, nihil aliud est, quam habere diversam a Deo essentiam.’

⁴² Taurellus, Kosmologia, 238: ‘Defluxus omnis aut substantiae est, aut accidentis. Neuter mundo competere potest. Non enim accidens est. Substantia vero defluens, eam minuit ex qua profluxerit.’ The same argument occurs in Taurellus, De rerum aeternitate, 459.

⁴³ Taurellus, De rerum aeternitate, 43: ‘Vix quicquam adeo & impium, & absurdum est, quod non & cogitatum, & assertum, & defensum fuerit ab aliquibus.’

⁴⁴ Taurellus, Synopsis Aristotelis metaphysices, par. 82: ‘[M]undum […] caeteraque in eo corpora perfectas, completas, & per se conquiescentes esse substantias: nec in ipso amplius esse generationis motu. Non ergo mundus a Deo est per modum (ut loquuntur) emanationis. Quae cum ita sint: manifeste liquet veteres Philosophos de Deo nihil habuisse certi. Deus enim nec materia, nec forma, nec εντελεχεια rerum est […].’

⁴⁵ R. Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum (Marburg, 1613), 40: ‘Actio immanens […] maxime propria, habet unum idemque principium proximum & Activum & Receptivum. Manet in eodem supposito, & in eadem potentia, a qua elicitur, ut Cognitio & Appetitio. Huc pertinent emanationes seu resultantiae proprietatum spiritualium animae, ut, Intellectus & voluntas sunt proxime ab anima & in anima.’

⁴⁷ Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum, 146: ‘Emanare est immediate essentiam comitari, tamen sine respectu existentiae, & ante existentiam, & sine respectu causae externae. Proprie est fluere ab alio, seu ex principiis essentiae subiecti existere[,] ab essentia alicuius indissolubili nexu vinculoque proficisci. Sic emanant reales proprietates. Sic ex anima emanant potentiae.’

⁴⁶ See D. Sennert, Quaestionum medicarum controversarum (Wittenberg, 1609), 19; G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Darmstadt and Berlin: Akademie‐Verlag, 1923–), vol. 2, 1, 113. On emanative causation in Sennert, see A. Blank, ‘Sennert and Leibniz on Animate Atoms and Subordinate Forms’, in Machines of Nature and Composite Substances in Leibniz, edited by O. Nachtomy and J. E. H. Smith (Dordrecht: Springer, forthcoming).

⁴⁸ R. Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus (Kassel, 1609), 119.

⁴⁹ Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, 119. See J. C. Scaliger, Exotericarum exercitationum liber XV. De subtilitate, ad Hieronymum Cardanum (Paris, 1557), ex. 6, 6.

⁵⁰ Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, 119. See T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 104, art. 2, ad. 1. On Aquinas’s views on the role of secondary causes in conservation and late scholastic alternatives to this view, see A. J. Freddoso, ‘God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not Enough’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67 (1994), 131–56.

⁵¹ Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, 165–6.

⁵² Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, 166: ‘Participatio haec fit non Abscissione partis, sed unitate, per similitudinem.’

⁵³ So far, no extensive discussion of formal emanation in Goclenius’s writings came to my attention. Note, however, that Goclenius rejects the view that God could be understood as a Platonic world soul that is ‘the form and internal entelechy’ (forma & εντελεχεαι interna) of things in the world (Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, 167).

⁵⁴ Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, 167.

⁵⁵ Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, 167: ‘Deus igitur non est quaecunque substantia formaliter’.

⁵⁶ Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, 207; Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum, 146 (Mercer’s translations). See also Mercer, ‘Leibniz and Spinoza on Substance and Mode’, 284–5. On eminent containment in late Scholastic thought, see G. Gorham, ‘The Dilemma of Eminent Containment: Descartes and Suárez’, Dialogue, 42 (2003), 3–25.

⁵⁷ Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 694: ‘In universo, ut sit Perfectio, sunt diversi gradus & modi rerum, ipsis a Deo tributi […] Modus in rebus est limitatio divinae potentiae efficientis’ (Mercer’s translation).

⁵⁸ Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 704: ‘Deus quidem creaturas per suam naturam cognoscit, nos autem Deum per creaturas’ (Mercer’s translation).

⁵⁹ Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 704: ‘Deus est omnia in omnibus […] Deus dicitur esse in rebus universis, id est, omnibus & singulis […]’ (Mercer’s translation).

⁶⁰ Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 704: ‘Deus est omnia in omnibus Causaliter, cum tamen nihil sit eorum, quae sunt in rebus essentialiter […]’ (my italics).

