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Abstract
The de facto state of Somaliland has featured prominently as constituting an allegedly exceptional case of state-making, especially because peaceful and democratic elements of its trajectory have frequently been emphasized. Yet, evidence suggests that the polity's state-making project not only showed considerable traits of authoritarian leadership, but also that it was significantly perpetuated by the civil wars encouraged by President Egal during his first term in office. Hence, this article proposes that Somaliland's ‘best kept secret’ lies less with the commonly emphasized processes of reconciliation and consensus-based governance driven by ‘traditional authorities’ than with the shrewd politics and war projects that underpinned its state-making endeavour. While clarifying that war was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-making, this article counters the neo-liberal proposition that war invariably constitutes ‘development in reverse’ and contributes to the argument that we need to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of war in order to enhance our understanding of under what condition war, or certain elements thereof, can be constitutive of state-making in the contemporary world.
Notes
1. Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention”.
2. Jhazbhay, “Somaliland – Africa's Best Kept Secret.”
3. Bryden, Somaliland and Peace; Jhazbhay, “Somaliland's Post-War Reconstruction”; Walls, “Emergence of a Somali State.”
4. Adam, “Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?”; Forti, “Pocket of Stability,” 5.
5. Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders; Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,” 723.
6. See e.g. Othieno, “New Donor Approach to Fragile Societies.”
7. Hoyle, “Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?,” 85; Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States, 148; Jhazbhay, “Somaliland: Journey of Resistance, Reconciliation and Peace,” 50.
8. Kaplan, “Remarkable Story of Somaliland,” 248; Forti, “Pocket of Stability,” 5.
9. Sufi, “Future Political Order,” 285.
10. Huliaras, “Viability of Somaliland”; Spears, “Reflections on Somaliland”; Bakonyi, “Moral Economies of Mass Violence”; Helling, “Tillyan Footprints Beyond Europe.”
11. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 67.
12. Leander, “Wars and the Un-Making of States,” 69; Taylor and Botea, “Tilly Tally.”
13. For example, Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
14. Herbst, “War and the State in Africa”; Herbst, States and Power in Africa; Deflem, “Warfare, Political Leadership, and State Formation”; Niemann, “War Making and State-making.”
15. It should be noted that, first, war is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-making; second, that state-making is a complex process, which cannot simply be broken down into a ‘war makes states and vice versa’ equation; and, third, that the analysis provided here focuses only on pertinent processes of state-building, refraining from broadening the discussion to include nation-building.
16. Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Self-Portrait of Somaliland, 20.
17. Compagnon, “Somali Armed Movements,” 77; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 85.
18. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty, 247; Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 202; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 85.
19. Wartorn Societies Project (WSP), Rebuilding Somaliland, 61; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 85.
20. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 85; personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
21. Interview with an ex-SNM officer and politician, Hargeysa, July 8, 2011. While it is commonly argued that the Calan Cas (‘Red Flag’) had a socialist inclination (e.g. Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 202f.), most of its members were no more leftist than the ‘civilian wing’. The name Calan Cas originates in the founding of the Somali Democratic Union (SDU) in 1962, which had a socialist inclination, and was used to label the SNM's ‘military wing’ as the founder of the SDU and the leader of the ‘military wing’ were one and the same – Saleebaan ‘Gaal’; interview with a Member of Parliament (MP), Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.
22. Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 202f.; cf. International Cooperation for Development (ICD), Conflict Transformation and Peace Building, 12.
23. Gilkes, Two Wasted Years; Spears, Civil War in African States, 155.
24. Personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 5, 2011.
25. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
26. Bryden and Farah, Peace Committee for Somaliland, 13; interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, February 10, 2009; personal communication with a local employee of an international non-governmental organization (NGO), Hargeysa, February 25, 2009; interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 19, 2011; interview with an ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009.
27. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
28. Flint, “Somaliland: Struggling to Survive,” 37; Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 195f.; interview with a government official, Erigavo, April 8, 2009.
29. Gilkes, Two Wasted Years.
30. Cf. Farah and Lewis, Roots of Reconciliation, 57.
31. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty, 250.
32. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty, 250.; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 98.
33. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 19, 2011; interview with a government official, Erigavo, April 8, 2009.
34. Wartorn Societies Project (WSP), Rebuilding Somaliland, 49.
35. Cf. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland.
36. Cf. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 100.
37. Cf. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 98; Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 196.
38. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, March 30, 2009; interview with an ex-minister, Hargeysa, August 7, 2008; interview with an ex-SNM officer and politician, Hargeysa, July 8, 2011.
39. Interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, August 2, 2011.
40. Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 216.
