Sectarian Rebellions in Post-Transition Nigeria Compared

Abstract

The Boko Haram, a radical Islamic group based in north-east Nigeria, has killed over 1,000 people since mid-2011. This article explores the historical origins and structural drivers of Boko Haram and puts them into context. It argues that the Nigerian government's coercive response to Boko Haram has perpetuated a cycle of violence and undermined endogenous sources of moderation based on cultural, institutional, and political conditions. State repression to implement a counter-terrorism strategy has radicalized the group, created incentives to find international sympathizers, and contributes to fragmentation that impedes political solutions. A comparison with rebellions in the oil producing Niger Delta helps identify some barriers to and opportunities for conflict resolution.

Keywords:

• Nigeria
• African security
• terrorism
• Islamic extremism
• Boko Haram

Acknowledgements

This paper benefited from feedback received at an African Studies Association panel on ‘Rethinking Counterterrorism in Trans-Sahel’ at the 2011 Annual Meeting. It was greatly improved thanks to comments from Ebere Ownudiwe, John Harbeson, William Miles, John Paden, Charles Call, John Campbell, and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes on Contributor

A. Carl LeVan is an Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC. His articles have appeared in Governance, Africa Today, Democratization, International Affairs Forum, and The Journal of African Elections. Before entering academia, he worked as legislative director in the US Congress, and then as the National Democratic Institute's Country Director in Nigeria. He publishes the blog Development4Security. ([email protected])

Notes

1 Council on Foreign Relations, Nigeria Security Tracker (https://nigeriasecuritytracker.crowdmap.com/main).

2 Interview with Okwesilieze Nwodo, 8 March 2010, Abuja.

3 This figure is based on a review of newspaper accounts. See also Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (2008).

4 Some governors did ask for an increased military presence (see Isine 2009).

5 See for example his speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, 12 April 2010.

6 Interview with Hon. Farouk Lawan, 24 February 2012, Abuja.

7 Interview with Anyakwee Nsirimovu, 29 February 2012, Abuja.

8 This group, Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguard for the Aid of Muslims in Black Africa), claimed responsibility for attacks on Nigerian troops headed to Mali in January 2013.

9 Interview with Hon. Farouk Lawan, 24 February 2012, Abuja.

10 Abdulmultallab, who did pose a threat to the US and did have ties to al-Qaeda, had no known link to Boko Haram (International Crisis Group 2010).

11 Interview with an aid to Governor Ibrahim Idris, 26 February 2012, Abuja.

12 Interview with Hon. Farouk Lawan, 24 February 2012, Abuja.

13 Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting on Complex Insurgencies, August 2012, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Nigeria.

14 Interview with Anyakwee Nsirimovu, 29 February 2012, Abuja.