Cross-fertilisation, Clarity and Consistency at an Overburdened European Court of Human Rights – the Case of the Discrimination Grounds under Article 14 ECHR

Abstract

The literature on article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) has identified how recent case law on its scope ratione materiae seems unclear and conflicting, and how this could indicate a change of approach whereby some discrimination grounds would be excluded from protection altogether. After describing this case law against the background of settled doctrine, this article moves on to exhibit how it is also accompanied by an undercurrent towards a subtle change in analytical approach, which seems to be taking hold irrespective of whether a clear narrowing of the scope of article 14 ratione materiae will take place. The article is critical of these trends, and asks why the changes described have occurred at this point in time in the life of the Convention. Placing current developments in context, it suggests three key explanatory factors related to the reform of the Strasbourg Court and calls for the gradual convergence between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg jurisprudence. In conclusion it is argued that the developments discussed exemplify the pitfalls of the current process of reengineering the European system for the protection of human rights, and how each step the Strasbourg Court takes in pursuance of the aims of the reform process must be accompanied by careful judicial reflection.

Keywords:

• European Convention on Human Rights
• Reform of the European Court of Human Rights
• Discrimination Grounds
• Admissibility Ratione Materiae
• Cross-fertilisation

Notes

¹A Føllesdal, B Peters, and G Ulfstein, ‘Conclusions’, in A Føllesdal, B Peters and G Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (CUP 2013) 393.

²Lord Woolf et al, ‘Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights’ (December 2005). www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2005_Lord_Woolf_working_methods_ENG.pdf (accessed 12 March 2015); Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, CM(2006)203 (15 November 2006) https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1063779&Site=CM (accessed 12 March 2015).

³High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Interlaken Declaration’ (19 February 2010) www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/capacitybuilding/Source/interlaken_declaration_en.pdf (accessed 12 March 2015), 1.

⁴High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Izmir Declaration’ (26–27 April 2011) www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2011_Izmir_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf (accessed 12 March 2015); High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Brighton Declaration’ (19–20 April 2012) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf > (accessed 12 March 2015).

⁵Protocol No 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (24 June 2013) CETS No 213; Protocol No 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2 October 2013) CETS No 214. See generally ‘Report on the follow-up to the Brighton Declaration’ (CM(2013)41, 2 May, 2013) https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2060871&Site=CM (accessed 12 March 2015).

⁶Interlaken Declaration (n 3), 2.

⁷Izmir Declaration (n 4), 4–5.

⁸Brighton Declaration (n 4), para 14.

⁹ Ibid, paras 21 and 23.

¹⁰The office of the Court's Jurisconsult is charged with working towards ensuring consistency in the case law, but government reform measures have not been focused on this activity.Former Judge David Thór Björgvinsson argues that by appeasing fierce criticism from the political and judicial levels in the contracting states (which I would argue can be linked substantively to the efficiency and subsidiarity related reform measures), the Court risks diminishing its ‘moral capital’ vis-à-vis civil society (which similarly can be linked to the quality of its judgments), on which the ‘backbone of the Court's claim to legitimacy rests’, see DT Björgvinsson, ‘The Role of Judges of the ECtHR as Guardians of Fundamental Rights of the Individual’, iCourts Working Paper Series, No 23, 2015 <file:///C:/Users/oddnyma/Downloads/SSRN-id2601291%20(1).pdf> (accessed 16 June 2015), 5–6.

¹¹Protocol 15 (n 5); Protocol 16 (n 5).

¹²High Level Conference on the ‘Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared responsibility’, ‘Brussels Declaration’ (27 March 2015) http://justice.belgium.be/fr/binaries/Declaration_EN_tcm421-265137.pdf (accessed 16 June 2015).

¹³European Court of Human Rights, ‘Priority Policy’ http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Priority_policy_ENG.pdf (accessed 12 March 2015).

¹⁴European Court of Human Rights, ‘Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria’ (31 March 2011) http://www.dp-rs.si/fileadmin/dp.gov.si/pageuploads/RAZNO/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf (accessed 12 March 2015).

¹⁵European Court of Human Rights, ‘Preliminary Opinion of the Court in preparation for the Brighton Conference’ (20 February 2012) www.coe.int/t/dgi/brighton-conference/documents/Court-Preliminary-opinion_en.pdf (accessed 12 March 2015), paras 8, 20 and 21.