41. Bryden, “Banana Test.”
42. Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 216; see also Spears, Civil War in African States, 157, who refers to the International Crisis Group (ICG), Somaliland: Democratisation and Its Discontents, 10.
43. Interview with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011; interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008.
44. Interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, August 2, 2011; personal communication with a Somaliland entrepreneur, Hargeysa, June 11, 2011.
45. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B391.
46. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 22.
47. Against this background, it is questionable how far the conflicts of the early 1990s did, in fact, drastically alter the balance of power against the SNM, as Renders and Terlinden have it; Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,” 730. It appears that the hardline members of the SNM emerged from the conflict as winners; interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, August 2, 2011.
48. Interview with an ex-SNM officer and politician, Hargeysa, July 8, 2011; interview with an ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009.
49. Interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, August 2, 2011.
50. Interview with an ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009; Jimcaale, “Consolidation and Decentralization,” 74; see also Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 213; cf. Farah and Lewis, Roots of Reconciliation, 7.
51. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 3, 2011.
52. Hoehne, “Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia,” 16ff.; Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,” 731.
53. Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions, 23.
54. Jimcaale, “Consolidation and Decentralization.”
55. Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions, 23.
56. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 100.
57. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.
58. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 109.
59. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 112.
60. Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,” 732.
61. Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,”, 731.
62. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 112.
63. Interview with an ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009.
64. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 1, 2011. Zierau depicts how the Somaliland state was largely captured by a small Habar Awal elite; Zierau, “State Building without Sovereignty,” 60.
65. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 112.
66. Personal communication with an ex-guurti advisor, Hargeysa, July 5, 2011.
67. While custom duties levied on imported/exported goods fell to the Ministry of Finance, the revenues generated from service charges came under the presidency. Thus, Egal not only controlled important revenues, but could also assure his Habar Awal/Iisa Muse clansmen that ‘their’ revenue remained under their control; personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 11, 2011.
68. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 111.
69. Khat (also qaat) is a mild amphetamine-like stimulant consumed by most male Somalis.
70. Flint, “Somaliland: Struggling to Survive,” 38; interview with a khat trader, Hargeysa, July 5, 2011.
71. Gilkes, Acceptance Not Recognition; cf. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 112.
72. Also the Iisa Muse militia that controlled the port of Berbera was given an extra six months (June–December 1993) to take revenue from the port before it became a national asset; personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 18, 2011.
73. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 11, 2011.
74. Bryden and Farah, Peace Committee for Somaliland, 8.
75. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 24.
76. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 98; Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 213, referring to the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Self-Portrait of Somaliland, 23.
77. Interview with a member of the Council of Elders, Burco, August 2, 2008.
78. Renders, “‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,” 213; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 99.
79. Personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 18, 2011.
80. Toyota pick-up trucks with weapon-mounting capabilities.
81. Interview with an ex-minister, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008; see also the interview with an ex-director of the National Demobilization Commission (NDC), Hargeysa, July 25, 2008.
82. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 113.
83. Warsame and Brons, “Somaliland: State in Pursuit of Peace and Stability,” 25.
84. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 23. The Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) started supporting Somaliland's DDR efforts in September 1994; GTZ, All What You Need to Know About Gtz, 4.
85. Interview with a Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) veteran, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
86. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011; personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 11, 2011.
87. Interview with an SSDF veteran, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011; personal communication with an ex-guurti advisor, Hargeysa, July 5, 2011.
88. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 114.
89. Brickhill, Disarmament and Demobilisation in Somaliland, 2.
90. Brickhill, Disarmament and Demobilisation in Somaliland, 3; interview with an ex-director of NDC, Hargeysa, July 25, 2008.
91. Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention.”
92. Cf. interview with an SNM veteran and journalist, Hargeysa, July 25, 2008.
93. Personal communication with an SNM veteran and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 20, 2008; interview with an ex-member of NDC, Hargeysa, July 24, 2008.
94. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 114; referring to Nyathi, “Somaliland, Zimbabwe: Demobilisation and Development,” 27.
95. Interview with judicial advisors to the Somaliland Police Force, Hargeysa, March 17, 2009.
96. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 114.
97. Cf. interview with an SNM veteran and journalist, Hargeysa, July 25, 2008.
98. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 23. The establishment of the military and police forces was a true demobilization process. “The soldiers were hired if they had a big gun. […] Anyone with no gun wasn't registered”; interview with an SNM veteran, Burco, April 21, 2009.
99. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 11, 2011.
100. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.
101. Yet, it remains questionable to what extent the Habar Yonis and Eidagalle formed part of the ‘national’ army.
102. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.
