Doping: Just Do It?

Abstract

This paper provides a new philosophical argument against the lifting of the ban on doping in sports. It makes several assumptions for the sake of argument, one of which is, ironically, the moral justification of the lifting of the ban on sports doping. It is, then, a reductio ad absurdum against the claim that said ban should be lifted. Following this is a preliminary discussion concerning how doping athletes ought to be punished given that there ought to be a ban on doping due to the implausibility of the position to lift said ban. Considerations from responsibility and punishment theories are brought to bear in order to discern which punishments are most fitting for those athletes caught doping in designated clean sports competitions.

Este artículo ofrece un argumento filosófico nuevo contra el levantamiento de la prohibición del dopaje en el deporte. Toma diversos presupuestos para que el argumento funcione, uno de los cuales es, irónicamente, la justificación moral del levantamiento de la prohibición del dopaje deportivo. Es, por lo tanto, una reducción al absurdo contra la afirmación de que dicha prohibición debe ser levantada. Siguiendo a esto hay una discusión preliminar sobre cómo deberían ser castigados los atletas dopados, ya que debe haber una prohibición del dopaje debido a que la posición en favor de levantar dicha prohibición es implausible. Se traerán a colación cuestiones de las teorías de la responsabilidad y el castigo para aclarar qué castigos casan mejor con aquellos atletas pillados dopándose en las denominadas competiciones deportivas limpias.

Dieses Papier soll eine neue, philosophische Argumentation gegen die Aufhebung des Dopingverbots zur Verfügung stellen. Dazu werden zunächst mehrere Annahmen überprüft, eine davon in ironischer Weise, die die Aufhebung des Verbots rechtfertigen wollen. Durch eine “reductio ad absurdum” wird diese Annahme so gewendet, dass sie ein Argument gegen die Aufhebung des Verbots liefern kann. Daran anschließend folgt, vor dem Hintergrund der Unglaubwürdigkeit der Argumente für die Aufhebung des Doping-Verbots, eine Diskussion darüber, wie dopende Athleten bestraft werden sollten. Dazu werden Überlegungen, zu Verantwortung und Strafe im Allgemeinen und zur Frage, welche Strafen angemessen sind, angestellt.

Cet article fournit un nouvel argument philosophique contre la levée de l'interdiction sur le dopage dans le sport. Il fait plusieurs hypothèses pour les besoins du raisonnement, dont l'un est, ironiquement, la justification morale de la levée de l'interdiction du dopage sportif. Il est, alors, une reductio ad absurdum contre l'affirmation selon laquelle ladite interdiction devrait être levée. S’en suit une discussion préliminaire sur la façon dont les athlètes dopés devraient être punis étant donné qu'il devrait y avoir une interdiction de dopage en raison de l'invraisemblance de la position de lever ladite interdiction. Les théories sur les considérations de responsabilité et de sanction sont mises à profit afin de discerner quelles sont les peines les plus appropriées pour les athlètes dopés dans les compétitions sportives propres désignées.

本文提出一項新的哲學論證, 用以反駁取消對運動禁藥的禁制。提出取消禁制的一方, 為辯而辯所提出的幾項假設裡, 其中一點相當諷刺的是, 將取消運動禁藥禁制之行動道德合理化。這個假設因此可說是個歸謬法, 反而與應該取消禁制的宣稱自相矛盾。此初步討論著眼於使用禁藥的運動員理應接受懲處, 原因在於使用禁藥本應被禁止, 建議取消管制的出發點則令人難以置信。針對在特定清白的運動競賽中, 被發現使用禁藥的運動員, 本文則運用責任與懲罰理論的考察, 以釐清對他們最適當的懲戒方式。

KEYWORDS:

• desert
• doping
• fairness
• health care costs
• medical care costs
• proportional punishment
• punishment
• responsibility
• rights
• sport

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to anonymous referees for this journal, along with its Editor, Mike McNamee, for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Notes

This article is dedicated to Professor Claudio Tamburrini who first brought my mind to the attention of the matter of doping in sport.

1. While the issues surrounding the use of currently banned devices in sport is an important one, I shall not concern myself with them herein.

2. I assume herein that what the WADA and the USADA declare as prohibited substances are indeed justified as such non-institutionally, though precisely what ought or ought not to be banned in sports is surely a topic worthy of ethical consideration. However, this important question is not the focus of this paper.

3. Among the most recent include Corlett et al. (2013). This article lists other sources that defend a ban on doping due to considerations of fairness.

4. Including Fraleigh (1985). For further discussion of this matter, see Simon (1985) and Brown (1985).

5. A short list of such authors includes Brown (1980). For a critical analysis of the Role Model Argument, see Tamburrini (2000). For an overview of the arguments for and against doping, see Schneider and Butcher (2000). For a discussion of and reference to further work on the ethics of doping in sports, see Corlett et al. (2013).

6. See note 3.

7. For example, see Kershnar (2012, especially 154–158).

8. See notes 3 and 7.

9. It is not even a personal need such as food, shelter, or clothing.

10. For a discussion of self-support and athletics in the context of intercollegiate athletics in the U.S., see Brand (2006) and Corlett (forthcoming).

11. See note 3 for a fuller articulation and defense of this position.

12. Indeed, there are other scenarios, both real and imagined. Jan Todd and Terry Todd discuss the multifaceted leagues in powerlifting and explain how the lifting of the ban on doping in that sport essentially eventuated in its ruin (Todd and Todd 2009, especially 44–80). To the extent that what ruined the sport of powerlifting can be generalized to other sports, this would support the idea that the lifting of the current ban on doping would be a bad thing for sports. But M. R. King argues that the creation of parallel sports leagues is without moral grounding in either rights or autonomy, regardless of what occurred in the sport of powerlifting. Here he has in mind doped leagues, not the clean leagues of moral protest in my example. The idea is also problematic on practical grounds, argues King, because of the impossibility of figuring out what ought and ought not to be banned in a non-arbitrary manner and because the same incentives to dope would be retained in the development of such leagues (King 2012).

13. See note 7.

14. For discussions of some of the problems of moral and legal responsibility, see Cane (2002). For discussions of some of the problems of proportional punishment, see Davis (1992).

15. These points are discussed in general terms in Corlett (2013c, Chapters 2 and 5).

16. For philosophical analyses of the concept of proportionate punishment, see Corlett (2013c, Chapter 5) and Davis (1992). For legal expertise on the matter of proportionate punishment, see von Hirsch and Ashworth (2005).

17. The issue of proportionality in punishing doping athletes is raised in McNamee (2012, 307).

18. Details on how prison reforms can substantially reduce incarceration costs are found in Corlett (2013c, Chapter 8). Assumed here is that taxpayers should not be over-burdened with skyrocketing costs of incarceration by rather permissive attempts at prison ‘reform.’ Reasonable prison reform as genuinely hard treatment can reduce incarceration costs to taxpayers quite substantially (Corlett 2013c, Chapter 5).

19. For a discussion of such devices, see Todd and Todd (2009, 63).

20. The reasoning for this claim is found in Corlett (2013c, Chapter 5).

21. See note 17.

22. See note 21.

23. See note 7.