¹⁶European Court of Human Rights, ‘The Interlaken Process and the Court’ (16 October 2012) www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Interlaken_Process_ENG.pdf (accessed 12 March 2015), 11.

¹⁷Preliminary Opinion of the Court in preparation for the Brighton Conference (n 15) para 20. When Protocol 15 to the Convention comes into effect, the admissibility criteria will be narrowed down even further by reducing the six-month time-limit to four.

¹⁸Contribution of the Court to the Brussels Conference (n 12), para 2.

¹⁹Report on the follow-up to the Brighton Declaration (n 5), 2.

²⁰J Christoffersen and M Rask Madsen, ‘Postscript’, in J Christoffersen and M Rask Madsen (eds) The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (OUP 2013), 233.

²¹Fifth Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH Ad Hoc Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, ‘Final report to the CDDH’ (47+1(2013)008rev2, 10 June 2013) www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Source/Docs2013/47_1_2013_008rev2_EN.pdf (accessed 13 March 2015), Appendix I (Draft Accession Agreement).

²² Ibid, preamble. Also Brighton Declaration (n 4), para 36.

²³Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014.

²⁴For example Demir and Baykara v Turkey ECHR 2008, paras 76 and 85; Scoppola v Italy (No 2) App. No 10249/03 (ECtHR, 17 September 2009), paras 105–109.

²⁵P Van Elsuwege, ‘New Challenges for Pluralist Adjudication After Lisbon: The Protection of Fundamental Rights in a Ius Commune’ (2012) 30 NQHR 195, 217.

²⁶See also ‘Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris’ (24 January 2011) http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf (accessed 13 March 2015).

²⁷For a fuller discussion see J Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds of Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2013) 13 H.R.L.Rev. 99; and OM Arnardóttir, ‘The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation under article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 14 H.R.L.Rev. 647.

²⁸The judgments discussed in part III.2 infra, for example, do not explicitly anchor the discussion of the scope of art 14 in the established rules of interpretation of Convention norms or the difference between open and closed non-discrimination models in human rights law, and they further do not come with any dissenting opinions.

²⁹AW Heringa, ‘Standards of Review for Discrimination. The Scope of Review by the Courts’ in T Loenen and PR Rodrigues, Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 1999), 27.

³⁰Compare for example Art 14 ECHR and Arts 2 and 14(2) of Directive 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle of the equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23 (hereinafter Equal Treatment Directive).

³¹Compare for example Art 14 ECHR and Art 1 of Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16 (hereinafter Framework Directive).

³²S Besson, ‘Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain Meet?’ (2008) 8 H.R.L.Rev. 647, 660.

³³Compare for example Art 14 ECHR and Art 3 of the Framework Directive (n 31).

³⁴Protocol No 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (4 November 2000) CETS No 177, Explanatory Report, para 22; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, Art 26. Compare for example with arts 7, 8 and 14(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive (n 30).

³⁵R Wintemute, ‘‘Within the Ambit”: how Big is the ‘Gap” in art 14 European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2004) 9 E.H.R.L.R. 366, 367.

³⁶ E.B. v France App No 43546/02 (ECHR 22 January 2008). As ever more issues of a socioeconomic nature are interpreted as coming under the ambit of Convention rights, the width of the art 14 ‘gap’ in protection diminishes, see OM Arnardóttir, ‘Discrimination as a magnifying lens: Scope and ambit under Art. 14 and Protocol No 12’, in J Gerards and E Brems (eds) Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights (CUP 2013), 599.

³⁷For example Heringa (n 29) 27–28; Besson (n 32) 660; D Schiek, L Waddington and M Bell, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Hart 2007), 33–34.

³⁸ Engel v Netherlands (1976) Series A No 22, para 72 (no violation).

³⁹ Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1976) Series A No 23, para 56 (no violation).

⁴⁰In contrast with abundant case law and the literature that all but uniformly emphasises the non-exhaustive list of discrimination grounds and the open personal scope of protection of Art 14 (see n 37 and 149), J Gerards argues that there has always been a confusion on the scope of art 14 and that a strand of the case law exhibits the approach that art 14 only protects discrimination grounds based on personal status, see Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds’ (n 27), 99.

