The philosopher, the ordinary believer, and their piety: Spinoza’s philosophical religion

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the nature and working of Spinoza’s philosophical religion. In doing so, it critically engages with Carlos Fraenkel’s study of the tradition of philosophical religions and Spinoza’s place in it. Spinoza can be said to be part of this tradition because the relation of his philosophical conception of God to the conceptions of God of some popular religions (especially Christianity) can be construed as that of the universal versus the particular, in which the particular expresses something of the universal, in an inadequate yet more readily accessible way. The account of Spinoza’s philosophical religion provided is kindred to Fraenkel’s, but it also explicitly discusses a crucial issue which Fraenkel only sparingly addresses, viz. the question how we must envisage the transition from a confused, imaginary to a more rational conception of God. A related issue the paper addresses concerns the question whether – and, if so, how – the dogmas of the universal faith can be reinterpreted philosophically. These discussions underpin a critical assessment of Fraenkel’s claim that Spinoza’s philosophical religion project is, ultimately, flawed.

KEYWORDS:

• Spinoza
• philosophical religion
• imagination
• prophecy
• piety
• Christianity

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Piet Steenbakkers, Susan James, Willem Lemmens, and an anonymous reader for Intellectual History Review for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to Edwin Curley, who helped me make my Tractatus Theologico-Politicus citations up-to-date with respect to the latest version of his forthcoming translation (this translation has since been published).

Notes on contributor

Rudmer Bijlsma is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Fort Hare, participating in the research project “Democracy, Heritage and Citizenship”. He received his PhD from Antwerp University for a dissertation entitled “Spinoza, Hume, and the Politics of Imagination: Naturalism, Narrative, Enlightenment”. He has been awarded a Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellowship for a project on the republican critique of commercial society of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson, to be carried out at the University of Lausanne.

Notes

1. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 12.

2. Fraenkel points out that his thesis challenges two established strands of interpretation as to how the relation between religion and philosophy was understood in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. In the first place, it challenges the “subordination thesis,” which saw philosophy as the handmaiden of religion, serving as “a tool to clarify religious doctrines” (ibid., 28). In the second place, Fraenkel challenges the Straussian school, which contends that there is “a sometimes cleverly disguised, yet irreconcilable conflict between philosophy and religion […] at the core of medieval thought” (ibid.). Leo Strauss has also interpreted the Theologico-Political Treatise as a work that disguises its actual, religion-undermining purport by employing a kind of “doublespeak” (Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion).

3. Fraenkel’s contention that Spinoza offers a philosophical expression of Christianity may not be wholly adequate, though. Spinoza grew up within the Jewish tradition, and never converted to Christianity after being excommunicated by his fellow Jews. Moreover, his philosophy is rooted at least as much in pagan and Jewish as in Christian sources (cf. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza; Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy), and blends these into a whole that rises supremely above its constituents.

4. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 282.

5. According to Fraenkel, Spinoza’s immediate aim in including a critique of Scripture in the Theologico-Political Treatise was to undermine the authority of the Dutch Calvinist Church, which hoped to become the state church through its alliance with the House of Orange (ibid., 280).

6. Ibid., 278.

7. Spinoza, Ethics, part IV, proposition 16.

8. Of course, there is no literal fallenness in Spinoza’s philosophical anthropology. However, he presents the Biblical Fall as an allegory for human bondage, out of which the patriarchs found their way “guided by the Spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God, on which alone it depends that man should be free” (ibid., proposition 68, scholium). Cf. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 215–6.

9. In fact, this only makes us worse off; Spinoza warns against the imitation of the affects of animals, which he links to the Fall (Ethics, part IV, proposition 68, scholium).

10. Cf. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 4, Vol. 3, 67; Chap. 11, Vol. 3, 155; Chap. 12, Vol. 3, 158. The chapters of the Theologico-Political Treatise are not subdivided in numbered sections. Following convention, therefore, I refer to the work’s page and volume numbers in the edition of Gebhardt.

11. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 12, Vol. 3, 165.

