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Abstract
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen has proven itself to be a highly adaptable organisation. Their most recent evolution has seen them transform from an overt, military and governmental force in southern Somalia to a covert, insurgent and anarchic force in Kenya. This article indicates how al-Shabaab has reinvented itself in Kenya. Both ‘clan’ and ‘Islam’ are often thought of as immutable factors in al-Shabaab's make-up, but here we show that the organisation is pragmatic in its handling of clan relations and of Islamic theology. The movement is now able to exploit the social and economic exclusion of Kenyan Muslim communities in order to draw them into insurgency, recruiting Kenyans to its banner. Recent al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya, launched since June 2014, indicate how potent and dangerous their insurgency has become in the borderlands and coastal districts where Kenya's Islamic population predominates.
Acknowledgements
The Research Council of Norway supported the research reported in this paper, under the project 214349/F10, ‘The Dynamics of State Failure and Violence', administered by the Peace Research Institute, Oslo. We are grateful to Anna Bruzzone for research assistance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Maruf and Joseph. “Sources on Final Days of Al-Shabaab's Godane.”
2. Barnes and Hassan, “The Rise and Fall”, 151–60.
3. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement” is the most important source on al-Shabaab's history, esp. 10–23. See also Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, ch. 2.
4. For a history of the war with AMISOM, see Bruton and Williams, Counter-Insurgency in Somalia.
5. Open Society Foundations, Counterterrorism and Human Rights.
6. Anderson and McKnight, “Kenya at War”, 4–7; Bruton and Williams, Counter-Insurgency in Somalia.
7. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia; Marchal, “A Tentative Assessment,” 381–404; Menkhaus, “The Crisis in Somalia”, 357–90; Anzalone, “Al-Shabaab's Tactical and Media Strategies”, 12–16; Pantucci, “Bilal al-Berjawi”, 14–17.
8. Hansen, “An in-Depth Look”, 9–12.
9. Bryden, Reinvention of Al-Shabaab, 3–6.
10. Menkhaus, “Al-Shabaab's Capabilities”, 5.
11. Bryden, Decline and Fall, 5.
12. Anderson and McKnight, “Kenya at War”, 8–11.
13. Bryden, Reinvention of Al-Shabaab, 2.
14. Gartenstein-Ross and Appel, “Al-Shabaab's Insurgency.”
15. Menkhaus, Conflict Assessment, for the use of the term “spoiler” in this context. See also, Anderson, Why Mpeketoni, 1–6; Branch and Mosley. “Why East Africa's Borders are Blowing Up,” 1–4.
16. Besteman, Unravelling Somalia.
17. Lewis, Blood and Bone.
18. As discussed by Schlee, Approaches to Identity, intro.
19. For examples: Gettelman, “New Somali Government” (for a fatalist approach to clanism); Blair, “Somalia: Analysis of a Failed State” (for the conflation of ‘clan’ and ‘warlord’); Dowden, “Internal and External” (for war as a ‘continuation of Somali tradition’).
20. For the key debate, see: Besteman, “Representing Violence”, 120–33; the response from Lewis, “Doing Violence to Ethnography,” 100–8; and Besteman's reply, “Primordialist Blinders,” 109–20.
21. Samatar, “Destruction of State and Society,” 630, 639.
22. Ibid, 627.
23. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society; Barnes, “U dhashay Ku dhashay”, 487–98; Bemath, “The Sayyid and Saalihiya Tariga,” 33–47; Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty; Samatar, In the Shadow of Conquest.
24. Samatar, “Destruction of State and Society,” 636; Menkhaus, “Government Without Governance,” 60.
25. For a controversial interpretation of the consequences, see Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia.
26. World Bank, Conflict in Somalia.
27. Samatar, “Somalia's Post-Conflict Economy.”
28. Besteman, Unravelling Somalia, 4; Schlee, “Customary Law”, 258–71; Little, Economy Without a State; Simons, Networks of Dissolution.
29. Menkhaus, Conflict Assessment, 9–15.
30. A lengthy propaganda video released early in 2015, Al-Kataib Media Foundation, “The Westgate siege – Retributive Justice,” gives warning of al-Shabaab's intention to internationalise its assault, across eastern Africa and beyond.
31. For the most recent examination, Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
32. This section draws upon Anderson, “Clan Identity and Islamic Identity”, with significant updating.
33. For the historiography: Abdullahi, Culture and Customs; Lewis, Saints and Somalis; Samatar, In the Shadow of Conquest; Thordsen, “New Muslim Activism”; Mwakimako and Willis, “Islam, Politics and Violence.”
