Brownfield regeneration and the shifting of financial risk: between plans and reality in public-private partnerships

Figures & data

Table 1. Research questions: what they involve and how we report on them.

Research questions	Aspects covered	Empirical report
(1) How and to what extent do public-sector actors shift responsibilities and financial risks?	Original actor constellation, contractual agreement, and financial risk allocation	Background to case study, explaining original project plan and financial risk arrangement
(2) How do arrangements for financial risk evolve over time?	Key moments and decisions in development and/or planning process that bear relevance to financial risk arrangement	Account of when and how financial risk arrangement changed (dynamics)
(3) How do real-life events and decisions compare to the original financial risk allocations?	Consequences of financial risk shifting for actor constellation, contractual agreement, financial risk allocation, and project plan in general	Discussion of impact and legacy of dynamics of financial risk

Table 2. Case studies: facts and figures.

Case study	Belvédère (NL)	Firepool (UK)	Porto Maravilha (BRA)
Location	Maastricht	Taunton	Rio de Janeiro
Project start-end Date	2000-unclear(no formal project schedule)	2012–2021	2009–2026
Public-sector party(ies) – Contract Signatories	Municipality of Maastricht (City Council and Board of Mayor and Aldermen)	Network Rail, Taunton Deane Borough Council (TDBC), Somerset County Council, and the Heart of the South West Local Enterprise Partnership (HSWLEP)	Urban Redevelopment Company of the Port Region (CDURP); Real Estate Investment Trust Porto Maravilha (REIT PM)
Private-sector party(ies) – Contract Signatories	Until 2010/2011: BPF Bouwinvest; ING Real Estate Since 2011: N/A	Great Western Railway (GWR), formerly First Great Western	Porto Novo Consortium (PNC): Odebrecht (37.5%), OAS (37.5%) and Carioca Engenharia (25%)
Estimated cost of regeneration	€1 billion (approx.)	£8.97 million (2012 prices)	R$8 billion (2011 prices)
Estimated cost split	Until 2010/2011: Municipality of Maastricht 33%; Bouwinvest 33%; ING Real Estate 33% Since 2011: Maastricht 100%	£4.6 million: Local Growth Deal funding (central government) £4.37 million: GWR and TDBC	R$8 billion: REIT PM

Table 3. Financial risk dynamics in the cases studied.

Case study	Belvédère (NL)	Firepool (UK)	Porto Maravilha (BRA)
Background	Urban regeneration company founded by municipality and two private-sector actors, with equal shareholdings and risk allocation.	Project Taunton established as a public arms-length delivery body to regenerate derelict railyards and cattle market.	Urban regeneration company founded by the municipality, real estate investment trust created by quasi-public welfare fund, and private concessionaire, all with different roles in the regeneration scheme.
Dynamics	Changing local real estate market affected business case of land development; private-sector actors exited joint-venture, leaving local government as single shareholder.	Politically sensitive scheme. National government funding would need to be returned if scheme was not delivered.	A shift in macroeconomic conditions (2014) affected the local real estate market and frustrated the aim of financing the regeneration plan through the assetization of development rights.
Risk transfer in contract	Equal allocation of shares and risk among Municipality of Maastricht and two private-sector actors.	Risk of failure placed on local government, rather than private company Great Western Railway (GWR).	Private developers and investors would assume financial risk of the regeneration plan by providing upfront cash through the acquisition of CEPACs.
Risk transfer in practice	Original risk transfer was undone by the municipality’s decision to take over shares from private-sector partners.	GWR’s costs underwritten by local municipality removing financial risk from private-sector company.	Never applicable, considering the key role of public-sector actors in speculating on the property market.
Impact and legacy	Depreciation of land value; municipality remained single landowner and manager to better monitor financial risks. Revised regeneration strategy was launched based on piecemeal approach to mitigate risk.	Work started on site seven years after government funding announced and was completed in 2021.	Public and quasi-public institutions assumed a prominent role as investors and risk takers; infrastructure improvements have been delivered; new real estate developments are taking place very slowly; public agents involved suffered financial losses.

Data availability statement

The datasets generated and/or analysed during the current study are not publicly available due to political and commercial confidentiality and sensitivity. Due to the nature of this research, participants of this study did not agree for their data to be shared publicly, so supporting data is not available. In line with the ESRC guidelines the anonymized transcripts for the UK case studies can be accessed via the UK Data Service website: https://beta.ukdataservice.ac.uk/datacatalogue/studies/study?id=853302.