Understanding Libya's ‘Revolution’ through Transformation of the Jamahiriyya into a State of Exception

Abstract

This article aims to provide a historical and structural context to the outbreak of the Libyan Revolution, which began in February 2011. It does so through an analysis of the polity Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi termed a Jamahiriyya. By identifying a crucial transformation within the long development of the Jamahiriyya through what Giorgio Agamben defines the state of exception, the article demonstrates how the official discourse entered in sharp contradiction with the very principles around which the regime had framed its moral purpose since the coup d'état in 1969. This metamorphosis resulted both in the slow, yet constant, erosion of the legitimacy of the regime and in the emergence of different forms of resistance. It is in such conditions, where emerging offstage resistances, what James Scott has called hidden transcripts of power, and counter-discourses began to come out, that the paper tries to assess the significance of the popular revolt and NATO's subsequent international intervention for the future of the country.

Keywords:

• Libya
• Qadhdhafi
• Jamahiriyya
• Revolutionary Committees
• Giorgio Agamben
• state of exception
• Libya Islamic Fighting Group
• James C. Scott
• infrapolitics

Notes

¹ A. Camus (1951) L'uomo in Rivolta [The rebel: an essay on man in revolt] (Milano: Bompiani), p. 178.

² A young human rights activist and lawyer for the families of those political opponents who had been killed in the Abu Salim prison massacre in 1996. That mass murder of 1,200 political prisoners was a terrible contradiction of a revolution that, according to Qadhdhafi, would have to ‘empty the prisons.’

³ UNSC Resolution 1973 (March 17, 2011). Available online at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol = S/RES/1973(2011), accessed August 14, 2012.

⁴ G. Agamben (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 97.

⁵ G. Agamben (2005) The State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 87.

⁶ It is particularly interesting to note the analysis of careful scholars of Libya, such as Hervé Bleuchot and Taoufik Monastiri. At the outset of the RCs' creation and in the absence of research material, they write ‘One thing is certain: they are lobbies, which are created for implementing volume 2 of The Green Book. These are the shock troops to lead the charge attack against a new section of the middle class …’ See H. Bleuchot & T. Monastiri (1978) L'Évolution des Institutions Politiques (1969–1978) [The evolution of the political institutions (1969–1978)], in: Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 16, pp. 141–187 (Paris: CNRS).

⁷ H. Mattes (1995) The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees, in: D. Vandewalle (ed.) Qadhafi's Libya 1969–1994, pp. 89–112 (New York: St Martin's Press), p. 90.

⁸ H Mattes (1995) The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees, in: D. Vandewalle (ed.) Qadhafi's Libya 1969–1994, pp. 89–112 (New York: St Martin's Press), p. 90

⁹ H Mattes (1995) The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees, in: D. Vandewalle (ed.) Qadhafi's Libya 1969–1994, pp. 89–112 (New York: St Martin's Press), p. 90 p. 93. One of the commentaries to The Green Book, which was published after the establishment of the RCs, also provided a theoretical explanation of the role of RCs as being ‘to convince the masses with valid, scientific evidence and objective analysis of the dominant relationships of society in order to induce them then to play their role by destroying these unjust relationships and create new alternative, more egalitarian ones.’ VV. AA. (1984) Il Libro Verde: Commenti e recensioni—Volume I [Commentaries on The Green Book—Volume I] (Tripoli: Centro Internazionale Ricerche e Studi sul Libro Verde), p. 185.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 93. One of the commentaries to The Green Book, which was published after the establishment of the RCs, also provided a theoretical explanation of the role of RCs as being ‘to convince the masses with valid, scientific evidence and objective analysis of the dominant relationships of society in order to induce them then to play their role by destroying these unjust relationships and create new alternative, more egalitarian ones.’ VV. AA. (1984) Il Libro Verde: Commenti e recensioni—Volume I [Commentaries on The Green Book—Volume I] (Tripoli: Centro Internazionale Ricerche e Studi sul Libro Verde), p. 185

¹¹ Article 37: ‘The present constitutional proclamation shall be in effect until a permanent constitution is issued. It will be amended by the Revolutionary Command Council only in case of necessity and in the interest of the Revolution.’ Libyan Constitution (1969) Available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cafrad/unpan004643.pdf, accessed August 20, 2012.

¹² M. Gathafi (2005) The Green Book (Reading: Ithaca Press) p. 21.

