Electoral persistence and the quality of public policies: evidence from the dynamics of lawmaking in the Philippine House of Representatives, 1992-2016

ABSTRACT

Can elections serve as vector of good public policy in fledgling democracies where electorally persistent elites circumvent institutional safeguards? Examining legislative productivity for each member of the Philippine House of Representatives from 1992 to 2016, we argue that while electoral persistence can be short-run welfare enhancing by inducing legislative attention on particularistic policies, it is ultimately electoral competition and the prospect of ouster that determine overall legislative behaviour. Using various measures of electoral competition, our panel estimates suggest that district incumbents who faced competitive elections, regardless of political pedigree, are more likely to work for the passage of their legislative proposals into legislation. The results lend credence to the disciplining effect of elections, even in precarious political settings where competition is between equally persistent political elites. Overall, incumbents who fought competitive elections are generally more likely to produce laws as a legislative preoccupation – a commitment they are likely to pursue even in the presence of institutional and political uncertainties.

KEYWORDS:

• Electoral accountability
• House of Representatives
• legislative policymaking
• Philippine congress
• particularistic legislation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. Unlike district representatives, senators in the Philippines are elected at large and do not represent constituencies.

2. Christine Avendano, ‘Palace, Congress, hit for keeping pork’, Inquirer.net, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/860490/palace-congress-hit-for-keeping-pork (accessed 10 October 2018).

3. DJ Yap, ‘Alvarez tells 24 solons who got no funding: That’s life’, Inquirer.net, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/954026/alvarez-tells-24-solons-who-got-no-funding-thats-life (accessed 10 October 2018).

4. Marcelo Lihgawon, ‘Baguilat says PDAF properly utilized in Ifugao’,BusinessWeek Mindanao, http://www.businessweekmindanao.com/2014/10/29/baguilat-says-pdaf-properly-utilized-in-ifugao/ (accessed 10 October 2018).

5. Bea Cupin, ‘Opposition congressmen get zero budget in 2018’, Rappler.com, https://www.rappler.com/nation/191810-budget-cut-opposition-congressmen-2018 (accessed 10 October 2018).

6. Consider, for instance, relationship restrictions in appointments under Sec. 79, disclosure requirements regarding assets and liabilities under Sec. 91, and restrictions in appointive barangay officials under Sec. 394 of Republic Act 7160. See, An Act Providing for The Local Government Code of 1991, Republic Act 7160, 10 October 1991.

7. For instance, under Section 2 (c) of Republic Act 3019, receiving a gift includes ‘accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer’s immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive’. See, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act 3019, 17 August 1960.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the University of the Philippines Diliman Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research and Development [PHDIA No. 171701].