34. For the most significant examples: Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia; Botha, Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths; Haynes, “Islamic Militancy,” 1312–39; Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” 24–38; Kfir, “Islamic Radicalism,” 829–55; Ndzovu, “The Politicization of Muslim Organizations,” 25–53; Rabasa, Radical Islam, 39–70; Vittori et al., “Islam in Tanzania and Kenya”, 1075–99.
35. As exemplified in the best-selling book on Somalia, Fergusson, The World's Most Dangerous Place.
36. Menkhaus, “Political Islam in Somalia.”
37. Abdullahi, Culture and Customs.
38. Marchal, “A Tentative Assessment”; Menkhaus, “Political Islam in Somalia.”
39. Menkhaus, “Political Islam in Somalia”; de Waal, Islamism and Its Enemies.
40. Menkhaus, “Political Islam in Somalia,” 112–13.
41. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement”, ch. 2; ICG, Somalia's Islamists.
42. Marchal, “A tentative assessment”; Le Sage, “Somalia: Sovereignty Disguise.”
43. ICG, Counter-terrorism in Somalia; Menkhaus, “Political Islam in Somalia”; Le Sage, “Prospects for al-Itihad.”
44. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” 12–14.
45. Menkhaus, “The Crisis in Somalia,” 10; Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” 11.
46. ICG, Somalia: To Move Beyond a Failed State.
47. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” 14–18.
48. See Marchal, “A Tentative Assessment”; Marchal, “Warlordism and Terrorism”; Menkhaus, “The Crisis in Somalia”; and ICG, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia, for the context.
49. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” 16–17.
50. Menkhaus, “Violent Islamic Extremism.”
51. ICG, Somalia: The Transitional Government; Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement.”
52. Gordon and Mazzeti, “US Used Base in Ethiopia.” For a recent overview of US activity in Ethiopia and Somalia, Turse, Tomorrow's Battlefield.
53. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement.”
54. Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, 4.
55. Menkhaus, “Violent Islamic Extremism.”
56. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement”, 17–18.
57. Anderson and McKnight, “Kenya at War”, 4–8.
58. Hansen, “An in-depth Look”, 9–12.
59. Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
60. ICG, Somalia's Divided Islamists.
61. Bryden, Reinvention of Al-Shabaab, 3–4; Hansen, “An in-depth Look”; Menkhaus, “Al-Shabaab's Capabilities.”
62. Botha, “Political Socialization”, 895–919; Hassan, “Understanding the Drivers,” 18–20; Hansen, “Mis-Spent Youth”; Thordsen, “New Muslim Activism.”
63. Anderson, Why Mpeketoni, 3–4; Hidalgo, “Kenya's Worst Enemy,” 1–3; HRW, “Kenya: Halt Crackdown Against Somalis.”
64. Lind and Jude, “Counter-Terrorism,” 335–53; Lochery, “Rendering Difference Visible,” 615–39; Carrier and Lochery, “Missing States?”, 334–51.
65. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” 46–50.
66. Nzes, “Terrorist Attacks”, 13–15; Rabasa, Radical Islam; Botha, Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenya Youth; Thordsen, “New Muslim Activism.”
67. Ploch, Countering Terrorism in East Africa.
68. Ibid.
69. Hansen, “Mis-Spent Youth”; Gartenstein-Ross, “The Strategic Challenges,” 25–36; Botha, Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youth.
70. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement”; Le Sage, “Prospects for al-Itihad”, 472–77.
71. Figures from Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement”, 42.
72. Compagnon, “Somali Armed Units”, 84. See also, Adam, “Somalia: Militarism, Warlordism, or Democracy.”
73. Compagnon, “Somali Armed Units,” 90.
74. Menkhaus, “State Collapse in Somalia”, 410–11.
75. This paragraph draws upon Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” 39–51.
76. UN, Report of the Monitoring Group 2013.
77. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” 40–1.
78. Rabasa, Radical Islam; Botha, Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenya Youth; and Thordsen, “New Muslim Activism” provides between them a very full historical coverage.
79. Anzalone, “Kenya's Muslim Youth Center,” 9; Shinn, “Al Shabaab's Foreign Threat”; Lind et al., Tangled Ties, 18. According to the UN Monitoring Group, the Kenya contingent was amongst the best organised and most efficient of al-Shabaab's units: UN, Report of the Monitoring Group 2010, 140.