⁶¹ Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 704: ‘& ideo quidquid in rebus existens cognoscatur […] in omnibus istis cognitis quodammodo cognoscitur Deus, sicut causa: cum tamen ex nullo cognoscatur, sicut est’ (my italics).

⁶⁴ R. Goclenius, Adversaria: Ad exotericas aliquot Julii Caesaris Scaligeri acutissimi philosophi exercitationes (Marburg, 1594), 192: ‘Intellectum cognoscere res seu entia materialia per speciem […] Se vero ipsum per reflexionem id est, dum intelligit se ipsum, non moveri sui specie, sed per reflexionem sibi ipsi praesentem fieri. Nec tamen posse se intelligere absque aliarum specierum intellectione, seu, nisi seipsum ad sese ducat per alia externa. Quo intelligat illa ab sese intelligi per intellectionem suam, atque iccirco se esse intelligentem, & aliquid substantiale […].’

⁶² On Scaliger’s presence in the Protestant university curriculum, see K. Jensen, ‘Protestant Rivalry – Metaphysics and Rhetoric in Germany c.1590–1620’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 41 (1990), 24–43.

⁶³ Scaliger, Exotericarum exercitationum, 389 recto: ‘[S]unt enim eius actiones duae: una recta, altera reflexa. Prima quidem cognoscit aliquid. Secunda cognoscit se & cognoscere, & cognoscendi habere potestatem. Qua reflexione seipsum, tametsi non disiungit, tamen geminat.’ On Scaliger’s views on reflexive minds, see I. Maclean, ‘Language in the Mind: Reflexive Thinking in the Late Renaissance.’ Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle, edited by C. Blackwell and S. Kusukawa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 296–321, esp. 317–18 (Maclean’s translation).

⁶⁵ Scaliger, Exotericae exercitationes, 405 verso. On Scaliger’s account of intelligible species and its influence on Goclenius’s, see L. Spruit, Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge. Volume Two: Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern Philosophy (Leiden, New York and Koeln: Brill, 1995), 250–4.

⁶⁷ Scaliger, Exotericae exercitationes, 399 verso: ‘Decet enim Animam propter suam dignitatem fungi suis officiis: suasque exercere potestates, absque ullius accidentis, aut inhaerentis, vel praesidio, vel adminiculo: sed sine ullo medio statim per essentiam suam. Quae essentia sine reali potestatum disiunctione, est principium sibiipsi αυταρκης: id est quod sit satis sibi, ad producendas effectiones suas […].’

⁶⁶ Scaliger, Exotericae exercitationes, 406 verso.

⁶⁸ Goclenius, Conciliator philosophicus, 119: ‘Ipsum esse animae, non est animae ut δεκτικω, multo minus ut πρoτω δεκτικω. Vita […] intellectiva est ipsum esse animae intelligentis. Ergo vita […] intellectiva, non est animae intelligentis ut δεκτικω, multo minus ut πρoτω δεκτικω, seu primi recipientis, nec vita haec est proprium animae intelligentis adjunctum seu παθoς, sed substantia.’ For recent discussions of the concept of receptacle in Plato’s Timaeus, see A. Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence. A Study of Plato’s Metaphysics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002), 155–70; T. K. Johansen, Plato’s Natural Philosophy. A Study of the Timaeus‐Critias (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 95–9.

⁷⁰ Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 39: ‘[Actio est] Substantiae seu rei subsistentis (suppositi) accidenti affectae 1. Denominative: Quod est per se subsistens, denominatur agens. 2. Sustentative, id est, propter dependentiam accidentis ab illa. 3. Determinative seu modificative. Determinatio autem accidentis provenit Subiective ex substantiae in qua inhaeret. Finaliter ex substantia per ipsam debet produci’ (my italics).

⁶⁹ Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 39: ‘Actio est Accidentis, Effective’ (my italics).

⁷¹ Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, 39: ‘Actio est […] Primario et fundamentaliter substantiae (quae accidentis fundamentum et Radix). Accidentis secundario et instrumentaliter’ (my italics).

⁷² Mercer, ‘Humanist Platonism in Seventeenth‐century Germany’, 239.

⁷³ See A. Blank, ‘The Analysis of Reflection and Leibniz’s Early Response to Spinoza’, forthcoming in Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft.

⁷⁴ Research for this paper was made possible through a fellowship from the Herzog August Bibliothek at Wolfenbüttel. An earlier version was presented at the Early Modern Philosophy Colloquium at the University of Chicago in March 2008. In preparing the final version, I greatly profited from extremely helpful comments by Mogens Laerke and two anonymous referees for the Review.