12. Spinoza, Ethics, part IV, proposition 37; part V, proposition 42.

13. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 251–3. Cf. also James, Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, 105–10.

14. Throughout this paper, I have replaced Curley’s translation of charitas with “loving-kindness” by “charity,” since this is the more literal and more common translation of the term. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of “loving kindness” is: “Kindness arising from love; tenderness; compassion; an instance of this”; its definition of “charity” is “Christian love” (Online edition, June 2014). “Loving kindness” is a relatively new term (1535), and is used primarily in reference to God’s love for man, as the dictionary’s examples show. “Charity” also explicitly concerns “[m]an’s love of God and his neighbour, commanded as the fulfilling of the Law” (ibid.); this is the sense in which Spinoza mostly uses charitas in the Theologico-Political Treatise. The disadvantage of “charity,” as Curley points out, is that it may suggest giving alms to the poor, whereas Spinoza’s use of charitas has a broader connotation (Glossary-Index, Collected Works, Vol. 2).

15. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 14, Vol. 3, 179.

16. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, part V, proposition 42.

17. Cf. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 16, n. 34, Vol. 3, 198 and Letters, 75, 78. The reference is to Romans 9:18 (cf. also Isaiah 64:8, Jeremiah 18:6). Although Spinoza may not think of Paul as propounding a fully adequate conception of the philosophical God in the philosophical parts of his letters, he seems to think that Paul’s words that we are as clay in the hands of the potter capture an important philosophical truth. He contrasts it with another passage in Romans, where Paul supposedly speaks in a “human manner.” In letter 78 to Oldenburg (a follow-up to 75), Spinoza describes human fate, and how to face it, in similar terms as Paul, while both use the clay and potter image in doing so: God has given us the nature that we have, and it is foolish to complain about its faults. As a result of their perfections and/or faults, some humans have been made for salvation/blessedness, while others necessarily perish.

18. A conception of God which can also be found in Scripture. Spinoza mentions Solomon in this respect: “There is no one in the Old Testament who spoke about God more rationally than Solomon, who surpassed everyone in his age in the natural light” (Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 2, Vol. 3, 41).

19. Cf. Wolfson: “God has always been spoken of as the last refuge of man in time of trouble. His own God, Spinoza concludes, is no less powerful to answer to this human need” (The Philosophy of Spinoza, 345). See also De Dijn, “Knowledge and Religion,” 11–12.

20. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, preface, Vol. 3, 6.

21. Spinoza, Ethics, part II, proposition 47.

22. Strictly speaking, such non-awareness of a true idea is not possible (Ethics, part II, proposition 43: “He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing”). As we will see, however, Spinoza allows for a subtle interplay between imagination and reason, which makes it possible to speak of degrees of adequacy and degrees of knowing that one knows – cf. Gatens and Lloyd, Collective Imaginings, 34–40; Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics. For analyses of this interplay at the ethical/political level, see Bijlsma, “Spinoza’s Politics”; James, “Narrative.” Nadler writes that Spinoza “suggests that such an adequate knowledge of God’s essence, like our adequate knowledge of common notions, is latent in all of our ideas, adequate and inadequate. (…) Most people are not aware of this for the obvious reason that so much of our attention is devoted to the senses and the imagination. Making this knowledge explicit, in such a way that we achieve at least the second kind of knowledge and, ideally, the third kind of knowledge, is of the utmost importance for our well-being and happiness” (Spinoza’s Ethics, 185).

23. Spinoza, Ethics, part II, proposition 11, corollary.

24. Ibid., proposition 32.

25. Considered in themselves, the body’s parts do not pertain to its essence: “they are highly composite individuals, whose parts (…) can be separated from the human body and communicate their motions (…) to other bodies in another manner, while the human body completely preserves its nature and form” (ibid., proposition 24, demonstration).