⁴¹For example, Konstantin Markin v Russia ECHR 2012 (violation).

⁴²For example, D.H. v Czech Republic ECHR 2007–IV (violation).

⁴³For example, Kiyutin v Russia ECHR 2011 (violation).

⁴⁴For example, L and V v Austria ECHR 2003–I (violation).

⁴⁵For example, Hoffmann v Austria ECHR (1993) Series A No 255–C (violation).

⁴⁶ Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom ECHR 1998–V (no violation).

⁴⁷For example, Marckx v Belgium ECHR (1979) Series A No 31 (violation).

⁴⁸For example, Schwizgebel v Switzerland ECHR 2010 (no violation).

⁴⁹For example, Van der Mussele v Belgium ECHR (1983) Series A No 70 (no violation).

⁵⁰ Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania ECHR 2004–VIII (violation, but see partly dissenting opinion of judge Thomassen); Zickus v Lithuania App No 26652/02 (ECtHR 7 April 2009) (violation).

⁵¹For example Kafkaris v Cyprus ECHR 2008 (no violation).

⁵² Burden v United Kingdom ECHR 2008 (no violation); Petrov v Bulgaria App No 15197/02 (ECtHR 22 May 2008) (violation).

⁵³ Danilenkov v Russia ECHR 2009 (violation).

⁵⁴ Stubbings v United Kingdom ECHR 1996–IV (no violation).

⁵⁵See for example Manfred Nowak, CCPR Commentary (N.P. Engel 2005), 605–606.

⁵⁶ Beian v Romania ECHR 2007–V (violation); Fredin v Sweden (1991) Series A No 192 (no violation).

⁵⁷OM Arnardóttir, ‘Multidimensional Equality from Within – Themes from the European Convention on Human Rights’ in D Schiek and V Chege (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law (Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 60–61. For a clear example from case-law see Rasmussen v Denmark (1984) Series A No 87, para 34 (no violation): ‘For the purposes of article 14 . . . the Court accordingly finds that there was a difference of treatment . . . There is no call to determine on what ground this difference was based, the list of grounds appearing in article 14 . . . not being exhaustive.’

⁵⁸For example, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) Series A No 94, para 78 (violation); Konstantin Markin v Russia (n 41) para 127 (violation).

⁵⁹For example, Inze v Austria (1987) Series A No 126, para 41 (violation); Pla and Puncernau v Andorra ECHR 2004–VIII, para 61 (violation).

⁶⁰For example, Gaygusuz v Austria ECHR 1996–IV, para 42 (violation); Andrejeva v Latvia ECHR 2009, para 87 (violation). The discrimination ground of nationality, however, is somewhat more circumscribed than the other suspect grounds, see M-B Dembour, ‘Gayguzus Revisited: The Limits of the European Court of Human Rights’ Equality Agenda’ (2012) 12 H.R.L.Rev. 689, 721.

⁶¹ Timishev v Russia ECHR 2005–XII, para 56 (violation); D.H. v Czech Republic (n 42) para 176 (violation); Nachova v Bulgaria ECHR 2005–VII, para 145 (violation).

⁶² L and V v Austria (n 44) para 45 (violation); E.B. v France (n 36) para 91 (violation); Hoffmann v Austria (n 45) para 36 (violation); Milanovic v Serbia App No 44614/07 (ECtHR 14 December 2010), para 97 (violation).

⁶³ Glor v Switzerland App No 13444/04 (ECtHR 30 April 2009), para 84 (violation); Kiyutin v Russia (n 43) para 64 (violation).

⁶⁴ Kiyutin v Russia ibid, para 63.

⁶⁵See generally Arnardóttir, ‘The Differences that Make a Difference’ (n 27), part 2.

⁶⁶J Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law (Kluwer 1998) 215.

⁶⁷ D.H. v Czech Republic (n 42), para 175.

⁶⁸ Thlimmenos v Greece ECHR 2000–IV, para 44.

⁶⁹See generally OM Arnardóttir, ‘Non-discrimination under Article 14 ECHR: the Burden of Proof’ (2007) 51 Scandin. St. in L. 13.

