The Muslim paranoia narrative in counter-radicalisation policy

ABSTRACT

With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the issue of radicalisation has loomed large in Western policy debates. Recent summits on countering violent extremism have sought to highlight the importance of undermining extremist narratives, mobilising moderate Muslims who oppose ISIS and working to address drivers of radicalisation. This article explores the ideological underpinnings of this approach. It focuses on what I call the “Muslim paranoia narrative”, a recurring feature of Western radicalisation discourse that helpfully captures its ideological commitments and their contemporary significance. Analysing its manifestation in American political culture, I argue that the Muslim paranoia narrative indicates a powerful process of ideological reproduction that works against approaches to counter-radicalisation centred on engagement and collaboration with Muslim communities.

KEYWORDS:

• Terrorism
• paranoia
• radicalisation
• countering violent extremism

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article from Roland Bleiker, NAJ Taylor, Tim Dunne, and Shannon Brincat, as well as the reviewers at Critical Studies on Terrorism.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 There may be differences in the way the Muslim paranoia narrative has been developed or transmitted in other contexts. But even if my US focused analysis does not map directly onto every Western state, its will be at the very least suggestive.

2 For a critical perspective on the ideological convergence of Cold War liberals, see Mills (2000).

3 The term “paranoid style” is regularly used in political commentary. For instance, see Lemann (2006), Krugman (2006); Lexington, (2006); Kristol (2006) and Brooks (2006).

4 Lasswell specifically advocated that experts in government and the academy should foster certain kinds of citizens and remove the circumstances that give that give rise to dissent (Bratich 2008, 29).

5 I have described the scope and significance of this association elsewhere, but it is worth noting that Friedman, particularly, was amongst the most prolific purveyor of the Muslim paranoia narrative, producing 13 articles advancing that perspective over the year after 9/11 (Aistrope 2016, 69–104).

6 On the significance of NSS (2006b), see Gaddis (2005).

7 This same excerpt appeared in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2006, pp. 9–14. I have left off the final point on the NSS (2006b) list in the above and next excerpt to keep the text to the most relevant material.

8 The issue of Eurocentric thinking in international politics has received a thorough airing in John M. Hobson’s recent book (Hobson 2012). For a good summary of the book and the debates around it, see Hobson (2014).

9 Recent debates about the standard of civilisation have emphasised the same division in both historical and contemporary international politics. See, for instance, Stroikos (2014) and Ramgotra (2014).

10 Of course, the understanding of American as a “city on the hill” and “humanity’s last, best hope” is a powerful theme in America’s foreign policy tradition, which explicitly position American liberal democracy as the exemplar model for humanity. For an incisive account of the way liberal democracy has operated normatively in US foreign policy, see Monten (2005). For the broader contexts, see Coker (1945) and Mead (2002).

11 Jackson (2007) highlights this narrative in his analysis of the way the terrorist enemy was constructed by Terrorism Studies scholars and policy experts.

12 Said’s focus was on British and French orientalism during the colonial period, and, more recently, orientalism in post-War American foreign policy.

13 Said’s work has been increasingly influential for international relations scholars. See, for instance, Duvall and Varadarajan (2007) and, in particular, Duvall and Varadarajan (2007).

14 On the difficulty of stepping away from dominant discourses and assumptions, see, for instance, Van Der Veer (2001), Dirks (2001), and Spivak (1988).

15 See, for instance, the explosive debate between Said, Grabar, and Lewis (1982). For an indication of Said’s engagement with Lewis after 9/11, see Said (2003). For an indication of the influence that commentators advancing the Muslim paranoia narrative had on the Bush Administration, see Woodward, (2006, 84) and Said, (2002, 359).

16 See also the incisive work on Paranoia by Harper (2008), Conspiracy Panics by Bratich (2008) and anti-Conspiracy discourse by Goshorn (2000).

17 See Ross (2010) for an interesting account of this dynamic with regard to the characterisation of Muslim dissent in terms of stereotypical emotional positions.

18 The “Don’t Be a Puppet” website focuses not just on Muslim-related violent extremism, but also on white supremisits, violent anarchists and environmentalist, as well as the so-called “sovereign citizens” movement. Nevertheless, the website has its origins in pilot programmes run in Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis, which were focused exclusively on Muslim youth. Moreover, the US Government countering violent extremism agenda is overwhelmingly presented in relation to the issue of Muslim radicalisation and home-grown terrorism, particularly with regard to ISIS (see Goodsein 2015; Hussain 2016; and ACLU 2016).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tim Aistrope

Tim Aistrope is an early career researcher lecturing at the University of Queensland.