80. Interviews, conducted in Isiolo and Eastleigh, May and June 2010.
81. Hassan, “Understanding Drivers,” 18.
82. Nzes, “Terrorist Attacks,” 14–15.
83. UN, Report of the Monitoring Group 2011, 25–6; UN, Report of the Monitoring Group 2010, 25–7.
84. UN, Report of the Monitoring Group 2010, 25–7.
85. Anon., “Uganda Trial Resumes.”
86. Bryden, Decline and Fall, 8.
87. Anzalone, “Kenya's Muslim Youth Center,” 12–13.
88. Pantucci, “Bilal al-Berjawi,” 14–17.
89. Interviews, Eastleigh district, Nairobi, September 2011.
90. See, for example, Gisesa, “Portrait of a Jihadist.”
91. Anon., “Police: Militant-Trained Kenya Youth a Threat.”
92. Anzalone, “Kenya's Muslim Youth Centre,” 9–10.
93. Nzes, “Al-Hijra,” 24–6. Activists from within the MYC were believed to be among Al-Hijra's principal agents.
94. Critical Threats, “Linda Nchi – Timeline”; Nzes, “Al-Hijra,” 24–26.
95. UN, Report of the Monitoring Group 2012, annex 3.1.
96. UN, Report of the Monitoring Group 2013, 15.
97. Anzalone, “Kenya's Muslim Youth Centre,” 9–10.
98. Ibid., 80–81.
99. Anzalone, “The Nairobi Attack,” 1–6; Anzalone, “Al-Shabab's Tactical and Media Strategies,” 12–16.
100. ICG, Kenya: Al-Shabaab, 4–5; Al-Kataib Media Foundation, “The Westgate siege – Retributive Justice.”
101. All four issues of Gaidi Mtaani are available from http://jihadology.net/.
102. Gaidi Mtaani, Issue 1 “Operation Linda Uislamu”, 4.
103. See the Al Jazeera documentary film, Inside Kenya's Death Squads, available at http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/KenyaDeathSquads, last accessed August 3, 2015.
104. Gaidi Mtaani, Issue 3, “Sheikh Aboud Rogo – Chanzo cha Mabadiliko.” See also, Swaleh, “The Radicalization of Sheikh Aboud Rogo.”
105. Gaidi Mtaani, Issue 2, “The Long Road to Kismayu.”
106. Gaidi Mtaani, Issue 4, “Special Edition – Westgate.” For further discussion, see Anderson and McKnight, “Kenya at War,” 20–3.
107. Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,”, 44–5.
108. Samatar, In the Shadow of Conquest.
109. Botha, Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youth, charts this very clearly.
110. Gifford, Christianity, Politics and Public Life, describes the Christian character of Kenya's state.
111. Lind et al, Tangled Ties, 17–19.
112. Schlee, “Customary Law,” 258–71.
113. IPOA, Operation Sanitization Eastleigh Report.
114. Straziuso, “Bombings Kill 10.” This was typical of other attacks over the previous year: Gartenstein-Ross and Appel, “Al-Shabaab's insurgency.”
115. For a fuller account of this incident, see Anderson, Why Mpeketoni, 1–4. Also, IPOA, Report Following the Mpeketoni Attack.
116. Gettelman, “Gruesome Attacks.”
117. Al Jazeera, “Al-Shabaab Claims Deadly Bus Attack.”
118. Ndurya, “How Squatters Became Landowners in Lamu.”
119. Abdullahi, “To Prevent More Mpeketonis.”
120. Bryden, Decline and Fall, 9.
121. Musumba, “Uhuru Blames Massacre on Tribalism.”
122. Government of Kenya, “Flagship Projects: Lamu Port and New Transport Corridor.”
123. For the background, see Willis and Gona. “Pwani C Kenya?” 48–71; and Brennan “Lowering the Sultan's Flag,” 831–61.
124. Abdullahi, “To Prevent More Mpeketonis”; Bryden, Decline and Fall, 9.
125. Anon., “Police Unveil Names Behind Coast Killings.”
126. Anon., “Governor Roba Had Warned of Imminent Attack.”
127. Anon., “Al-Shabab Massacres Non-Muslims at Kenya Quarry.”
128. Lind et al., Tangled Ties, 31.
129. Bryden, Decline and Fall, 9.
130. Lind et al., Tangled Ties, 32.
131. Three Kenya soldiers and three police officers were also among the dead.
132. See the analysis by Bryden, Decline and Fall, 9.
133. Anon., “Somalia's Shabab Warn Kenyan Public of ‘Long Gruesome War'”; Anon., “Kenya Arrests Five.”
134. Anon., “Al Shabaab Group Formed to Cripple Kenya”; Bryden, Decline and Fall, 9.
135. Bryden, Decline and Fall, 1.
136. Bryden, Reinvention of al-Shabaab, 3–4; Hansen, “An In-depth Look,” 9–12; Menkhaus, “Al-Shabaab's Capabilities,” 4–9; Williams, “After Westgate,” 908–9.
137. See, for example, Le Sage, “The Rising Terror Threat in Tanzania,” 11.