⁷⁰J Gerards, ‘The Application of Article 14 ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights’ in J Niessen and I Chopin (eds), The Development of Legal Instruments to Combat Racism in a Diverse Europe (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 18.

⁷¹For example Rasmussen v Denmark (n 57), paras 37–40.

⁷²For example Fredin v Sweden (n 56) (no comparability, no violation); Sunday Times (II) v United Kingdom (1991) Series A No 217 (no comparability, no violation); Sunday Times (I) v United Kingdom (1979) Series A No 30 (no comparability, no violation); Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia App No 14902/04 (ECtHR 20 September 2011) (no comparability, no violation).

⁷³For example Burden v United Kingdom ECHR 2008 (siblings' cohabitation, no comparability, no violation); Raviv v Austria App No 26266/05 (ECtHR 13 March 2012) (residence, no comparability, no violation); Graziani-Weiss v Austria App No 31950/06 (ECtHR 18 October 2011) (employment, no comparability, no violation); Johnston v Ireland (1986) Series A No 112 (residence, no comparability, no violation).

⁷⁴For example Konstantin Markin v Russia (n 41), particularly paras 141–146 (violation).

⁷⁵ Kafkaris v Cyprus (n 52), compare paras 163–164 and para 165 (no violation).

⁷⁶See generally Arnardóttir, ‘The Differences that Make a Difference’ (n 27), section 3.A.

⁷⁷G Letsas, ‘The Scope and Balancing of Rights: Diagnostic or Constitutive?’ in J Gerards and E Brems (eds) Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human Rights (CUP 2013), 64.

⁷⁸ Carson v United Kingdom ECHR 2010, para 68 (no violation).

⁷⁹ Ibid, para 61.

⁸⁰ Ibid, para 70.

⁸¹ Ibid, para 90.

⁸²Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds’ (n 27), 107.

⁸³ Clift v United Kingdom App No 7205/07 (ECtHR 13 July 2010), para 55 (violation), emphasis added.

⁸⁴ Ibid, para 59.

⁸⁵ Ibid, para 56.

⁸⁶ Bah v United Kingdom ECHR 2011, para 25 (no violation).

⁸⁷ Ibid, para 45.

⁸⁸For example Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia (n 72) (taxation arrangements, no comparability, no violation); Serife Yigit v Turkey App No 3976/05 (ECtHR 2 November 2010) (marriage status, justification, no violation); Maggio v Italy App No 46286/09 (ECtHR 31 May 2011) (point in time of pensions liquidation, justification, no violation); Stummer v Austria ECHR 2011 (prisoner status, justification, no violation); Valkov v Bulgaria App No 2033/04 (ECtHR 25 October 2011) (employment status, no comparability, no violation); Vuckovic v Serbia App No 17153/11 (ECtHR 28 August 2012) (residence, justification, no violation); Chabauty v France App No 57412/08 (ECtHR 4 October 2012) (size of land owned, justification, no violation); Altinay v Turkey App No 37222/04 (ECtHR 9 July 2013) (graduates from different schools, justification, no violation); Pichkur v Ukraine App No 10441/06 (ECtHR 7 November 2012) (residence as an ‘aspect of personal status’, justification, no violation); Efe v Austria App No 9134/06 (ECtHR 8 January 2013) (residence as an ‘aspect of personal status’, justification, no violation); Tierbefreier E.V. v Germany App No 45192/09 (ECtHR 16 January 2014) (animal rights association and different types of activists, justification, no violation); Oran v Turkey Apps No 28881/07 and 37920/07 (ECtHR 15 April 2014) (unaffiliated independent candidate for election, justification, no violation); Berger-Krall v Slovenia App No 14717/04 (ECtHR 12 June 2014) (different categories of tenants, justification, no violation).

⁸⁹For example Berkvens v Netherlands App No 18485/14 (ECtHR Adm Dec 27 May 2014); Ramaer and van Willigen v Netherlands App No 34880/12 (ECtHR Adm Dec 23 October 2012); Axel Springer AG v Germany App No 44585/10 (ECtHR Adm Dec 13 March 2012); Torri v Italy App No 11838/07 (ECtHR Adm Dec 24 January 2012); Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland App No 48703/08 (ECtHR Adm Dec 20 September 2011); Donaldson v United Kingdom App No 56975/09 (ECtHR Adm Dec 25 January 2011).