26. Ibid., proposition 28, demonstration.

27. Ibid., proposition 16, corollary 2.

28. See also ibid., proposition 36.

29. Ibid., proposition 33.

30. Ibid., part I, proposition 15.

31. Ibid., part II, proposition 35.

32. Ibid., proposition 45.

33. By ibid., proposition 2.

34. Ibid., proposition 47.

35. Ibid., scholium.

36. Cf. Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics, 185 (cited in fn. 22).

37. Although a transition to a higher level of knowing involves a fundamental, qualitative transformation (one no longer regards things as contingent, but as necessary – Ethics, part II, proposition 44), this transformation can be said to be prepared by the development that takes place beforehand, within the lower level of knowledge. See also fn. 22.

38. Ibid., proposition 38.

39. Ibid., lemma 2. The laws of motion and rest are an immediate infinite mode of God, that is, they follow immediately from an attribute (in this case extension), and are an intermediary cause in the causal chain between the attribute and its particular, finite modifications (cf. Spinoza, Letters, 64; Marshall, “Adequacy and Innateness,” 64).

40. Spinoza, Ethics, part II, propositions 38, 39.

41. Ibid., proposition 47, scholium.

42. For a discussion of the dynamic interrelations between affects, imagination, and common notions, see Gatens and Lloyd, Collective Imaginings, 104–6.

43. Spinoza, Ethics, part IV, proposition 45, scholium.

44. Ibid., part II, proposition 40.

45. Cf. Steinberg, “Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics”; Marshall: essences are “self-evident truths of the highest simplicity,” which “can only be known adequately or not at all” (“Adequacy and Innateness,” 70).

46. Steinberg, “Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics,” 165.

47. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, part IV, proposition 7.

48. Ibid., part II, proposition 39, corollary.

49. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 251, 253.

50. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, preface, Vol. 3, 8.

51. Ibid., Chap. 19, Vol. 3, 229.

52. Ibid., Chap. 7, Vol. 3, 116. Elsewhere, Spinoza writes: “I confess that someone can get prior control of another person’s judgment in many ways, some of them almost incredible. So though that person does not directly command the other person’s judgment, it can still depend so much on what he says that we can rightly say that to that extent it is subject to his control” (ibid., Chap. 20, Vol. 3, 239). A strong degree of control over the inner life of citizens is possible, then. However, simplicity and sincerity of heart are not among the dispositions that can be inculcated; effective laws and politics can merely stimulate them. Spinoza also adds that there are limits to the degree of control of judgment a state can bring about, and that stringent attempts to do so will cause discontent and ultimately destabilize the state (ibid., Vol. 3, 239, 240).

53. Ibid., Chap. 4, Vol. 3, 59.

54. Ibid., Chap. 1, Vol. 3, 27.

55. Ibid., Chap. 2, Vol. 3, 42.

56. Ibid., Chap. 1, Vol. 3, 16.

57. Ibid., Chap. 2, Vol. 3, 31.

58. As I indicated, Fraenkel believes that Spinoza’s contention that the prophets are supremely virtuous without having philosophical knowledge forms a detrimental problem for his theologico-political project. I return to this point in Section 5.

59. Ibid., Chap. 19, Vol. 3, 232.

60. Before the erection of the state, God’s decrees only exist as eternal truths (ibid., Vol. 3, 231, see also Chap. 4). Once these truths are translated into law in a state, they can be properly seen as commands, and hence as establishing a system of divine justice. Qua substance, divine and civil justice are exactly the same. The only difference is the perspective on the law that they offer: the former a theological, the latter a secular perspective.

61. Ibid., Chap. 19, Vol. 3, 231. Spinoza’s quote is from Jeremiah 29:7.

62. Ibid., Chap. 14, Vol. 3, 176–7.

63. Cf. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 268; Melamed, “Metaphysics,” 136; Nadler, Book Forged in Hell, 183–7; Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Dogmas,” 2001. For a recent interpretation that contests such philosophical reinterpretability: Garber, “Should Spinoza Have Published” (cf. also Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion). James writes that “in presenting them (i.e., the doctrines, RB) as he does, Spinoza chooses his audience, favouring readers who are immersed in biblical doctrine and the image of God around which it is organized” (Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, 214). Thus, although the doctrines are universal, they may, due to their specific formulation, be more immediately compelling for Jewish and Christian believers than for those of other popular religions. But they can be made compatible with any view of the divine that encourages justice and charity.

64. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 14, Vol. 3, 178.

65. Ibid., Vol. 3, 177.

66. Ibid., Chap. 13, Vol. 3, 172.

67. Ibid., Chap. 14, Vol. 3, 177.

68. Ibid., Vol. 3, 178.

69. Garber, instead, argues that Spinoza only has in mind the possibility of different anthropomorphic interpretations of the doctrines, because a philosophical interpretation would take away the ground for obedience (“Should Spinoza Have Published,” 180). However, given Spinoza’s clear indication that a philosophical interpretation is possible, Garber’s argument is unconvincing. It might be the case that, in order to safeguard obedience, Spinoza should have held the doctrines to be open for anthropomorphic interpretations only, while he mistakenly argued for the contrary. In my view, however, the obedience of citizens need not be undermined by Spinoza’s allowing for philosophical reinterpretation. I discuss this point later in this section and in Section 5.

70. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 14, Vol. 3, 177.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., Vol. 3, 178.

73. See also fn. 69 and Section 5.

74. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 14, Vol. 3, 177.

75. Ibid., Vol. 3, 178.

76. Spinoza, Ethics, part III, proposition 59, scholium.

77. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 14, Vol. 3, 177.

78. Ibid., preface, Vol. 3, 7.

79. For example, Israel (Radical Enlightenment, 11) and Smith (Question of Jewish Identity, 202) argue for this. Note that, if Spinoza had aimed to establish such a universal religion, he would not have been part of the tradition of philosophical religions, as this tradition envisages an ongoing constructive relation between historical popular religions and philosophy.

80. Rosenthal, “Spinoza’s Dogmas,” 69.

81. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 278.

82. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, preface, Vol. 3, 9.

83. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 278.

84. Ibid., 106.

85. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 2, Vol. 3, 34.

86. Ibid., Vol. 3, 35.

87. Ibid., Chap. 1, Vol. 3, 20.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., Chap. 2, Vol. 3, 38.

90. Ibid., Vol. 3, 41.

91. Ibid., Chap. 3, Vol. 3, 53.

92. Ibid., Chap. 2, 31.

93. Ibid., Vol. 3, 29.

94. Ibid., Vol. 3, 28.

95. See Nadler, Book Forged in Hell, 71.

96. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chaps. 14, 15.

97. Or even undermined: cf. Steenbakkers, “Das Wort Gottes,” 131; James, Philosophy, Religion, and Politics, 179 ff.

98. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 4, Vol. 3, 64.

99. Ibid., Chap. 11. The fact that they combined reason with a moderate degree of prophetic imagination confirms my reading of Spinoza as holding that prophetic imaginings come in different degrees of adequacy.

100. Ibid., Vol. 3, 157.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid., Vol. 3, 157–8.

103. Ibid., Vol. 3, 158.

104. Paul’s speculation was probably flawed because it also adapted ideas from the ancient philosophical schools. Yet, because he was strongly influenced by Christ – God’s mouth – his speculation is, from Spinoza’s perspective, unlikely to have been without any philosophical truth. Spinoza’s agreement with certain insights of Paul’s speculation also suggests this (see fn. 17).

105. Ibid., Vol. 3, 153.

106. Paul’s understanding of the doctrine of original sin is crucial in this context: Paul is so pessimistic about the possibility that any human being might do the right thing most of the time, that no-one would be saved if salvation depended on good works. Curley argues that Paul’s metaphysical justification of original sin is the chief element in his speculation that Spinoza did not deem properly philosophical (“Resurrecting Leo Strauss”).

107. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 13, Vol. 3, 171.

108. See Section 4.

109. Garber, “Should Spinoza Have Published.”

110. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions, 261.

111. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. 14, Vol. 3, 180.

112. Ibid., Chap. 16, n. 34.

113. See Section 4.