Virtuous or Vicious Circle? Governance Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood

Figures & data

Table 1. Reasons for compliance.

Type of Reason	Content-Dependent	Content-Independent
Prudential (Logic of Consequences)	Self-Interest	Sanctions and Incentives
Normative (Logic of Appropriateness)	Substantive Moral Convictions	Legitimacy

Source: Authors’ illustration. For an earlier version see Schmelzle (2011, 8).

Table 2. Degrees of legitimacy.

	No legitimacy	Benefit-of-the-doubt cooperation	Performance-based legitimacy	Intrinsic legitimacy
Sources	Absence of democratic authorization, ineffective service provision, lack of religious authority, etc.	Anticipated performance; reputation for effectiveness e.g. UN-Missions	Experiences of utility improving performance; expression of shared values through performance of services	Authorization through accepted norms and procedures: e.g. democratic selection, contracting or ethnic identity. Plus a threshold of performance
Consequences for cooperation	No voluntary cooperation, resistance, unprovoked defection	Willingness to play Tit-for-Tat: No resistance, inclination to cooperate if advantageous	Willingness to tolerate some degree of defection, inclination to cooperate even if not immediately advantageous, feelings of loyalty	Willingness to cooperate largely but not completely independent of consequences and of content of norms/directives.
Reasoning for cooperation	Elements of both logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness	Logic of consequences	Transitional phase between logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness	Logic of appropriateness (above a certain threshold)

Source: Authors’ illustration.

Figure 1. The virtuous circle model. Source: Authors’ illustration.

Schmelzle, Cord. 2011. “Evaluating Governance: Effectiveness and Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood.” SFB-Governance Working Paper Series Nr. 26, Berlin.

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