¹³ Agamben, State of Exception, p. 58.

¹⁴ Agamben, State of Exception p. 98.

¹⁵ O. I. El Fathaly & M. Palmer (1995) Institutional Development in Qadhafi's Libya, in: D. Vandewalle (ed.) Qadhafi's Libya 1969–1994, pp. 157–176 (New York: St Martin's Press), p. 164.

¹⁶ M. Ouannes (2009) Militaires, Élites et Modernisation dans la Libye Contemporaine, [Military, élites and modernization in contemporary Libya] (Paris: L'Harmattan), p. 196.

¹⁷ M. Djaziri (1987) La Dynamique des Institutions et la Structure du Pouvoir en Libye 1978–1987 [The dynamic of the institution and the structure of power in Libya 1978–1987], in: Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 26, pp. 451–476 (Paris: CNRS), p. 469.

¹⁸ For a detailed description of the final communiqué, see Mattes, Rise and Fall p. 101.

¹⁹ For a detailed description of the final communiqué, see Mattes, Rise and Fall p. 102; and El Fathaly & Palmer, Institutional Development, pp. 164–174.

²² Ouannes, Militaires, Élites et Modernisation, p. 194.

²⁰ Mattes, Rise and Fall, p. 94.

²¹ M. Djaziri (1995) Creating a New State: Libya's Political Institutions, in: D. Vandewalle (ed.) Qadhafi's Libya 1969–1994, pp. 177–200 (New York: St Martin's Press), p. 193.

²³ A. Parteger (2006) Libya: Reforming the Impossible?, Review of African Political Economy, 33(108), pp. 219–235, p. 228.

²⁴ Ouannes, Militaires, Élites et Modernisation, p. 243.

²⁵ Parteger, Libya: Reforming?, p. 225.

²⁶ Mattes, Rise and Fall, p. 93.

²⁷ http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3dda540f4.pdf, accessed August 29, 2012.

²⁸ H. Mattes (2004) Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East: The Libyan Case. Paper presented at the Workshop on Challenges to security sector governance in the Middle East, 12–13 July, Geneva Centre DCAF (Democratic Control of Armed Forces), Geneva, p. 15.

²⁹ T. Niblock (2001) ‘Pariah States’ & Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan (London: Lynne Rienner), p. 89.

³² Niblock, ‘Pariah States’, p. 62.

³⁰ One can find a good account of these two episodes in ibid. pp. 19–94.

³¹ M. Villa (2012) Un caso poco studiato di rentier state [A less studied case of rentier state], in: K. Mezran & A. Varvelli (eds) Libia. Fine o rinascita di una nazione? [Libya. End or re-birth of a nation?], pp. 61–82 (Roma: Donzelli Editore).

³³ D. Vandewalle (1996) North Africa: Development and Reform in a Global Changing Economy (New York: St Martin's Press), p. 216.

³⁴ Although it will not be analyzed here, Qadhdhafi also worked on an ideological justification for these reforms, which seemed completely to refute the economic argument in The Green Book. See further Djaziri (1988) Incertitudes et limites du processus de ‘democratization’ et dinamique de ‘l'Infiraj’ [Uncertainties and limits of the ‘democratization’ process and dynamic of the ‘Infiraj’], in: Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 27, pp. 629–655 (Paris: CNRS).

³⁶ Villa, Un caso poco studiato, p. 75.

³⁵ Niblock, ‘Pariah States’, pp. 62–63.

³⁷ M. Djaziri (1990) Chronique Libyenne [Libyan Chronicals], in: Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 29, pp. 678–713 (Paris: CNRS), p. 682.

³⁹ J. C. Scott (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 103.

³⁸ M. Djaziri (1996) État et Société en Libye: Islam, Politique et Modernité [State and society in Libya: Islam, politics and modernity] (Paris: L'Harmattan), p. 201.

⁴⁰ J C. Scott (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press) p. 183.

⁴¹ J C. Scott (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press) p. 19.

⁴² Niblock, ‘Pariah States’, p. 64.

⁴³ Niblock, ‘Pariah States’ p. 78.

⁴⁴ One of Qadhdhafi's attempts to control this process was the creation of the Purification Committees in 1996. They were made up of junior officers who had to ‘purify’ and scrutinize—that is to apply the death penalty—to private business owners in order to catch ‘all those who practice speculation in foodstuffs, clothes, housing or transport.’

