A Moral Defense of Trophy Hunting and Why It Fails

ABSTRACT

This is a critique of Timothy Hsiao’s ‘A Moral Defense of Trophy Hunting.’ I argue that Hsiao’s arguments on pain, consciousness, behavior, cruelty, and necessity all fail. More importantly, I argue against his broader conclusion that non-human animals ‘do not have any inherent moral significance.’ My conclusion is that Hsiao’s moral defense of trophy hunting fails.

KEYWORDS:

• Hunting
• animals
• animal ethics
• ethics
• applied ethics

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Kagan’s discussion of various accounts of well-being, even if not exhaustive, are representative of established thinking on the concept (29–41).

2. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who pointed this out.

3. I am only loosely referring to Joel Feinberg here (1990).

4. Mercier and Sperber’s The Enigma of Reason expresses some disagreements with Kahneman’s work but not so much that they part ways with Hume (2017, 51).

5. Hsiao might say that plants can be trained too and thus are like animals. My response is to again point out that this would be a surface level comparison that is little more than word play. Plants can be ‘trained’ but a lot of work would need to be shown to conclude that they can be trained to be rational. The ethologists are light years ahead of the botanists if this line of thinking is offered as a serious response.

6. Hsiao seems to mean moral considerably when he uses the phrase ‘moral significance.’ I am not parsing out the distinction here because I want to carry on the discussion on his terms. He is denying that animals have ‘moral considerability,’ to use Goodpaster’s term, and I disagree (1978, 311). I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who emphasized this point.

7. I would like to thank Dr. Hsiao for his contribution on this subject. The confluence of sport and species is not sufficiently attended to and while we obviously disagree on a matter of serious moral significance I hope that we read each other in good-faith and in the spirit of philosophy.