103. Gilkes, Acceptance Not Recognition; cf. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 23.
104. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 115.
105. Interview with a CSI official, Hargeysa, July 18, 2011.
106. Interview with a CSI official, Hargeysa, July 20, 2011.
107. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 23.
108. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 111.
109. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 120.
110. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 120.
111. It was, for example, not until 1997 that the central government established some nascent control over Erigavo, which remained, however, largely under the control of the local administration; interview with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, August 4, 2011.
112. Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,” 733.
113. Personal communication with an ex-CSC official, Hargeysa, March 21, 2009; personal communication with a CSI official, Hargeysa, July 20, 2011.
114. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 111.
115. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 22.
116. Interview with an SNM veteran, Burco, April 21, 2009.
117. Gilkes, Acceptance Not Recognition, 11f., 22; The Peace Committee for Somaliland, A Peace Proposal, 6.
118. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 109.
119. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 115.
120. Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Self-Portrait of Somaliland, 21.
121. The ‘heartland’ is conceived of comprising the Kalabeydh–Hargeysa–Berbera corridor.
122. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 116.
123. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 100. The Harti were the second most important clan confederation after the Isaaq until 1993, when they were overtaken by the Gadabursi – partly signified by the vice-presidential appointment; interview with an MP, Hargeysa, July 3, 2011; personal conversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
124. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 101; Spears, Civil War in African States, 156; interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, July 30, 2011. Amongst the central Calan Cas figures Egal accommodated were militia leader Muse Behi Abdi, Dayib Mohamed Gurey, and ex-Minister of Interior ‘Gaal’, whom ‘Tuur’ had sacked for having withheld Berbera port revenues.
125. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 116.
126. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 116.
127. Garowe Online, “Somalia,” November 22, 2007; Spears, Civil War in African States, 156.
128. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.
129. Spears, Civil War in African States, 156.
130. Interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, July 30, 2011.
131. Bryden and Farah, Peace Committee for Somaliland, 9.
132. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 119.
133. Interview with an ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009.
134. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 25.
135. Interview with an ex-SNM and NDC official, Hargeysa, July 25, 2011.
136. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.
137. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 117.
138. Personal conversation with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.
139. In the imminent civil war, the Garhajis were, indeed, fighting at least as much against the Calan Cas as against Egal, as most of them perceived the former as their main opponent who had pushed them out of government; cf. Spears, Civil War in African States, 157.
140. Interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008.
141. Personal conversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
142. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 117.
143. Interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008.
144. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 117.
145. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 116.
146. Personal conversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011; interview with an SSDF veteran, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
147. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 19, 2011; personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 18, 2011.
148. For historical, geographical and political reasons the Garhajis were, indeed, largely in favour of unification; interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008. The portrayal of the opposition as pro-unionists gained credence when ‘Tuur’, his former Finance Minister ‘Buba’ and General ‘Yare’ all accepted positions in Aideed's government in Mogadishu. Given that they also took with them all senior politicians of the Garhajis, this Isaaq clan lost any influence in Somaliland politics; personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011. Similarly, also Dr Ali Khalif Galayd, who had been part of the Dhulbahante delegation in Burco, abandoned Somaliland and became the first Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia in 2000; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 82.
149. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 118; Spears, Civil War in African States, 157.
150. Spears, Civil War in African States, 158; referring to Bryden, Somaliland and Peace, 2.
151. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 123.
152. Personal communication with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008, and July 10, 2011.
153. Personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, June 29, 2011; interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008.
154. Interview with a Somaliland intellectual, Hargeysa, July 6, 2011.
155. Personal conversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
156. Personal conversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
157. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 123.
158. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.
159. Interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008; interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, July 30, 2011.
160. Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,” 731.
161. Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,” 731.
162. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
163. Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,” 734.
164. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 3, 2011.
165. Cf. personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.
166. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 121.
167. Interview with a Somaliland intellectual, Hargeysa, August 1, 2011.
168. Interview with a Somaliland intellectual, Hargeysa, July 6, 2011; personal conversation with an APD researcher, Hargeysa, July 22, 2011.
169. Cramer, Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing.
170. World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap; Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”; see also Leander, “Wars and the Un-Making of States.”
171. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 67.
172. Rasler and Thompson, War and Statemaking; Kestnbaum and Skocpol, “War and Development of Modern National States,” 667.
173. Jhazbhay, “Somaliland – Africa's Best Kept Secret.”
174. Borrowing from Rodrik, One Economics, 6, who makes a similar point with regards to economic growth.