⁴⁵ L. Martinez (2007) The Libyan Paradox (London: Hurst & Co), p. 34.

⁴⁶ L Martinez (2007) The Libyan Paradox (London: Hurst & Co) p. 33.

⁴⁸ Niblock, ‘Pariah States’ pp. 74–75.

⁴⁷ Niblock, ‘Pariah States’, p. 74.

⁴⁹ Niblock, ‘Pariah States’ p. 80.

⁵⁰ Niblock, ‘Pariah States’

⁵¹ Martinez, Libyan Paradox, p. 40; see further on the case of the five Bulgarian nurses who were charged with this crime: http://i-p-o.org/Koechler-EU-Lockerbie-Bulgaria-14Feb07.pdf, accessed August 6, 2012.

⁵² Martinez, Libyan Paradox, p. 41

⁵³ Ibid. p. 36.

⁵⁴ Scott, Domination, p. 119.

⁵⁵ Martinez, Libyan Paradox, pp. 36–37.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 36.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 38.

⁵⁸ Gathafi, Green Book, p. 45.

⁵⁹ Martinez, Libyan Paradox, p. 64.

⁶⁰ In this perspective, it is also necessary to reconsider part of the events of the Libyan revolt in 2011, particularly the presence of mercenaries, who were denounced immediately.

⁶¹ C. Sterling (1981) The Terror Network (New York: Holt & Co.).

⁶² Martinez, Libyan Paradox, p. 69.

⁶³ Martinez, Libyan Paradox

⁶⁴ Martinez, Libyan Paradox pp. 69–70.

⁶⁵ For more on the opposition movements, see Djaziri, État et société en Libye, pp. 227–254.

⁶⁶ http://www freerepublic.com/focus/news/825808/posts, accessed September 2, 2012.

⁶⁷ See Alice Alunni (2012) L'africa di Gheddafi: tra ideologia e pragmatismo [Qadhdhaf's Africa between ideology and pragmatism], in: K. Mezran & A. Varvelli (eds) Libia. Fine o rinascita di una nazione? [Libya. End or re-birth of a nation?], pp. 137–156 (Roma: Donzelli), p. 150.

⁶⁸ http://www meforum.org/681/dissident-watch-fathi-el-jahmi, accessed September 10, 2012.

⁶⁹ Saif al-Islam al-Qadhdhafi (2005) Why the Arab World Needs Democracy. Available at http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2005_spring/14_gaddafi.html, accessed August 18, 2012; and Yehudit Ronen (2005) Libya's Rising Star: Saif al-Islam and Succession, Middle East Policy, 12(3), pp. 136–144.

⁷⁰ Parteger, Libya: Reforming?, p. 224.

⁷¹ D. Vandewalle (2006) A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 175–206.

⁷² http://www monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/01/CALLIES_DE_SALIES/14689, accessed September 14, 2012.

⁷³ L. Martinez (2000–01) Quels Changements en Libye? [What changes in Libya?], in: Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 39, pp. 181–194 (Paris: CNRS), p. 188.

⁷⁶ Ouannes, Militaires, Élites et modernisation, p. 280.

⁷⁴ Ouannes, Militaires, Élites et modernisation, pp. 279–280.

⁷⁵ Ironically, Qadhdhafi years earlier had financed a movie in the English language about Omar al-Moktar and the heroic mujahidin in which an exceptional cast took part: The lion of the desert (1981), directed by Moustapha Akkad, and starring Anthony Quinn, Rod Steiger, Oliver Reed, and Raf Vallone; produced by Anchor Bay Entertainment.

⁷⁸ C. Weulersse (2007) Histoire et révolution en Libye [History and revolution in Libya], in: L'Année du Maghreb [online], II. Available at http://anneemaghreb.revues.org/118; DOI:10.4000/anneemaghreb.118, accessed February 14, 2012.

⁷⁷ In this regard, one may cite the Friendship Agreement between Italy and Libya, which was signed in Benghazi in 2008 by Qadhdhafi and the then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. This was a major achievement for both parties because, in addition to ensuring greater economic cooperation between the two countries, it put an end to the endless litigation on the Italian colonial past in Libya.

⁷⁹ Parteger, Libya: Reforming?, p. 229.

⁸⁰ Agamben, State of exception, p. 88.