⁹⁰ Springett v United Kingdom App No 34726/04 etc (ECtHR Adm Dec 27 April 2010) (‘incompatible ratione materiae’).

⁹¹ Peterka v Czech Republic App No 21990/08 (ECtHR Adm Dec 4 May 2010) (manifestly ill-founded).

⁹² Cadek v Czech Republic App No 31933/08 (ECtHR 22 November 2012), para 94 (manifestly ill-founded).

⁹³ Yordanova and Toshev v Bulgaria App No 5126/05 (ECtHR 2 October 2012), para 62 (manifestly ill-founded).

⁹⁴ Tarkoev v Estonia App No 14480/08 (ECtHR 4 November 2010), para 59 (no violation).

⁹⁵ Raviv v Austria (n 73), para 55 (no violation).

⁹⁶Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds’ (n 27) section 2.D and Arnardóttir, ‘The Differences that Make a Difference’ (n 27) section 3.B.

⁹⁷In addition to the cases discussed in section III.1 supra, see for example how the Court summed up the state of play in Biao v Denmark App No 38590/10 (ECtHR 25 March 2014) (length of enjoyment of nationality, no violation), para 79; and in R & L, s.r.o. v Czech Republic Apps No 37926/05 etc. (ECtHR 3 July 2014) (deliberately acquired rent controlled property, manifestly ill-founded) para 130.

⁹⁸ Hode and Abdi v United Kingdom App No 22341/09 (ECtHR 6 November 2012), para 46 (violation).

⁹⁹ The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day-Saints v United Kingdom App No 7552/09 (ECtHR 4 March 2014), para 26 (no violation) and Begheluri v Georgia App No 28490/02 (ECtHR 7 October 2014), para 171 (violation).

¹⁰⁰ Laduna v Slovakia ECHR 2011, para 55 (violation); Varnas v Lithuania App No 42615/06 (ECtHR 9 July 2013), para 111 (violation); Gülay Cetin v Turkey App No 44084/10 (ECtHR 5 March 2013), para 127 (violation).

¹⁰¹ D.H. v Czech Republic (n 42).

¹⁰²See n 72, 73 and Tarkoev v Estonia (n 94).

¹⁰³For example Gas and Dubois v France ECHR 2012 (no violation).

¹⁰⁴See the indifference of the Court towards the precise construction of the discrimination grounds in Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria ECHR 2011 (no justification, violation).

¹⁰⁵ Magee v United Kingdom ECHR 2000–VI (no violation). See also critical commentary on this judgment by P van Dijk and GJH van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Intersentia 2006), 1050–1051.

¹⁰⁶ Maktouf and Damjanovc v Bosnia and Herzegovina ECHR 2013, para 83 (no violation).

¹⁰⁷In Maktouf and Damjanovic v Bosnia and Herzegovina, i bid, para 83, the substantive argument under ‘objective and reasonable justification’ at the second level of analysis was also mentioned in passing, as the Court noted that the State Court decided which cases it heard on basis of an ‘objective and reasonable criteria’. The case was decided, nevertheless, with reference to the issue of causation. Similarly see Magee v United Kingdom (n 105), para 50.

¹⁰⁸To some authors the classic open approach to non-discrimination grounds under the ECHR seems almost inconceivable as it is taken for granted that the list of discrimination grounds must be limited in some way, see J Small, ‘Structure and Substance: Developing a Practical and Effective Prohibition on Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 6 Int. J. Discr. and the Law 45, 56 and Ellis and Watson (n 130), 106–107.

¹⁰⁹‘Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris’ (n 26); G Harpaz, ‘The European Court of Justice and its Relations with the European Court of Human Rights: The Quest for Enhanced Reliance, Coherence and Legitimacy’ (2009) 46 CML Rev. 105, 139–140; Van Elsuwege (n 25), 216; Gragl, ‘(Judicial) Love is Not a One-Way street: The EU Preliminary Reference Procedure as a Model for ECtHR Advisory Opinions under Protocol No. 16’ (2013) E.L.Rev. 229, 237.

