The US discourse on political Islam: is Obama's a truly post-‘war on terror’ administration?

Abstract

In this article, I examine the legacy of the discourse on political Islam in the context of George W. Bush's ‘war on terror’, reflecting on the role this discourse has performed in constructing and affirming the United States' self-identity as a beacon of ‘democracy’, ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’, in contradistinction to an Islamist ‘other’. It will evaluate the three most prominent manifestations of the modern rationalist paradigm in relation to the ‘war on terror’ discourse: the tendency to ‘ideologise terror’; the tendency to conflate Islamist movements and view them solely within a security/counterterrorism framework; and the tendency to employ double standards when distinguishing between what is regarded as legitimate and illegitimate uses of political violence. This article will then consider to what extent it is appropriate to label the period since the Obama election as a truly ‘post-war on terror’ politics.

Keywords:

• US foreign policy
• critical theory
• discourse
• political Islam
• ‘war on terror’

Notes

1. This article is influenced by Euben's (1999) definition of the term ‘modern rationalist’ (p. 23) and by her ‘dialogic’ approach to understanding political Islam.

2. As Hansen (2006, pp. 8, 52) argues, these ‘different genres of foreign policy writing adopt different forms of knowledge’, which gain their authority through their interconnectedness, or ‘intertextuality’.

3. According to Global Trends 2025, a new report written by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) ahead of President-elect Obama's inauguration, the world will in future be marked by a shift in economic power from West to East, described by Sevastopulo (2008) as ‘without precedent in modern history’.

4. For an analysis of US strategic and military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Porter (2011) and Bishara (2011). On the Obama administration's failure to keep up with events taking place in the Middle East, see Kristof (2011). See Adib-Moghaddam (2009) on implications of Obama's election on United States Middle East policy.

5. See International Crisis Group (2005), which discusses the circumstances under which normally non-violent Islamist movements might take up arms.

6. For a good description of some of these differences, see Rougier (2007).

7. See Black (2007), who claims that the prominent Egyptian Islamist Sayid Imam al-Sharif Sharif is involved in a growing movement to challenge the theological basis for violent jihad through religion. See also Kay and Slisli, who point out the different stances on jihad taken by groups like Hamas and Hesbollah, as opposed to international jihadi organisations like al-Qaeda. With regard to the issue of internal challenges to the Islamist belief in the need to reunite the ummah at the expense of a focus on domestic politics, see Azzam (2006).

8. For a brief history of the distinction made between the West's ‘rational’ use of force and that employed by the ‘barbarians’ of the world, including contemporary ‘terrorist’ organisations, see Englehardt (2006).

9. For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the two most important fronts in the ‘war on terror’, 3700–5000 people a year and 655,000 people overall have been killed, in comparison with the 1000–7000 people who die each year at the hands of ‘terrorists’ (Herold). See also Brown (2006), with reference to the study on Iraqi casualties conducted by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and Jackson (2005, p. 92). The accuracy of these figures has been challenged by other academics and journalists (see Jacoby 2008).

10. As described by Beebe and Kaldor (2010), ‘human security’ refers to the ‘everyday security of individuals and the communities in which they live rather than the security of states and borders’, and, rather than ‘focusing on traditional threats’, the focus is on ‘conditions-based vulnerabilities’.

11. Dreyfuss (2008) expressed scepticism regarding some of the top advisers Obama has chosen for his foreign policy team, several of whom – such as Tony Lake, UN Ambassador-designate Susan Rice, Tom Daschle, Dennis Ross – along with ‘leading Democratic hawks like Richard Holbrooke’, have close connections with some of the neoconservative think tanks responsible for devising many of the policies associated with the ‘war on terror’, such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). For further critiques of Obama's political appointments, see Newman (2008), Democracy Now! (2008), New York Times (2010), Scheer (2008).

12. For a rigorous analysis of the impact of Obama's election on US foreign policy in general and on Middle East policy in particular, see Adib-Moghaddam (2009).

13. For more analysis of the increasing irrelevance of these movements, see Bayat (2011), Shane (2011).

14. For examples of what a hermeneutic analysis of Islamist movements would look like, see Burgat (2005), Euben (1999), Tamimi (2001, 2007).

15. A survey of 1000 American voters conducted by Zogby International found that 76% were concerned about their country's reputation, 74% believed the United States is viewed negatively by people in other countries and 66% said United States relations with the rest of the world were on the wrong track. See PRNewswire-USNewswire (2007).