¹¹⁰Besson (n 32) 650; Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds’ (n 27), 102.

¹¹¹Besson ibid, 651.

¹¹²Besson (n 32), 680–681.

¹¹³Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds’ (n 27), 101–102.

¹¹⁴For specific rules see for example Framework Directive (n 31), arts 2, 4, 6, and 10.

¹¹⁵For example Framework Directive, ibid, art 2(b)(i).

¹¹⁶For example Directive 79/7 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment of men and women in matters of social security, OJ L6/24, art 7(1).

¹¹⁷ D.H. v Czech Republic (n 42) paras 81–91, 184 and 187 (indirect discrimination and burden of proof); Stec v United Kingdom ECHR 2006–VI, paras 38–41 and 63 (exceptions).

¹¹⁸Similarly see Besson (n 32) 677.

¹¹⁹R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (OUP 2010) 45–48 (with references); R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (HUP 1978), 22–28.

¹²⁰See Equal Treatment Directive (n 30) art 14(2) and Framework Directive (n 31) arts 2(5) and 4.

¹²¹Schiek, Waddington and Bell (n 37) 269–270. This article follows their taxonomy of using the term ‘exceptions’ for ‘specific circumstances identified in law where acts that would otherwise be unlawful direct discrimination will not be so treated’ and the term ‘justifications’ for ‘open-ended possibility for a perpetrator of direct discrimination to propose a good reason why their actions should not be treated as unlawful’. Exceptionally, however, direct discrimination on the grounds of age is subject to a general justifications clause, see Framework Directive (n 31) art 6.

¹²²Dworkin (n 118) 24; Alexy (n 118), 48.

¹²³The Court refers to the Convention as ‘a constitutional instrument of European public order’, see Ermakov v Russia App No 43165/10 (ECtHR 7 November 2013), para 280.

¹²⁴Dworkin (n 118), 25–26.

¹²⁵Alexy (n 118) 47–48. Indeed, at 57, he conceptualises principles as ‘represent[ing] reasons which can be displaced by other reasons.’

¹²⁶Dworkin (n 118) 22, the generic Dworkinian sense indicating ‘principles, policies, and other sorts of standards’, while the specific sense refers to a standard that ‘is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.’

¹²⁷Alexy (n 118), 80

¹²⁸J Gerards and H Senden, ‘The structure of fundamental rights and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2009) 7 ICON 619, 652.

¹²⁹Gerards and Senden ibid, 625. A similar argument is made by S Greer, ‘What's Wrong with the European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2008) 30 Hum. Rts. Q. 680, 697.

¹³⁰Gerards and Senden ibid, 641.

¹³¹E Ellis and P Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP 2012), 171–174.

¹³²For example Equal Treatment Directive (n 30) art 14(2). On exceptions, see Dekker v Stichting Vormingcentrum Voor Jong Volwassenen Plus (177/88) [1990] ECR I-3941; Brunnhofer v Bank den österreihishcen Postsparkasse AG (381/99) [2001] ECR I-4961.

¹³³Costa, ‘On the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’, Judgments’ (2011) 7 EuConst 173, 177; G Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legitimacy’, in A Føllesdal, B Peters, and G Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (CUP 2013), 124–125.

¹³⁴See nn 72 and 73.

¹³⁵See Test Achats v Council of Ministers (236/09) [2011] ECR I-773.

¹³⁶See for example Framework Directive (n 31) art 10. Placing part of the burden of persuasion for comparability and causation on the perpetrator at the first level of analysis is, in essence, what the Strasbourg Court did in the context of indirect discrimination in D.H. v Czech Republic (n 42) para 180: ‘where an applicant is able to show, on the basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a specific rule – although formulated in a neutral manner – in fact affects a clearly higher percentage of women than men, it is for the respondent Government to show that this is the result of objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex’ (emphasis added). The Court has, however, not made the same move in the context of direct discrimination as the respondent state is free to offer any justification at the second level of analysis anyway.

¹³⁷Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal (nyr).

¹³⁸Letsas, ‘Strasbourg's Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2010) 21 EJIL 509, 512; Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument’ (n 132), 124–125. See also Costa (n 132), 177.

¹³⁹ Brunnhofer (n 131) para 80; Kücükdeveci v Swedex (555/07) [2010] ECR I-365, para 43; Runevic-Vardyn and Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija (391/09) [2011] ECR I-3787, para 43.

¹⁴⁰ D.H. v Czech Republic (n 42), paras 81–91, 184 and 187 (indirect discrimination and burden of proof); Stec v United Kingdom (n 116), paras 38–41 and 63 (exceptions).

¹⁴¹See for example ‘CDDH Response to the Court's Jurisconsult's notes on the principle of subsidiarity and on the clarity and consistency of the Court's case-law’ (CDDH(2012)R74 Addendum III, 15 February 2012) www.coe.int/t/dgi/brighton-conference/Documents/CDDH-Brighton-contribution_en.pdf (accessed 12 March 2014), Appendix, para 13.

¹⁴²J Gerards, ‘The Prism of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 EuConst 173, 188. In the context of the Convention's non-discrimination law see also Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds’ (n 27), 123–124.

¹⁴³On the Court's current approaches see Costa (n 132) and Letsas, ‘Strasbourg's interpretive ethic’ (n 138). Gerards and Senden (n 127) 625, however, point out how an increased emphasis on the first level of analysis (scope of rights) implies classic methods of legal interpretation and a heavier burden of proof for applicants, instead of the balancing and moral reasoning from principle that characterises the second level of analysis.

¹⁴⁴Gerards and Senden ibid, 641.

¹⁴⁵Kokott (n 66), 215.

¹⁴⁶Brighton Declaration (n 4) paras 11–12 and Protocol 15 to the ECHR (n 5) Preamble.

¹⁴⁷It should be noted in this connection that although the Court is moving closer to the target of dealing with the backlog of clearly inadmissible cases, the cases keep coming in and there still exists a backlog of meritorious ones.

¹⁴⁸Gerards, ‘The Discrimination Grounds’ (n 27), 123, has remarked that cutting the non-personal discrimination grounds off from protection would ‘do justice to the principle of subsidiarity’, while indeed also pointing out some of the detrimental effects of such a change.

¹⁴⁹For example The Council of Europe and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European non-discrimination law (Publications Office of the EU 2011) 85; OM Arnardóttir, Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2003) 34–35, Besson (n 32), 660; R O'Connell, ‘Cinderella comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the right to non-discrimination in the ECHR’ (2009) 20 Legal Studies 211, 222; K Monaghan, ‘Limitations and opportunities: a review of the likely domestic impact of Art. 14 ECHR’ (2001) 6 E.H.R.L.R. 167, 170–171; D Moeckli, S Shah and S Sivakumaran, International Human Rights Law (OUP, 2010), 197; D Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP, 2009), 584.

¹⁵⁰European Court of Human Rights, ‘Analysis of statistics 2013’ (January 2014) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2013_ENG.pdf (accessed 13 March 2015), 4.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 4–5.

¹⁵²Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Annual Report 2013’ (1 January 2014) http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-06/qdag14001enc.pdf (accessed 13 March 2015), 89.

¹⁵³I Cameron, ‘The court and the member states: procedural aspects’ in A Føllesdal, B Peters and G Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (CUP 2013) 54. Cameron also draws a comparison with the US Supreme Court, which delivers around 100 judgments pr. year.

¹⁵⁴Interlaken Declaration (n 3) 1.

¹⁵⁵Preliminary Opinion of the Court in preparation for the Brighton Conference (n 15) para 15. Also Brighton Declaration (n 4) paras 25(c)–(e). In addition to the focus on the Grand Chamber, the quality of the bench was also put on the Brighton agenda, see paras 25(a)–(b) and (f).

¹⁵⁶See Protocol 15 to the ECHR (n 5) art 3 and amended Rule 72 in European Court of Human Rights, ‘Rules of Court’ (1 July 2014) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf (accessed 13 March 2015).

¹⁵⁷Arnardóttir, ‘The Differences that Make a Difference’ (n 27), 19–23. While having also voiced some of these concerns, and expressing a favourable position towards the maintenance of current doctrine, J Gerards has pointed out that the Court might nevertheless choose to continue this development for ‘strategic reasons’ related to legitimacy criticism and backlog of cases, see Gerards (n 27), 123–124.